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Migration and work: a cross-national comparative analysis of migrant groups and their labor 
experiences, post migration 
by 
Jill Douek 
Advisor: Dr. Charles Scherbaum 
Although there is a large body of literature about migration and employment post 
migration, much of it is limited to study designs restricting either migrant groups or countries. In 
other words, current research is limited to focusing either a) only on one migrant group (usually 
expatriates), thereby failing to compare it to other migrant groups within the same country or 
cross-nationally or b) on multiple migrant groups in one country, thereby making it difficult to 
draw comparisons cross-nationally across those migrant groups. Thus, the purpose of the current 
study was to 1) examine the career-related outcomes, post migration, of three types of migrant 
groups representing a broad array of migrants and 2) to do this cross-nationally using a single 
design and dataset so as to be able to draw cross-national comparisons and conclusions.  
To achieve these objectives, I analyzed data about three migrant groups: Employer 
Sponsored Expatriates (migrants sent on assignment by an employer), Self-Initiated Expatriates 
(migrants who emigrated on their own initiative for work related reasons, without the support of 
an employer), and Asylum Grant Migrants (migrants who relocate out of necessity such as on 





represent a broad range of migration types. Data was acquired from the Eurostat Labor Force 
Survey and its 2014 Ad Hoc module titled “Labor market situations of migrants and their 
immediate descendants” (EULFS) as well as other sources including project GLOBE’s cultural 
dimensions, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), O*NET, 
and the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).  
Using a multilevel design which included a micro (immigrant) level and a macro (country) 
level, I investigated the extent to which to career outcomes (career achievement and financial 
compensation) vary by migrant groups indirectly through human and social capital resources. On 
the micro level, I also examined whether these relationships differed by immigrant gender, 
perceived discrimination (as perceived by the migrants themselves) and cultural distance. Next, I 
examined similar potential moderation relationships using macro (national) level variables. 
These variables include national cultural dimensions (Power Distance, Individualism/ 
Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism), national policies (GDP per capita, Social Expenditure) and 
labor market mobility policies. Analysis was primarily done using a multilevel moderated 
mediation allowing multilevel mediation analyses.  
Results found that both financial compensation and career achievement differed by migrant 
group. Social capital was found to mediate the relationship between migrant status and career 
outcomes. Generally, the direct and indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation 
and career achievement were the most harmful for Asylum Granted Migrants and the least 
harmful for Employer Sponsored Expatriates. Individual level moderators such as gender and 
perceived discrimination were found to affect the career outcomes of each migrant group 
differently. Likewise, the group level cultural values as moderators were largely only impactful 




Ultimately the patterns which emerged from my study offer a foundation for cross-national, 
comparative research on migrant groups. Important implications of my findings for theory and 
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MIGRATION AND WORK 1 
  
Chapter 1 
Introduction of the Problem 
 
The United Nations defines a migrant as any person who is living in a country other than 
their birth country (United Nations [UN] International Migration Report, 2015). Globally, the 
number of migrants is growing and expected to continue to rise for the foreseeable future (UN 
International Migration Report, 2015; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD], 2017). As migration continues to rise, more research is needed around migrants 
integrating into the local workforce (Zimmerman, 2017), including more research about 
migration patterns (from which countries to which countries) and the employment outcomes of 
migrants post migration. The goal of this study was to examine migrant employment success (as 
measured by key employment outcomes of migrants including financial compensation and career 
achievement), post migration and the relationships to a variety of factors (both on the individual 
level and the country contextual level) that precede it. These factors include individual (micro 
level) career-related resources (human and social capital), gender, perceived discrimination (of 
migrants by the migrants themselves), and cultural distance. Contextually (on the national, macro 
level), they include national culture, national policies, and labor market mobility.  
As of 2015, there were an estimated 244 million permanent and temporary migrants 
worldwide, up from 222 million in 2010. The majority (66%) of these 244 million migrants live 
on the European Continent (UN International Migration Report, 2015). Europe in particular has 
been at the forefront of this wave of migration. In 2015, the European Union (EU) recorded 4.7 
million immigrants. Of this group, approximately half were migrating within EU borders, with 
the other half migrating into the EU from non-EU countries. Moreover, in addition to approved 
migration into European countries, in 2015 the EU received a total of 1.5 million applications for 
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asylum, higher than any previous year on record, which resulted in 2015 becoming recognized as 
the beginning of what some call the “European Migration Crisis.” (“EU Migrant Crisis”, 2017).  
The focus of this study will be on 25 European countries in total, for which I have data. 
These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland* and the United Kingdom. 
All countries were members of the European Union in 2014 when these data were collected, 
except for Switzerland.  
Specifically, my study is an examination of migrant groups and their post immigration 
paid labor experiences. I examined three migrant groups, which cover a broad spectrum of 
migrant types. These include Employer Sponsored Expatriates (ESEs) defined as migrants who 
were sent on assignments in other countries by and with the support of their employers (Jokinen 
et al., 2008; Tharenou & Caulfield, 2010), Self-Initiated expatriates (SIEs) defined as migrants 
who immigrated, for an indefinite period, on their own initiative without the support of an 
employer- for employment reasons such as entrepreneurial ventures or in search of work 
(Tharenou & Caulfield, 2010), and Asylum Granted Migrants (defined as asylum seeking 
migrants who have been granted asylum) (AGMs) (Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Migrants, 
n.d.). ESEs are typically professional employees (Stahl & Cerdin, 2004; Thomas et al., 2005; 
Dickmann & Harris, 2005), AGMs are typically low skilled workers (Benach et al., 2012), and 
SIEs may fall into either skill category (Jokinen et al., 2008; Tharenou & Caulfield, 2010).  
The majority of migrants (ranging from 60% of migrants in Spain to 84% of migrants in 
Switzerland) are engaged in some kind of paid employment (OECD, 2018). Yet more specific 
and comparable cross-national data, pertaining to different types of migrants who work post 
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migration (e.g. self-initiated expatriation, migration in search of part time work) and their 
experiences is not available (Ollier- Malaterre & Foucreault, 2017). Existing scholarship has 
been criticized for its narrow focus and limited insights into paid labor experiences post 
international migration (Doherty et al, 2013). The primary focus of much of the literature 
examining paid labor and migration has been on ESEs and would not generalize to the larger 
group of migrants who lack employer support for their moves, such as SIEs. Additionally, the 
scholarly community still has not addressed the much-needed theoretical understanding about 
asylum seekers (defined as migrants who seek legal physical or legal protection) and SIEs, which 
are large and growing groups, due to the limited prior research and scholarship addressing their 
unique issues and concerns (Al Ariss & Ozbilgin, 2010; Cangiano, 2014; Doherty et al., 2011; 
Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Migrants, n.d.). Lastly, studies examining migrants in general 
are often focused on one country or migrant population, and therefore do not provide the 
opportunity to compare findings cross nationally (Ollier- Malaterre & Foucreault, 2017). In light 
of this need for more research on specific migrant groups Al Ariss and Ozbilgin (2010) as well 
as Doherty and colleagues (2011) have both recently called for more research about the work-
related adjustment responses of immigrants into their adopted countries, with a specific focus on 
the SIEs and AGMs.  
Thus, in an effort to contribute to the literature surrounding different types of 
immigration, this study will examine the three aforementioned migrant groups (ESE, SIE, AGM) 
and their experiences in the workforce, post immigration. My research will compare the financial 
compensation (from paid labor) and the career achievement resulting from the integration of 
immigrants into the labor market of the EU host country within a multilevel cross-national 
comparative framework. Specifically, work outcomes were compared for the three 
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aforementioned groups (ESEs, SIEs, AGMs), post immigration, both within and between 
migrant groups (see full study model in Figure A, below). Within group comparisons are those 
which represent individuals (migrants in the case of my study). Between group comparisons 
represent groupings (migrants grouped by country).  
First, on the micro level, immigrant characteristics of each group (ESE, SIE, AGM) and 
their relationships to Human Capital (HC) resources and Social Capital (SC) resources will be 
examined. HC and SC will also be posed as variables explaining the relationship between 
immigrant type and career outcomes. HC resources consist of an individual’s knowledge, skills, 
abilities and other productivity related factors such as work experience and education (Becker, 
1962). SC resources include one’s individual network of social connections which can aide a 
migrant in achieving labor related objectives (Coleman, 1990). Both of these variables have been 
shown to predict employment outcomes in the broader career literature. Next, I will investigate 
characteristics and experiences of migrants measured at the individual level including gender, 
perceived discrimination, and cultural distance to see if they alter the strength or direction of 
central relationships proposed in the model. I will then do the same for country context variables 
such as national culture, national policies and labor market mobility policies.  
The findings of my study are intended to be useful for scholars as they fill the existing 
aforementioned gaps in the scholarly literature and may open new directions for scholarship. The 
recent influx of low skilled labor into the EU is creating political and policy debates within the 
European Union about how best to integrate asylum seekers and low skilled migrants 
(Zimmerman, 2017). This coupled with an increasing need for high skilled workers in Europe 
(brought on by technological change and an ageing European population) (Zimmerman, 2017) is   
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creating increasingly polarized and politicized debates in various European countries about how 
to best manage migrants both legally and socially (Zimmerman, 2017). The study was designed 
to enhance our understanding of differences in employment outcomes for different types of 
migrant groups as well as different types of countries, which will hold the potential to inform 
broader national policy creation within the European Union. Additionally, the findings may have 
practical implications, such as offering a better understanding of what mechanisms may enable 
migrants to achieve job success post immigration across a spectrum of skill levels and cultural 
origins of migrants can be of use for the creation of European immigration policies for each 
group.  
In order to ensure an accurate representation of the European migrant population, an 
effort was made to use data for this study that is representative of the migrant population entering 
Europe in recent years. The sample consisted of the three aforementioned immigrant groups 
(SIE, ESE, AGM). Data was acquired through the 2014 Eurostat Labor Force Survey (EULFS) 
and its Ad Hoc module titled “Labor Market Situations of Migrants and Their Immediate 
Descendants.” The EULFS was selected because it is likely to provide the data most 
representative of the immigrants that this study examined. It is the largest European household 
sample survey, providing annual data on labor force participation of people ages 15 and over and 
on persons outside the labor force. The proposed model and its variables will be discussed in 
depth in the chapters that follow. The EULFS, in particular, is discussed in more detail in chapter 
4.  
In chapter 2 I will discuss the individual level (micro-level) literature. This chapter 
includes a detailed explanation of each migrant group, a literature review of career-related 
resources (human capital and social capital) in the context of different immigrant types, and a 
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discussion of gender, perceived discrimination (as perceived by the migrants themselves), and 
their possible moderating effects on the relationships between immigrant type, career-related 
resources, and career outcomes.  
Chapter 3 will primarily address the country level (macro-level) variables. This chapter 
details national cultural values using project GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior effectiveness) (House et al., 2004). It also discusses national social expenditure, GDP 
per capita, and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which indexes the conditions that 
a legal migrant has to fulfill in European countries, in order to participate economically and 
politically in the life of their respective host societies. Lastly, Cultural Distance (CD) will be 
discussed in this chapter. Cultural Distance is the degree to which cultural values in one country 
are different from values in another country (Kogut & Singh, 1988). The relationship between 
CD and migrants will be examined at a micro (individual) level. However, CD will be addressed 
in chapter 3 because the measure of CD, as it is generally used, is dependent on Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980), which are also discussed in chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 will provide a detailed explanation of the methods by which I tested my 
predictions. This chapter includes information about my dataset, participants, measures, and 
analytic strategy. The chapter will also provide sample details such as sample size by country or 
by age as well as details explaining my measures on both the micro and macro level. It also 
explains how cultural distance scores were calculated. Lastly it explains how MLMED was used 
and why certain model paths were or were not tested using MLMED.  
Chapter 5 provides the study results. These include the results of the preliminary analyses 
on both the micro and macro levels, the results of my main analyses, and explanations of how 
data were used with MLMED.  
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Lastly Chapter 6 is the discussion chapter. This chapter provides a brief recap of my 
study and study results. It then discusses my findings, patterns which emerged from my findings, 
empirical contributions, practical implications, study limitations, suggestions for future research 











Review of the Micro Level Literature 
 
As introduced in the previous chapter, each of the three migrant groups (Self-Initiated 
Expatriates, Employer Sponsored Expatriates, and Asylum Granted Migrants) have potentially 
different reasons for migration. The motivators of migration are usually employment related 
among SIEs and ESEs, but not among AGMs (Mayblin, 2013; Jokinen et al., 2008; Tharenou & 
Caulfield, 2010). In this chapter, I will elaborate on this idea. I will begin by discussing each 
migrant group in more detail. Specifically, as I detail below, both the impetus for and typical 
experiences post migration vary across migrant groups. ESEs and SIEs are motivated to relocate 
based on career or personal desires (e.g., desire to further their careers, high appetite for risk) 
(Doherty et al., 2011; Richardson & Mallon, 2005) while AGMs relocate out of necessity (e.g., 
on grounds of fear or persecution) (“Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants”, n.d.). 
This chapter also includes a discussion of the individual-level variables which may relate 
to the relationship between the motivators of migration and the outcomes posed in my model 
(financial compensation and career achievement). These variables, often found in the broader 
career literature rather than the migrant literature (as work related migrant literature is limited), 
include human capital, social capital, migrant gender, and perceptions of discrimination (as 
disclosed by the migrant). Human capital resources consist of an individual’s knowledge, skills, 
abilities and other productivity related factors (e.g. work experience, education) (Becker, 1962). 
Social capital resources are the tools in one’s individual network of social connections. These 
social connections can aide a migrant in achieving labor related objectives (Coleman, 1990). 
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Each of the three migrant groups I discuss in this paper are likely to have different experiences 
post migration.  
A Typology of Migrant Groups 
Self-initiated Expatriates  
Engaging in self-initiated expatriation has been empirically and conceptually related to a 
Protean Career Attitude (De Vos & Soens, 2008; Doherty et al., 2011). Individuals with a 
Protean Career Attitude believe that their careers are flexible, often self-directed, proactive at 
managing their vocational development, and are motivated by their own career values and 
subjective idea of career success (Hall, 1996). Empirically holding a protean career attitude has 
been found to be associated with levels of career self-management, objective career success 
(based in objective indicators of success such as organizational position or attained promotions) 
(Arthur et al., 2005; Bozionelos, 2004) and subjective career success, (individual feelings of 
satisfaction or accomplishment related to one’s job) (Cerdin & Selmer, 2014; De Vos & Soens, 
2008).  
Conceptually SIEs are considered internationally mobile individuals who moved to 
another country in search of work on their own agency (rather than being sent abroad by a 
company) (Al Ariss & Crowly-Henry, 2013). They are viewed as self-starters (Niles et al., 2002) 
who generally prefer to “make their own way” (Jokinen et al., 2008) and are more proactive in 
seeking international employment than ESEs (Cerdin, 2013; Doherty et al., 2013; Suutari & 
Brewster, 2000; Tharenou & Caulfield, 2010) They generally also have a higher appetite for risk 
than ESEs (Richardson & Mallon,2005) with their intent to stay abroad being either temporary or 
long term (Cerdin & Selmer, 2014).  
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Employer Sponsored Expatriates  
Employer sponsored expatriates are employees who volunteer or agree to be transferred 
by their employer to a foreign subsidiary for a set period of time (Black & Gregersen, 1999). 
Contrary to the self-initiated expatriate who moves abroad due to self-directed career 
management, employer sponsored expatriates move abroad due to the anticipated impact of the 
move on their career within their immediate organization (Doherty et al., 2011).  
Doherty and colleagues (2011) argue that traditional career arrangements (e.g., 
hierarchical promotion within the same organization) are not important in shaping career 
behavior and mobility opportunities for ESEs and thereby designate ESEs “boundaryless 
careerists.” Like the protean career attitude, a Boundaryless career attitude is one in which the 
individual is the central career agent (Sullivan, 1999). Boundaryless career experiences can 
transition across occupational and organizational boundaries using both physical and 
psychological mobility (Sullivan & Arthur, 2005). Similarly, other studies of ESEs tend to also 
be theoretically grounded in the boundaryless career paradigm as ESEs have been found to be 
both physically mobile (e.g., between occupations, firms, levels) and psychologically mobile 
(e.g., have the willingness to move across boundaries such as national, cultural, or occupational) 
(Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Shaffer et al., 2012; Sullivan & Arthur, 2005)  
Asylum Granted Migrants  
In contrast to SIEs and ESEs who may migrate for work related reasons, AGMs typically 
seek asylum on the grounds of fear or persecution and have been granted said asylum and some 
legal rights (“Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants, Habitat for Humanity Great Britain”, 
2016). These rights vary by country (“Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants, Habitat for 
Humanity Great Britain”, 2016). AGMs are distinct from asylum seeking migrants who have not 
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been granted asylum. Asylum seeking migrants (also often referred to as refugees) are 
individuals who have not been granted asylum often have access to little or no rights in their 
country of asylum (Lundborg, 2013). 
Upon arrival in their new country, AGMs often face contextual migration challenges 
unique to their immigration status. Many AGMs originate from low income countries (estimated 
gross national income per capita is less than $1,005, such as Afghanistan) or low middle income 
countries (estimated gross national income per capita between $1,006 and $3,955, such as Syria) 
(The World Bank, n.d.) and they often have qualifications (e.g., education, certifications) from 
their home country which require additional, costly, conversion courses and recertification 
processes in their adopted country (Phillimore & Goodson, 2006). Due to the lack of 
transferability of their qualifications, these individuals may find (or prefer to find) low skilled or 
unskilled work (Phillimore & Goodson, 2006) and engage in precarious employment which 
includes unstable work, lack of regular or reliable income, and the absence of workplace rights 
(Benach et al., 2012).  
Receiving asylum is a lengthy process that offers the legal protection of residency, but 
little to no other aide thereby failing to ensure optimal resettlement conditions (Mayblin, 2013; 
Warfa et al., 2012). Moreover, asylum seekers must usually wait for asylum to be granted in 
order to integrate into a paid labor market (Lundborg, 2013) making them, at least temporarily,  
welfare dependent (Mayblin, 2013; Warfa et al., 2012).  
National policies towards asylum seekers and AGMs in European countries are often 
restrictive, complex in nature, and challenging for individuals. Sweden, for example, requires 
that asylum seekers wait for asylum approval status to be granted prior to finding paid labor. 
However, Sweden also requires that immigrants wishing to enter the Swedish labor force have 
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paid labor arrangement in Sweden prior to immigration into the country (Lundborg, 2013). 
Moreover, most migrants into Sweden not seeking asylum are employed or have employment 
arrangements prior to arrival (Lundborg, 2013). Thus, Sweden’s restrictive policies and the 
influx of qualified labor into the Swedish market make integration into the labor market 
exceptionally difficult for AGMs (Lundborg, 2013). 
The United Kingdom offers another example of restrictive policies. In the United 
Kingdom, asylum seekers can apply for permission to work only after waiting at least 12 months 
for a decision on their asylum claim and only if they are not considered responsible for the delay 
in decision making (Gowers, 2020). Once granted permission to work, asylum seekers can only 
hold a job that is permissible per the United Kingdom shortage occupation list, thereby 
restricting the types of industries and roles in which the seekers can work (Gower, 2020). Further 
complicating the situation for AGMs, these work permits expire once a decision has been made 
about the asylum status of the seeker. In other words, individuals who are granted asylum must 
search for a new job as they can no longer work in their prior role (Gowers, 2020). 
These types of policies are exceedingly challenging for AGMs looking to engage in paid 
labor as early establishment in the labor market is important for success in future employment 
situations (Rooth, 1999). Moreover, late or challenged entrance into the labor market often 
implies poor labor market success (Rooth, 1999). Additionally, AGMs are less likely to be hired 
and have longer unemployment periods despite evidence that immigrants are no less active in 
their job search than are the locals within the country (Arai, 1999). Overall, it appears that 
AGMs face challenges both contextually (e.g., restrictive policies) and individually (the effect of 
these policies) when seeking employment, that are unlikely to be faced by other types of 
immigrants. 
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Human Capital and Social Capital 
 
Human Capital  
Human capital theory was initially introduced by Becker (1962). It argues that economic 
productivity is a result of a collection of knowledge, skills, and abilities embodied within a 
person and which the person can use to generate earnings (Becker, 1962). It assumes a calculated 
relationship between the existing labor market and peoples’ knowledge, skills, and abilities, such 
that occupation and wage levels directly correspond with human capital acquisition (Becker, 
1993). In other words, the theory argues that those with greater human capital have greater 
resources to offer employers in the market and therefore are presumed to earn greater rewards 
such as more prestigious jobs and higher income (Becker, 1993). Thus, Becker argued that as 
human capital increases, so does one’s competitive advantage in the labor force.  
Human capital resources are dynamic. According to Becker, professional experience (e.g. 
learning on the job) is one of the primary types of investment in human capital which influences 
wages (Becker, 1993). Individuals can choose to invest in their own human capital (e.g. 
education, skill development) for their professional development, thereby potentially improving 
their productivity and increasing their human capital resources (Schultz, 1961). Many 
immigrants (e.g., ESEs, SIEs) choose to invest in their professional development by accepting 
work abroad (Collings et al., 2011). 
Social Capital  
Social capital is any aspect of social structure which creates value or provides tangible 
and intangible resources (e.g., access to information, sponsorships), and aides the actions of 
individuals within that social structure (Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1990; Siebert, Kraimer & 
Liden, 2001). It is acquired through membership in a social group (Bourdieu, 1985; Portes, 1993) 
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and although it cannot be economically quantified (Fernandez et al., 2000; Aguilera & Massey, 
2002), it can facilitate one’s ability to make use of relationships with other people to improve 
economic well-being (Portes, 1995). 
There is evidence that the greater in size one’s social network, the easier it becomes to 
find a job (Calvo-Armengol & Jackson, 2004). This argument is aligned with social capital 
theory which proposes that as quantity and quality of labor market information stemming from 
one’s social network increases, so do labor market advantages (Coleman, 1990). Access to social 
networks may provide differential job-related information such as the knowledge of jobs only 
available through that network (Aguilera, 2002). Social networks also provide their members 
with helpful knowledge and help their members utilize this knowledge and socialize to the local 
environment (Bresman et al., 2010; Ranft & Lord, 2002; Zander & Zander, 2010).  
 Having access to superior information can lead to labor market advantages (Coleman, 
1990) such as salaries and career satisfaction (Siebert et al., 2001). However, the amounts of 
social capital resources will vary between individuals and groups as resources are not distributed 
equally between social networks or across individuals in those networks (Aguilera, 2002; 
Bourdieu, 1985; Putnam, 2000). The access to resources that a SC network provides can be 
influenced by a variety of factors including the strength of the relationships (e.g., strong or weak 
ties) (Granovetter, 1973), individual factors which help maintain interpersonal interactions (e.g., 
social skills, trust, reciprocity) (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Bourdieu, 1985) and social group 
distinctions (ethnicity, gender) (Lin, 1999). 
Strength of social relationships, for example, vary both the breadth and quality of the 
social network. Strong ties are characterized by regular and deep emotional involvement (e.g., 
with family, friends) and are usually based on similarities between people (actual or perceived). 
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Weak ties are defined by relationships in which the two parties have less frequent social contact 
(i.e., acquaintances) (Granovetter, 1973).  
Having strong ties is not always beneficial to one’s use of a social network for career 
development. On the one hand, strong ties can facilitate greater access to social and emotional 
support, thereby increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes in social or economic 
transactions (Coleman, 1990). On the other hand, strong ties may result in the exclusion of others 
who are deemed different from the group thereby restricting access to broader social interactions 
(Putnam, 2000). Weak ties generally provide the individual with a wider social network than 
close ties, which may be beneficial to employment outcomes, as the individual can gain a greater 
variety of information from these contacts (Granovetter, 1973).  
As mentioned above, social distinctions also alter the quality of one’s social capital 
network. Women, for example, often establish close ties with family and friends, whereas men’s 
social ties are more frequently work related. This means that women’s social contacts are often 
less relevant to the labor market and less likely to provide employment related information 
(Parks-Yancy, DiTomaso, & Post, 2008). Similarly, there is evidence that racial or ethnic 
minorities often have work related social ties that are lower in both quantity and quality (status of 
ties, closeness of parties) than white males (James, 2000).  
Typically, greater quality social capital (e.g., access to individuals or social groups which 
hold high ranking positions in the workplace), will improve people’s access to resources (both 
social and professional) which can result in better (i.e., more profitable outcomes) for careers 
(Lin, 1999). Conversely, workers with limited or deficient personal networks may lack 
knowledge of appropriate local employment protocol and practices (Fernandez- Kelly, 1995; 
Uzzi, 1999).  
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Human Capital, Social Capital and Employer Sponsored Expatriates 
  Among individuals who move abroad for work related reasons (ESEs, SIEs), there is 
evidence of substantial differences, both in the way that their labor move is managed (i.e., ESEs 
are managed by the organization, SIEs are self-managed) (Doherty & Dickmann, 2013) and in 
their subjective experiences in their adopted country (Agha-Alikhani, 2016; Nasholm, 2014). 
Foreign assignments for employees within an organization (i.e., in the case of ESEs) are 
important to organizations’ strategic goals (e.g., by transferring knowledge and skills overseas, 
increasing local control within the organization abroad, instilling company culture abroad) 
(Mendenhall et al., 2001) and typically require an investment of double or triple the employee’s 
salary by the organization (O’Neill et al., 2009). ESEs often receive more organizational support 
(e.g., training in the foreign language and culture, access to a social network abroad) than SIEs 
(Dickmann et al., 2016) although this is not always the case (Morris & Robie, 2001). Moreover, 
ESEs will have a job upon arrival in their country of migration (Suutari & Brewster, 2000) and 
often have higher hierarchical positions than SIEs (Jokinen et al., 2008).  
Yet, prior empirical research suggests that an expatriate assignment is not necessarily 
predictive of an employee’s job success (Bolino, 2007). There is inconclusive evidence in the 
literature on expatriation experiences and their impact on job successes (Dickmann & Doherty, 
2008; Ramaswami et al., 2016). Similarly, there is limited empirical research exploring social 
capital and ESEs (Jokinen et al., 2008; Tharenou, 2013). Moreover, empirical relationships 
touting the benefits of the expatriate assignment on the development of human and social capital 
are inconsistent (Adler, 1981; Caligiuri & DiSanto, 2001; Kohonen, 2008; Kramer, 2005; Tung, 
1998). Some scholars argue that employees with foreign work experience are likely to 
experience greater internal and external future career opportunities than those without foreign 
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work experience (Benson & Pattie, 2008). But others argue that there is little research on the 
development of human and social capital during international assignments (Jokinen, 2010), 
possibly in part, because the skills and lessons learned abroad may not transfer easily to new 
contexts (Peltokorpi, 2008; Selmer, 2002).  
ESEs may often not have a choice of destination and may go to places that they find 
unattractive (e.g., countries where they do not speak the language, distant from relatives or 
friends) or culturally different (Suutari & Brewster, 2000). They may have a difficult time 
adjusting to local rules and norms and integrating with the local community (Peltokorpi, 2008). 
In line with this idea, Lyness and Thompson (2000), for example, did not find a significant 
relationship between international assignment and objective career success (defined as 
compensation and level of management hierarchy attained). Collectively, the inconclusive 
evidence suggests that more scholarly research is recommended to better understand the 
experiences of ESEs.  
Human Capital, Social Capital, and Self-initiated Expatriates 
 Among SIEs, scholarly research on the human and social capital amassed by self-
initiated expatriates is very limited (Jokinen et al., 2008; Shaffer et al., 2012; Tharenou, 2013). 
Moreover, a review of existing literature shows that the effects of immigration on the 
immigrants’ usable human and social capital (consisting of both the human capital that 
immigrants bring with them and the native adjustments they make when abroad) are theoretically 
and empirically ambiguous and contradictory (Boheme & Kuos, 2017). 
Some scholars have found that self-initiated expatriation is, in fact, beneficial to human 
capital development, employability, and promotion opportunities. Richardson and Mallon 
(2005), for example, reported that international experience increases the self-initiated 
MIGRATION AND WORK 19 
 
 
expatriate’s employability in the job market as well as the promotion opportunities after 
expatriation. Shaffer and colleagues (2012) argued that self-initiated expatriates developed 
knowing how career competencies defined as competencies reflective of job related knowledge 
and career relevant skills (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1994). Likewise, Chiswick and Miller (2008) 
argue that migrants with high levels of skill, regardless of formal education level, carefully select 
their migration location. This may be in part because SIEs’ openness to foreign experiences and 
proactivity in seeking work abroad is high (Andresen et al., 2014; Suutari & Brewster, 2000) as 
is their level of agency or personal investment (Peltokorpi, 2008).  
SIEs often search for destinations where their skills are more valuable than where they 
are and where they are likely to achieve labor market outcomes which are more profitable than 
what they could achieve at home (Kan, 1999; Khwaja, 2002). Their decision to move is 
conditional upon a higher expected return from moving as opposed to staying (Kan, 1999; 
Khwaja, 2002). SIEs, unlike ESEs, may also have more choices of destinations and thus may go 
to places that they find attractive (e.g. familiar culture or language, easy travel or close, where 
they already have a network) (Suutari & Bewster, 2000). This means that SIEs are likely to 
generate better local adjustment and integration, thereby improving their social capital 
(Peltokorpi, 2008).  
Yet other research diverges from the findings above. In a study examining income gains 
across migrants within Sweden, Korpi and Clark (2015) compared percentage increases in 
income among SIE with different education backgrounds. They found that the largest percentage 
of increases in income among SIEs consist of income captured by the highest educated sample 
(post-secondary education or higher) when compared to others who had lower levels of 
education (e.g., primary, secondary). Moreover, in some cases (i.e., individuals with a bachelor’s 
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degree or higher who move to a non-metropolitan area) migration resulted in a reduced income. 
SIEs, unlike ESEs, often lack social networks abroad and consequently need to build their social 
capital in their host environment (Farh et al., 2010; Reiche et al., 2011). They are also likely to 
receive less organizational support than ESEs (Agha-Alikhani, 2016). As a result, they have 
more difficulty accessing positions and jobs where such connections are important (Peltokorpi & 
Froese, 2009).  
Part of the challenge with studying the human and social capital aggregation of SIEs is 
that migrant skills acquired in one’s home country may lack transferability or may not be 
recognized in their adopted country (Boheme & Kuos, 2017). Similarly, migrants may face 
situations where their education (from their home country) has provided them with knowledge or 
skills not needed in their new country (Boheme & Kuos, 2017). Thus, not unlike the literature 
about ESEs, more scholarly research is clearly needed to better understand the experiences of 
SIEs post migration.  
Human Capital, Social Capital, and Asylum Granted Migrants 
Among AGMs, the migration experience is drastically different than that of SIEs or 
ESEs. AGMs are unlikely to be migrating for job related purposes. For many asylum seekers, 
their identities, social roles, employment, and networks are abruptly severed when they depart or 
flee their homeland (Colic-Peisker & Walker, 2003). The acculturation process can be especially 
difficult for those moving to culturally distant countries such as AGMs moving from non-
western countries moving to western countries and cultures (Colic-Peisker & Walker, 2003).  
This task of adapting to their new environment is often difficult and costly in human 
capital, in part, because of immigrants’ unfamiliarity with labor regulations in host countries and 
lack of existing social networks (Chiswick & Miller, 2009). This was evidenced by Kalter and 
MIGRATION AND WORK 21 
 
 
Kogan (2014), for example, who examined the integration of Jewish refugees from the former 
Soviet Union into Germany. They found that job search strategies among underprivileged 
migrants (e.g., AGMs) differed from those of the native population. In searching for paid labor, 
these migrants targeted jobs below their skill and education levels and which were often low 
paying. As a result, they often worked unskilled labor or jobs for which they were overqualified 
and underpaid, despite their education levels (which were often higher than needed for these 
jobs). Similarly, Chiswick and Miller (2009) argued that job search strategies and education 
credentials are not always transportable internationally and thus contribute to a faulty 
transferability of human capital across borders. This was further evidenced by Colic-Peiker & 
Walkers (2003) who found that AGMs in Australia who possess a high level of human capital 
are often frustrated in their attempts to find appropriate work in their new labor market. Many of 
them are also underemployed. 
Among AGMs, formal employment is an important step which can help reduce welfare 
dependency and improve individuals’ well-being (Pernice & Brook, 1996; Ward et al., 2001). 
AGMs’ labor market integration- that is, securing and maintaining any type of formal 
employment has been identified as one of the primary goals and desirable outcomes at both the 
individual and societal levels (Battisti et al., 2019; Correa-Velez et al., 2010; OECD, 2016; 
Worbs et al., 2017). Yet, little research has focused on the social capital available to AGMs in 
the context of labor market integration (Gericke et al., 2018). The existing studies are 
inconsistent in their findings. 
 Cheung & Phillimore (2013) found that the mere possession of social network is not 
enough to find employment, however, the absence of social network does have a detrimental 
effect on access to work. Drever and Hoffmeister (2008) found that social capital is helpful to 
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migrants and refugees as it may compensate for lack of social qualifications and help AGMs gain 
access to the labor market. Contrarily, Potocky- Tripodi (2014) compared the effects of social 
capital and human capital on AGMs’ employment and found that social capital provides much 
less benefit to AGMs’ employment status than human capital. In other words, human capital was 
much more beneficial to the advancement of an AGM’s career. Collectively, it appears that from 
both the human and social capital lenses, integration into the labor market is challenging for 
AGMs.  
Therefore, after considering the contradictory nature of the ESE and SIE literature and 
the challenges faced by AGMs post migration, I pose that both the accumulation of human and 
social capital as well as the career achievement and financial compensation of each group (ESEs, 
SIEs, AGMs) are likely to be different, based on the experiences of each migrant group. 
Specifically, I hypothesize:  
H1: AGMs will have lower levels of H1a) HC resources and H1b) SC resources than 
either ESEs or SIEs 
RQ1: Are there differences between ESEs and SIEs in the levels of RQ1a) HC Resources 
and RQ1b) SC Resources? 
H2: HC resources positively relate to H2a) financial compensation and H2b) career 
achievement such that migrants with more HC will have greater financial compensation and 
career achievement  
H3: SC resources positively relate to H3a) financial compensation and H3b) career 
achievement such that migrants with more SC will have greater financial compensation and 
career achievement  
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H4: HC resources mediate the relationship between immigrant type and H4a) financial 
compensation H4b) career achievement 
H5: SC resources mediate the relationship between immigrant type and H5a) financial 
compensation H5b) career achievement 
Gender, Human Capital, and Social Capital  
Nearly half of global migrants worldwide are female (O’Neil et al., 2016). Yet, median 
annual earnings of women around the world continue to be lower than those of their male 
counterparts (World Economic Forum, 2016), with the global gender wage gap not expected to 
close until the year 2186 (World Economic Forum, 2016).  
There is an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the extent to which the gender wage 
gap reflects the results of different working patterns of men and women, behaviors by each 
gender, or stereotypes and assumptions about each gender (Lips, 2012; Correll et al, 2007). On 
the one hand Becker (1985) argues that the gender wage gap reflects different working patterns, 
that is differing employment investment by each gender (e.g., women are more likely than men 
to have breaks in their employment such as temporary leaves from work or delayed education, 
usually due to childbirth and childcare) (Goldin, 2014). As a result, there are differences in 
human capital development which are products of women’s behavior. On the other hand, Social 
Role Theory (Eagly, 1987) argues that men and women are distributed into breadwinner and 
homemaker roles, respectively. This distribution results in stereotypes (general expectations of 
how certain groups of people behave or should behave) (Eagly & Karau, 2002) pertaining to 
each gender and their expected behaviors. As a result, stereotypes and assumptions about women 
can interfere with women’s acceptance into paid labor roles, advancement within organizations, 
and human capital development. For example, explorations of gender-based discrimination 
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against women found that female employees may have inferior access to job specific trainings 
and promotions due to unfair perceptions and practices that favor male workers, challenging their 
access to improving their human and social capital (Ahmed & McGillivray, 2015; Menon & 
Rodgers, 2009). Similarly, among ESEs, international assignments are often granted to high level 
employees which are more likely to be male (Baruch et al., 2013; Shaffer et al., 2012). 
Globally, recent immigration policies emphasize human capital as a measure of a 
migrant’s worth and economic self-sufficiency (Li, 2003). Components such as education, 
qualifications, and industry of employment are considered when applying for immigration to 
many countries within Europe making it increasingly difficult for SIEs to migrate without the 
proper criteria. (“Moving to the European Union?”, 2016). Human capital grants access to higher 
levels of career achievement and financial compensation (Bertrand et al., 2010; Noonan & 
Corcoran, 2004), but it is not distributed evenly among men and women. 
 Not unlike human capital, there are gender differences in the acquisition and 
maintenance of social capital networks among men and women. Social capital networks vary by 
gender where women’s networks are typically smaller, more homogenous, lower in the 
professional hierarchy, than those of men (Lee, 2010; Lin, 2000). Women, and by extension, 
their networks, tend to work in smaller and more localized organizations (Lin, 2000). This, in 
part, reduces social capital when compared to that of men often lowering productivity and wages 
(Blau & Kahn, 2015). Given the gender differences in access to and acquisition of human and 
social capital, I pose the following: 
H6: Gender moderates the relationship between immigrant type human and social capital 
such that being male will result in higher levels of H6a) human capital and H6b) social capital 
for AGMs than for SIEs and ESEs.  
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H7: Gender moderates the relationship between career-related resources and career 
outcomes such that being male will result in higher levels of both H7a) financial compensation 
and H7b) career achievement for SIEs when compared to AGMs and ESEs.  
RQ2: How will the effect of gender on RQ2a) career-related resources and RQ2b) career 
outcomes differ by immigrant type? 
Perceived Discrimination, Human and Social Capital 
 General consensus in European scholarship is that differences in culture, religion, and 
ethnicity, not race (as perceived in American literature), motivate the majority of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Europe (Fekete, 2004; Peach & Glebe, 1995; Zolberg & Long, 1999). Put another 
way, it is the languages or dialects spoken by immigrants (Brubaker, 2001), their religious 
practices (Alba, 2005; Foner & Alba, 2008), and their actual national origin (or the national 
origin perceived by others) (Dancygier & Laitin, 2014) which motivate these anti-immigrant 
perspectives.  
The classic assimilation paradigm states that immigrants are discriminated against partly 
because of their cultural differences. However, as immigrants become more familiar with local 
culture and language, they become more acceptable to the native majority and therefore, face less 
discrimination (Bach, 1978; Portes et al., 1980; Warner & Srole, 1945). Yet other existing 
theories of immigrant adaptation predict that immigrants will face discrimination or perceive 
discrimination, regardless of the mechanism by which they acculturate (Alba, 2005; Fekete, 
2004, Peach & Glebe, 1995; Zolberg & Long, 1999).  
A study conducted with three rounds of data collection (2002, 2004, and 2006) from the 
European Social Survey (a biennial, cross-national survey of attitudes and behavior towards 
immigration, human values, media and social trust, politics and more) (“The European Social 
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Survey”, n.d.) on 13 European countries’ data found that even after extended stays, immigrants 
consistently report lower life satisfaction and reduced feelings of social integration (even after 
spending 20 years in the adopted country) than natives. This was attributed by the migrants to 
perceptions of discriminatory treatment, post migration. Moreover, this effect did not disappear 
with the second generation. Children of immigrants also report lower life satisfaction and 
reduced feelings of social integration that native peers their age. This held especially true for 
immigrants who reported being from a religion that is a minority in the country to which they 
migrated (e.g., Jews and Muslims in primarily Christian nations) and those who report migrating 
from a distinctly culturally different country (e.g., Asians and Turks who migrated to western 
European countries) (Safi, 2009) 
While it is difficult to assess the actual prevalence of discrimination-as the disadvantages 
faced by immigrants in many domains may be attributable to many factors (e.g., assimilation or 
lack thereof, language barriers) and these disadvantages vary by country-it is clear that there are 
anti-immigrant sentiments in European countries (International Migration Outlook, 2013). This 
is due to the well documented research which shows preferences in the workforce, housing 
markets, and education systems towards non-migrants (International Migration Outlook, 2013).  
Studies in Greece (comparing Greek locals to Albanian immigrants) (Drydakis & Vlassis, 
2007), Ireland (comparing Irish locals to African, Asian, and German immigrants) (McGinnity & 
Lunn, 2011), Norway (comparing Norwegian locals to Pakistani immigrants) (Midtboen, 2012), 
and the Netherlands (comparing Dutch locals to Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, and Antillean 
immigrants) (Andriessen et al., 2012), all provide examples of discriminatory behavior in the 
workplace against migrants across differing qualification levels (entry level, low, medium, and 
high skilled jobs). Each of these researchers submitted identical resumes and/or qualifications to 
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job applications with variations in applicant names or identifying information (i.e., responses to 
background questions) such that the resume was either that of a local or an immigrant and found 
evidence of substantially reduced callbacks for immigrants. Similarly, Dancygier and Laitin 
(2014) found that human resources personnel systematically prefer selecting ethnically similar 
immigrants to ethnically different immigrants for employment.  
Thus, given the assimilation difficulties resulting from perceived discrimination (as 
perceived by the migrants themselves) as well as the existing evidence of actual workplace 
discrimination against immigrants, I pose the following:  
H8: Immigrants’ perceived discrimination moderates the relationship between immigrant 
type and human capital and social capital such that high levels of perceived discrimination will 
lead to lower levels of H8a) human capital and H8b) social capital among AGMs in comparison 
to both SIEs and ESEs.   
H9: Immigrants’ reported perceived discrimination moderates the relationship between 
career-related resources and career outcomes such that higher levels of perceived discrimination 
will lead to lower H9a) financial compensation and H9b) career success for SIEs when compared 
to both ESEs and AGMs.  
RQ3: How will the effects of perceived discrimination on RQ3a) career-related resources 
and RQ3b) career outcomes differ by immigrant type? 
As can be seen in the figure in Figure B, the path from the independent variable (IV) 
(migrant type) to the mediating variables (career-related resources) show the direct effects of the  
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IV on the mediator variables (Hypothesis 1, Research Question 1). The path extending from the 
mediating variables to the dependent variables (DV) (career outcomes) indicates that the 
mediating variables have direct effects on the DV (Hypotheses 2 and 3). The path from the IVs 
to the DVs indicates that the IVs are indirectly related to the DVs via the mediating variables 
(Hypotheses 4 and 5). The line from the moderating variables (gender, perceived discrimination) 
to the path depicting Hypothesis 1 reflects the interaction of the IV and the moderating variable 
on the mediating variables (Hypotheses 6, 8, and 12, and Research Questions 2a, 3a. Similarly, 
the path from the moderating variables to line depicted by Hypothesis 2 represents the second 
stage moderation. That is, the interaction between the moderators and the mediating variables on 
the DVs (Hypotheses 7 and 9; Research Questions 2b and 3b). This model also includes depicts 
the placement of cultural distance (Hypotheses 15, 16 and Research Question 7). However, CD 
will be addressed in more detail in chapter 3.  
This chapter addressed moderated mediation on an individual level of analysis. In the 
following chapter, I will introduce some contextual variables and discuss their relationship to the 
variables introduced in this chapter. These variables include culture and national policies. It is 
important to account for contextual variables when studying migrants cross-nationally for two 
reasons. First, migrants are grouped (nested) in countries. Each country has contextual factors 
such as cultural dimensions or national policies which may alter a variety of elements of the 
migrant’s life (e.g., access to resources, access to the paid labor force). Second, a study such as 
the one I propose which examines migrants cross-nationally allows for a systematic examination 
of career outcomes, post migration as they differ across countries. 
 
  




Review of the Macro Level Literature 
In this chapter, I expand my model beyond individual level variables to include country 
level variables using both a culturalist and a structuralist approach. I chose to include country 
level variables in my study because there is a need in the existing literature for cross-national 
comparative frameworks examining immigrants’ work experiences, post migration (Ollier- 
Malaterre & Foucreault, 2017). Much of the existing cross-national literature around migrant 
integration into the European workforce is limited to a design focused on either a single group of 
migrants (most often ESEs) in multiple countries or in a single country (Brekke & Mastekaasa, 
2008; van Tubergen et al., 2004). These types of designs are restrictive. The do not provide a 
comprehensive cross-national perspective which accounts for the complexities and influences of 
the national environment (e.g., culture, local policies) on the economic integration of immigrant 
groups. Moreover, of the small number that do, it is difficult to draw comparisons and 
conclusions between the studies because their operationalization and theoretical foundations 
differ (Ollier-Malaterre & Foucreault, 2017; Powell et al., 2009).  
Culture is defined as the underlying system of values unique to a particular group or 
society that shapes the development of personality traits and motivates individuals in a society to 
engage in behaviors that may not be evident in another society (Mueller & Thomas, 2001). It is 
this meaningful system of values, understood by members of one culture but not another, which 
differentiates one culture from another. Moreover, the manifestation of national culture in a work 
environment, may lead to differential accumulation of both human and social capital among 
migrants (Mueller & Thomas, 2001).  
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Both the work of Hofstede (1980, 2001) and the work of project GLOBE (House et al., 
2004) are major typologies which have influenced organizational research over the last three 
decades (Erez, 2010) and are still heavily used by researchers today (Venaik & Brewer, 2012).  
Hofstede was the pioneer researcher studying culture and its effects on the management 
of business. Hofstede’s major contribution to the field of cultural research is his development of 
a set of dimensions, which can be measured through survey instruments, to obtain average values 
for a particular group of people (Venaik & Brewer, 2008). Project GLOBE was developed using 
Hofstede’s typology as its foundation (“GLOBE - About the Study”, 2016). Unlike Hofstede’s 
typology, which only has a score for one cultural dimension, project GLOBE’s typology draws 
distinctions between two aspects of cultural values, referred to as “cultural practices” and 
“cultural values” (Erez, 2010). Cultural practices can be thought of as current cultural values. 
They are assessed by surveying respondents about values based on how their society is, referred 
to “as is” questions. In contrast, “cultural values” are assessed by asking respondents’ questions 
about how their society “should be” (“GLOBE- About the Study”, 2016). GLOBE data were 
collected using a multi-phase (including pilot phases), multi-method, multi-sample approach 
spanning 62 countries. Specifically, GLOBE researchers surveyed and interviewed over 17,000 
mid-level managers about the cultural dimensions they believe might influence the behaviors and 
attributes desired of leadership in a society. Multiple analyses were then conducted on these 
scales to ensure their reliability and construct validity, confirming that these scales were uni-
dimensional. Ultimately these data were used to develop both the “as is” and “should be” scores 
for each culture, which assess societal culture and culturally shared implicit theories of 
leadership (House & Dickson, 2004). 
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Although I will not be using Hofstede’s typology directly in this study, I address it above 
(and in other sections of this paper) as it is the foundation on which cultural distance scores are 
commonly calculated (Ambos & Hakanson, 2014; Cuypers et al., 2018; Beugelsdijk et al., 2017; 
Dow & Larimo, 2011; Hakanson & Ambos, 2010; Shenkar et al., 2008). Cultural distance is 
defined as the differences in culture between the migrant’s home country and adopted country 
(Koch et al. 2016). The project GLOBE classification will be used to examine if select cultural 
dimensions alter the strength of the relationship between immigrant type and career-related 
resources. Each will be discussed in greater detail below.  
Structure refers to institutionalized rules, norms, and systems within a country which 
guide human interactions such as those in the work environment or economic relationships 
(Turner, 1997). Examples of structure are legal structures, such as labor laws and economic 
structures such as the degree of industrialization of a country (Turner, 1997). The two forms of 
structure I selected to examine in my research are Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) and 
National Social Expenditure. It is important to note that these forms of structure are not policies 
unto themselves, but rather results of national policies (e.g., monetary policies issued by a 
country’s central bank) (Castle & Ellis, 2002). That is, for example, GDP is a product of national 
monetary policies issued by a country’s central bank. Nevertheless, these outcomes (GDP and 
National Social expenditure) act as indicators of standard of living for both locals and migrants.  
Gross Domestic Product is defined as the total market value of all final good and services 
produced in a country in a given year minus the value of imports (Callen, 2018). In other words, 
it is the total amount of money a country makes. GDP per capita is that total number divided by 
the number of people. It is the measure of the country’s economic output that accounts for its 
number people, making it an indicator of standard of living (OECD, 2018). I to use GDP per 
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capita as a measure of national economic performance because it (along with GDP) has been 
labeled as being among the most important indicators of economic performance in a country 
(OECD, 2018).  
Social expenditure of a country is the extent to which a country aides disadvantaged or 
vulnerable groups. These vulnerable groups may include low income households, unemployed 
individuals, the disabled, and/or sick (Social Expenditure, 2003). Benefits are provided by public 
(e.g., central state or local government) or private institutions and include financial contributions 
(e.g., cash transfers, goods and services, tax breaks) targeted at households or individuals in 
order to provide support during circumstances that adversely relate to the individuals’ welfare 
(Social Expenditure, 2003). There is evidence that increased social expenditure improves 
migrants’ socioeconomic position when compared to migrants in lean welfare markets (Barret & 
Duffy, 2008).  
The following chapter will focus on national culture and policies at the host country. 
First, the chapter will discuss national culture, including the dimensions of The Global 
Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project (House et al., 2004) I 
intend to explore and a discussion of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980) and 
cultural distance. Next, I will address National Policies (including GDP and Social Expenditure). 
Finally, I will introduce the MIPEX index. MIPEX is a composite index that contains 148 policy 
indicators across 38 countries (including the 28 countries in the European Unions as well as non-
European countries such as Canada, South Korea, and Australia, and others) which describe the 
conditions that a legal migrant has to fulfill in order to participate economically and politically in 
the life of their respective host society. This index allows its users to establish whether third 
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country nationals are treated in the same way as locals. As it is a composite index, it will be used 
as an exploratory variable (Migration Integration Policy Index, 2015). 
National Culture 
As stated above, two major typologies heavily influence current organizational research 
and have done so for at least the last three decades (Erez, 2010; Venaik et al., 2012). These 
typologies include work by Hofstede (Hofstede, 1980) and project GLOBE (House et al., 2004).  
Hofstede was the pioneer researcher studying culture and its effects on the management 
of business (Erez, 2010). His work was initially conducted on employees in 40 subsidiaries of 
one multinational company and has continued to expand since (Erez, 2010; Venaik & Brewer, 
2008). Hofstede’s original survey consisted of several items assessing organizational norms and 
asking about the importance of certain organizational outcomes to respondents (Erez, 2010).  
Through his work, cultural research can assess a set of dimensions, which can be measured 
through survey instruments, to obtain average values for a particular group of people (Venaik & 
Brewer, 2008). Hofstede’s typology originally contained four dimensions. The typology as it 
stands today contains the dimensions: Power Distance* (degree to which less powerful members 
of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally), Individualism vs. 
Collectivism* (preference for a loosely knit or tightly knit societal framework), Masculinity vs. 
Femininity* (preference for competitive vs consensus oriented society), Uncertainty Avoidance* 
(degree to which members of society feel uncomfortable with ambiguity or uncertainty), Long 
term vs. Short term orientation (a preference towards maintain traditions and norms vs 
encouraging modernization), and Indulgence vs. restraint (preference towards free gratification 
of natural human drives vs. preference for strict social norms which regulate an suppress 
gratification) (National Culture, 2019). Starred dimensions reflect the original four dimensions. 
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While exiting literature commonly uses Hofstede’s dimensions to calculate Cultural Distance 
(Ambos & Hakanson, 2014; Berry et al., 201; Cuypers et al., 2018; Beugelsdijk et al., 2016; 
Dow & Larimo, 2011; Hakanson & Ambos, 2010; Shenkar et al., 2008), I will be using scores 
from the project GLOBE “as is” typology. Rationale for this and additional information is 
provided in the “cultural distance” section below and in chapter 4 (methods).  
Hofstede’s typology was the primary typology in use in cross-cultural research until 2004 
when the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project was 
published. Project GLOBE is a cross cultural research effort conceived in 1991, which expanded 
on Hofstede’s original work (“GLOBE-About the Study”, 2016). Like Hofstede’s work, it is still 
ongoing (“GLOBE”, 2016). Project GLOBE includes research exploring cultural dimensions 
from 800 organizations in 62 countries and collecting data from over 170,000 managers, senior 
executives, and CEOs. Data was collected using over 200 researchers, many of them local to 
their country, and it is considered the largest study of its kind (“GLOBE”, 2016). Project 
GLOBE is one of the most comprehensive measurements of cultural dimensions to date (House 
et al., 2004). Project GLOBE asked whether leadership characteristics that contribute to the 
leader’s success are universal or culture specific. Moreover, its typology assesses dimensions “as 
is” (what society practices) and how it “should be” (aspires to be) (GLOBE, 2016). In total, nine 
cultural dimensions were identified by the researchers, each presented in two variants (“ as is” 
and “ should be”) (House et al., 2014). I will be using the “as is” (in practice) scores as they 
address the cultural dimensions as they presently exist. The three cultural dimensions of focus in 
this paper are Power Distance (PD), Individualism/ Collectivism (IC) and Gender Egalitarianism 
(GE).  
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PD is defined as the extent to which a country accepts and endorses authority, power 
differences, status privilege, and the agreement that power is equally or unequally shared 
(Chhokar et al., 2007; House et al., 2004). High power distance cultures accept that the hierarchy 
which exists between supervisors and subordinates is legitimate and customary. GE is the degree 
to which gender differences are minimized (Steers et al., 2010). That is to say, in countries with 
high gender egalitarianism, gender inequalities are typically less common. The opposite holds 
true for countries with low gender egalitarianism. I chose to examine PD because existing 
research on power distance in the workplace often explores abusive supervision (and its 
implications on individuals and teams) as well as the relationships between Power Distance and 
employee/ employer contracts (see Chao Cheung et al., 2011; Farh et al., 2007; Lian et al., 2012; 
Wang et al., 2012). However, much less is known about its applications in the context of other 
workplace scenarios (Ozgen, 2012).  
Generally, IC is a societal level construct (Hofstede, 1980) in which individuals in that 
society identify or are identified as members of a group (Hofstede, 1997; House & Javidan, 
2004). In individualistic cultures, people consider themselves and are considered by others as 
autonomous and independent (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012). On the other hand, people in 
collectivistic cultures prefer and reward group membership and group decision making (Triandis 
& Gelfand, 2012).  
Project GLOBE expanded the original definition of IC set forth by Hofstede (1980) and 
refers to IC as two separate dimensions. IC per project GLOBE consists of institutional 
collectivism (INC) and in-group collectivism (IGC). Broadly speaking in-group collectivism 
(IGC) is the degree to which individuals prioritize and refer their in-groups (e.g., organizations, 
families) and to their out-groups. Institutional collectivism (INC) is the degree to which group 
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loyalty is encouraged by the organizational or societal institutions (e.g., government, workplace) 
to which people belong. This distinction is addressed in greater detail in the IC section below 
(House & Javidan, 2004; Marcus & Le, 2013). I chose to examine IC because in-group and 
institutional collectivism are related to an array of workplace related outcomes (e.g., 
organizational embeddedness, person-organization fit) (Andersson et al., 2017; Ballout, 2007; 
Marcus & Lei, 2013) and social outcomes (e.g., in-group belongingness) (Kelly, 2013; Realo et 
al., 2008) which may be related to the acquisition of HC and SC and to career success.  
GE is the degree to which a society promotes gender equality (Steers et al., 2010). 
Countries high on the GE dimension are less adherent to traditional gender roles and divisions of 
labor thereby making men and women’s roles more similar than countries low on the GE 
dimension. Countries low on this dimension are characterized by beliefs about traditional gender 
roles and division of labor (e.g., men are breadwinners, women are caretakers and mothers) 
(Emrich et al., 2004). I chose to examine GE because gender attitudes have been related to an 
array of work-related outcomes such as employment, earnings, and differences in labor market 
integration of male and female migrants (Rubin et al., 2008). GE is different from gender 
discussed in chapter 2 as GE is a contextual cultural variable while gender addresses the 
individuals’ gender (individual level variable). Both of these cultural dimensions (PD and GE) 
and their implications for migrants are discussed below.  
Power Distance  
Power Distance is the degree to which people are (or should be) separated by power, 
authority, and prestige (House et al., 2014; Ozgen, 2012). High power distance indicates a degree 
of tolerance for hierarchical relationships (that is, an order of inequality and privileges for those 
of higher status) whereas low power distance indicates small degree of tolerance (that is, a 
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preference towards equal rights and a minimized inequality between groups) (House et al., 2014; 
Ozgen, 2012).  
 Strong parallels have been established between power distance cultures (a cultural level 
construct) and social dominance orientation (and individual level construct). Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) is a measure of the degree to which one desires their ingroup to dominate and 
be superior to an outgroup (Aiello et al., 2013). In other words, it is one’s support for group 
based hierarchies. SDO tends to increase among people in higher group positions within societies 
(Lee et al., 2011 ) and in organizations (Guimond, 2006) and has been strongly implicated in 
outgroup prejudice and discrimination, including negative attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., the 
perception that immigrants are competing with natives to establish which groups’ culture and 
values are dominant) (Esses et al., 2001; Ward & Masgoret, 2006).  
Similarly, individuals living in high PD cultures also tend to show high tolerance towards 
social inequality (House et al., 2004; Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Waldman et al., 2006). High 
tolerance towards social inequality has been linked to weaker support for policies which promote 
social co-existence. People living in high PD cultures have reduced expectations that companies 
attend to social issues beyond what is mandated by law (Waldman et al., 2006; Ringov & Zollo, 
2007) 
Individuals living in high PD cultures have also been documented as being less willing to 
take risks (risks in general and risks to improve the workplace) than those in low PD cultures. 
This applies to managers within the organization as well as job seekers. Similarly, individuals 
engaged in, or looking to engage in paid labor, are typically less willing to take risks in the work 
environment and often accept and endorse unequal power between groups (Kreiser et al., 2010; 
Shane, 1993).  
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Contrarily, low PD cultures have low tolerance for social inequality and often encourage 
employers to take initiatives to address social needs (beyond what is mandated by law) (Ho et 
al. 2012; McWilliams et al., 2006). Employees also typically face less bureaucracy in low Power 
Distance cultures (when compared to high Power Distance cultures), have an increased level of 
autonomy and engage in more risk-taking behaviors (Kreiser et al., 2010; Shane, 1993).  
The Nordic Cluster of countries, for example, described by project GLOBE (consisting of 
Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) are typically low in PD (both in practice and in values). This 
often manifests in little use of formal titles in the workplace, relaxed dress codes, little to no 
adherence to status (e.g., titles or last names are rarely used when addressing others) and 
egalitarian behavior in the workplace (Warner-Soderholm, 2012).  
Thus, I argue that the acceptance of unequal power between groups, reduced concern for 
social needs, and the lack of risk taking, as is the case in high PD societies (House et al., 2014), 
may create in an environment which makes that integration into both workplace and social 
networks more difficult for migrants in high PD cultures than in low PD cultures. Specifically, I 
hypothesize: 
H10: Migrants in lower power distance cultures will have higher levels of H10a) human 
capital and H10b) social capital than those in higher power distance cultures 
RQ4: Which group, ESEs, SIEs, or AGMs will have higher levels of RQ4a) human 
capital and RQ4b) social capital, as power distance increases?  
Individualism/ Collectivism 
The cultural dimension of individualism/collectivism (IC) was originally conceptualized 
as a societal level construct (Hofstede, 1980) which delineates the extent to which one is 
identified and identifies as an individual or as part of a group (Hofstede, 2001; House & Javidan, 
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2004). In individualistic cultures, people consider themselves and are considered by others as 
autonomous and independent. Moreover, in highly individualistic cultures, personal 
achievement, accountability, specialization, and performance are rewarded in the work 
environment (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012) Contrarily, collectivistic cultures reward stable group 
membership, group decision making and coordination, and the maximization of social aspects of 
one’s job (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012).  
As stated earlier, project GLOBE expanded on Hofstede’s (1997) definition of this 
construct and identifies IC as multi-dimensional, consisting of institutional collectivism (INC) 
and in-group (IGC) collectivism. Broadly speaking, institutional collectivism reflects societal 
norms at a national level whereas in-group collectivism reflects these norms as they are 
displayed by smaller collectives (e.g., family, local team at work) (House & Javidan, 2004; 
Marcus & Le, 2013).  
Specifically, institutional collectivism is the degree to which the local population reward 
and encourage the distribution of benefits (monetary or other) by organizational and societal 
institutions to the collective population (House & Javidan, 2004). Countries high in institutional 
collectivism encourage group loyalty, sometimes at the expense of individual pursuits and 
rewards are distributed with an eye towards group equity. In these countries, duties and 
responsibilities are more important determinants of social behavior and outcomes than individual 
attitudes and needs. These cultures also often have stronger social ties than cultures low on 
institutional collectivism, with social interactions being longer term, sometimes indirect, and 
stronger.  
Having strong institutional collectivism has been associated with strongly defined in-
groups vs. outgroups (Gelfand et al., 2004). Strong relationships between workers in highly 
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collectivistic societies make it so that these countries restrict the benefits for autonomous skill 
development, skill variety, education, and similar human capital. Contrarily, countries low in 
institutional collectivism encourage the pursuit of individual goals, even at the expense of the 
group, often have economic systems which encourage and maximize the interest of individuals 
(House & Javidan, 2004). Thus, it can be argued that cultures high on institutional collectivism 
do not place a premium and may not expect high levels of autonomy or skill variety in their 
workers. They may also place less emphasis on human capital than countries which are high in 
institutional collectivism.  
In-group collectivism is the degree to which individuals prioritize group cohesiveness in 
the organizations or families to which they belong (House & Javidan, 2004). Similar to 
institutional collectivism, cultures high in in-group collectivism make strong distinctions 
between in groups and out groups and judgements about others are a product of group belonging 
(House & Javidan, 2004). Contrarily countries with low in group collectivism emphasize 
personal behavior, needs, and attitudes in making judgments about social behavior (House & 
Javidan, 2004). Due to the emphasis placed on social relationships over personal development in 
high in-group collectivistic cultures (like that of cultures high in institutional collectivism), I 
argue that there may be less of a need for migrants to establish and develop strong human capital 
in cultures high in in-group collectivism than in cultures with low in-group collectivism.  
With regard to the relationship between social capital and in-group or institutional 
collectivism, the patterns are not as obvious. There is substantial evidence that IC as a cohesive 
construct (Hofstede, 1997) (not divided into institutional and in-group collectivism) has an 
inverse relationship with social capital. That is, individuals living in individualistic cultures 
report higher levels of social capital than those living in collectivistic cultures (Allik & Realo, 
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2004; Beilmann et al., 2017). To determine if this pattern is consistent across both in-group and 
institutional collectivism, Realo and colleagues (2008) examined the relationship between the 
two dimensions of IC as defined by project GLOBE and social capital across 45 cultures. They 
found that social capital correlated highly and positively with institutional collectivism practices, 
arguing that in societies where people are encouraged and rewarded for their actions outside of 
the family (such as participating in institutional activities [e.g., voluntary organizations, religious 
services]) there is a stronger trust and participation in activities outside of one’s immediate social 
circles. However, they also found that in-group collectivism is highly, but negatively, correlated 
with social capital. That is, countries with the highest levels of in-group collectivism reported the 
lowest levels of social trust and social capital outside of one’s immediate social circle (Realo et 
al., 2008). The authors argued that among cultures with high in-group collectivism, people tend 
to me be more focused on their in-group than their out-group. As a result, there is generally a 
lower level of trust in people who belong to their out-group, making social capital difficult to 
develop outside of one’s social circles (Realo et al., 2008). 
As literature around INC and human capital tends to show similar patterns to the findings 
studying IGC and human capital (that is, high institutional collectivism and high in-group 
collectivism encourage group loyalty and discourage individual development), I argue that there 
will be an inverse relationship between levels of collectivism (both in-group and institutional) 
and human capital. That is, as collectivism (in-group or institutional) decreases, migrant human 
capital is likely to increase.  
H11: Levels of collectivism (both institutional and in-group) will relate negatively to 
levels of human capital. 
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That is to say, the higher the national levels of collectivism (both institutional and in-group), the 
lower the levels of human capital relative to migrants (of all types) in less collectivistic cultures.  
With respect to the relationship between collectivism and social capital, I argue that the 
aforementioned patterns found by Realo and colleagues (2008) will hold true for migrants. That 
is, there will be an inverse relationship between in-group collectivism and social capital and a 
positive relationship between institutional collectivism and social capital.  
Specifically: 
H12: National levels of institutional collectivism will relate positively to levels of social 
capital. 
That is, the higher the national levels of institutional collectivism the higher the levels of social 
capital in migrants. 
H13: National levels of in-group collectivism will relate negatively to levels of social 
capital, regardless of migrant type. That is, I expect that the higher the national levels of in-group 
collectivism increases, the lower the levels of social capital in migrants.  
As it is difficult to hypothesize how these patterns will hold for the different migrant groups, I 
ask: 
RQ5: As collectivism increases, which immigrant group, ESEs, SIEs, or AGMs will have the  
highest levels of RQ5a) human capital and RQ5b) social capital? 
Gender Egalitarianism 
Gender egalitarianism is the degree to which people’s gender differences are minimized 
(Steers et al., 2010). In other words, countries low on the gender egalitarianism dimension are 
characterized by beliefs about traditional gender roles and division of labor (e.g., men are 
breadwinners, women are caretakers and mothers) whereas countries high on this dimension are 
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less adherent to these roles and have more similarity in men and women’s roles (Emrich et al., 
2004). As stated in my previous chapter, there are nearly equal numbers of male and female 
migrants worldwide (O’Neil et al., 2016). Yet male and female migrants are granted differential 
access to resources (Ahmed & McGillivray, 2015; Baruch et al., 2013; Shaffer et al., 2012; 
Menon & Rodgers, 2009) and are subject to differential stereotyping and treatment by others 
when participating in the paid labor force (Eagly & Karau, 2002).  
Migration patterns indicate that immigrants generally move from countries with less 
gender egalitarian cultures to those with greater equality between the sexes (Ersanilli, 2012; 
Rubin et al., 2008; Röder & Mühlau, 2012), There is also evidence that male and female 
experiences after migration differ.  
Women’s economic activities are positively corelated with the extent of gender 
egalitarianism a society practices (House et al., 2004). Increasing support for gender-egalitarian 
values has been connected to increasing levels of education and female employment (Roder & 
Muhlau, 2014). Additionally, as gender egalitarianism increases, women are increasingly likely 
to enter the labor market, which is accompanied by changes in access to and accumulation of 
social and economic resources, and changes to women’s perception of and actual position in 
society (Fernández-Kelly & Garcia 1990; Roder & Muhlau, 2014).  
Contrarily, immigrant men generally experience a pattern of increased downward 
mobility post migration in the work environment (Fernández-Kelly & Garcia 1990; Roder & 
Muhlau, 2014), including a perceived loss in status and worth. This is accompanied by reduced 
accumulation of and access to social and economic resources (Fernandez- Kelly & Garcia, 1990; 
Idema & Pahlet, 2007). This occurs, in part, because immigrant men who migrate to countries 
that are higher in gender egalitarian values than their home countries and experience unfamiliar 
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gender norms. This results in perceived threat by the men to their social position as a product of 
the changing role of women (Hondagneu- Sotelo, 1994). Others have argued that it occurs 
because these men continue to insist on the gender norms from their home culture and thereby 
struggle to adapt to the new local norms (Arends-Toth & Van der Vijver, 2009).  
 I would like to explore if the aforementioned patterns of work-related outcomes exist in 
among the different groups of migrants found in my dataset. In line with the literature which 
states that women’s place in society and accumulation of social and economic resources improve 
when GE increases, the literature arguing that men often experience downward mobility when 
moving from a low GE to a high GE cultures, and the literature which shows that men and 
women’s position in society is somewhat similar in high GE cultures, I pose that it is possible 
that differences in human and social capital resources will be smaller in high GE cultures than in 
low GE cultures for men and women. Specifically: 
H14: Gender egalitarianism moderate the relationship between the immigrants’ migrant 
status and H14a) human capital resources and H14b) social capital resources such that there are 
smaller gender differences between male and female migrants in high gender egalitarian 
countries than in low gender egalitarian countries.  
RQ6: What effect will immigrant type have on the accumulation of RQ6a) human capital 
resources and RQ6b) social capital resources as gender egalitarianism increases? How will this 
differ across genders? 
Cultural Distance, Human and Social Capital  
Cultural distance posits that cultural differences matter to the adjustment of the 
immigrant in their host nation. Put another way, distance is the extent to which culturally distinct 
entities run up against each other in daily interactions (at the individual, team, organizational, or 
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societal levels) (Koch et al., 2016) and the degree to which cultural values in one country are 
different from those in another (Kogut & Singh, 1988). Increased cultural distance between 
countries may cause immigrants to perceive their host countries as different or “distant” from 
their native country (Dow & Larimo, 2011).  
There is substantial evidence that cultural differences can impede cross-cultural 
cooperation both in an individual’s everyday life as well as in the workplace (Fang, 2012; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Parkhe, 1991; Xu & Shenkar, 2002) with greater differences being more disruptive (Shenkar, 
2008).  
In the work environment, national cultural distance impedes knowledge transfer by 
constraining communication between knowledge acquirers and their sources. In turn, this has 
been found to have a negative effect on employee performance (Reus & Lamont, 2009). The less 
culturally disparate an organization and their team (e.g. as in the case of organizational mergers 
and acquisitions) the better the team member performance (Chakrabarti et al., 2009). It is 
common for immigrants who move abroad for work related reasons (i.e., SIEs, ESEs) to either 
dislike or struggle with working abroad, in part due to differences in culture and challenges in 
communication (Conrad, 2012). AGMs who are employed or searching for work may have 
similar struggles post migration (Slonim- Nevo & Regev, 2015). Therefore: 
H15: Cultural distance moderates the relationship between immigrant type and H15a) 
human capital H15b) and social capital such that migrants experiencing lower levels of cultural 
distance will have higher levels of these resources than those experiencing higher levels of 
cultural distance  
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H16: Cultural distance moderates the relationship between career-related resources and 
career outcomes such that migrants experiencing lower levels of cultural distance will have 
higher H16a) financial compensation and H16b) career achievement than those experiencing 
higher levels of cultural distance. 
RQ7: Does cultural distance have differing effects on RQ7a) career-related resources 
RQ7b) career-related outcomes among ESEs, SIEs, and AGMs? 
National Policies 
The socioeconomic position of migrants, post migration, cannot be fully explained by the 
social composition (e.g., country of origin of migrant) of the migrant population alone (Barrett et 
al., 2013; Buchel & Frick, 2005). Rather, a broader understanding is needed relating to the 
interplay of country wealth (e.g., GDP), institutional factors (e.g., social welfare policies, 
immigration policies, labor market regulations) and the benefits and/or assistance afforded to 
migrants, post migration (Hooijer & Picot, 2015). Both GDP per capita and Social Expenditure, 
contextual level country variables, are addressed below. 
GDP Per Capita 
GDP per capita is an indicator of a country’s prosperity (International Comparisons of 
GDP, 2009). That is, countries with higher GDP per capita typically have a higher standard of 
living for their population and more resources for the society to expend on their population 
(Global Economic Prospects, 2019)  
GDP per capita has been tied to indicators of economic security for workers and their 
families. Countries with higher GPD per capita have lower unemployment for immigrants when 
compared to countries with lower GDP per capita (Fleishmann & Dronkers, 2010). GDP per 
capita has also been linked to national investment in employee enrichment programs (e.g., 
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development of education programs, investment entrepreneurs and employee skill development) 
(Gennaioli et al., 2011) and country social spending (e.g., government subsidized social benefits 
such as family programs, active labor market support for families, unemployment assistance) 
such that countries with higher economic performance tend to invest more in such services 
(“OECD Social Expenditure”, 2019).  
Broadly speaking, there are two main sources of economic growth for a country, the 
growth in the size of the workforce and the growth in the productivity of the workforce (output 
per hour worked) (OECD Social Expenditure, 2019). There is general agreement in the literature 
that when migrants fill skill niches in the labor economy (that is, bring with them skillsets that 
are in short supply), there are positive impacts on the labor markets (Muenz et al., 2012) such as 
increased GDP (Migration Policy Debates, 2014) and improved migrant human capital (Dumont, 
2014).  
Similarly, there is evidence that migrants report greater life satisfactions and increased 
feelings of a favorable social climate in wealthier countries than in less wealthy countries 
(although this does vary by other indicators such as migrant integration policies) (Kogan et al., 
2018). Moreover, countries with higher GDP per capita typically provide a wider range of 
activities and development opportunities for their population (e.g., work, leisure, or cultural 
activities) than countries with lower levels of GDP per capita (OECD, 2001). Therefore, as 
country GDP per capita increases, often so do the quantity and quality of social policies and 
programs (e.g., policies and programs in support or of voluntary activities, local community 
centers, information, and communication technologies) (Dexter & Beverly, 2006). These ease 
migrant access to social capital acquisition by increasing access to local communities and 
community resources (OECD, 2001).  
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Therefore, as the wealth of a country is typically related to improved resources and 
access to capital (both human and social), I pose the following: 
H17: GDP moderates the relationship between immigrant type and career-related 
resources such that migrants living in countries with higher GDP will have higher H17a) Human 
capital resources and H17b) social capital resources than migrants living in countries with lower 
GDP.  
RQ8: Which group, SIEs, ESEs or AGMs, will have higher levels of RQ8a) human 
capital and RQ8b) social capital, as GDP increases?  
Social Expenditure  
Social expenditure is defined as the benefits provided by both public and private 
institutions to households and individuals to provide support during circumstances which 
adversely affect their welfare (OECD, 2003). Public social welfare spending is measured as a 
percentage of GDP (OECD World Factbook, 2013). Additionally, among European countries, 
social expenditure usually (but not always) correlates positively with GDP (“Social Expenditure 
Database”, 2018) such that countries with increased GDP also invest in increased social 
expenditure spending. Similarly, increased social expenditure has been linked with increased 
GDP (Ranis et al., 2000). This cyclical relationship is built, in part, on the benefits of social 
expenditure to the human and social capital development welfare recipients (Ranis et al., 2000).  
There is evidence that social expenditure policies reduce challenges to workplace 
integration post migration. Moller and colleagues (2003), for example, used the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) to examine whether social expenditure (e.g., in the form of child and family 
allowances, unemployment subsidies, education system access) reduced poverty (operationalized 
as post tax disposable income). The LIS is a microdata survey which collects data on income, 
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wealth, unemployment, and demographic data across 50 countries in Europe (Luxembourg 
Income Study Data Center, 2018). The authors found that the more generous the social welfare 
spending was, the greater the reduction in income inequality and wage dispersion. Similarly, 
Borjas (2004) found that social welfare programs in the United States reduce food insecurity 
(insufficient or inadequate food). Likewise, Nam and colleagues (2008) concluded that increased 
social welfare programs reduce lack of access to medical care (Nam et al., 2008) which can 
improve the health of the recipients (Hagan et al., 2003). Increased access to resources by way of 
social expenditure programs has also been shown to increase family income and improve 
schooling (access and quality) for children (Williamson, 1993).  
Overall, increased social welfare policies are an important determinant in reducing 
unemployment (Kogan, 2007) and income inequality in European countries (Brady, 2003). 
Given the generally positive relationship between social expenditure and reduction in challenges 
to workplace and social integration, a possible logical thread that follows is that as social 
expenditure increases so does access to human capital development resources (e.g., training 
programs) and social capital development resources (e.g., public events funded by a city). 
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H18: Social expenditure moderates the relationship between immigrant type and career-
related resources such that migrants living in countries with higher social expenditure will have 
higher H18a) Human capital resources and H18b) social capital resources than migrants living in 
countries with lower social expenditures.  
RQ9: Which group, SIEs, ESEs or AGMs, will have higher levels of RQ9a) human 
capital and RQ9b) social capital, as social expenditure increases?  
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Labor Market Mobility 
The relationship between migrants and their integration into their host countries is 
complex. On the one hand, the national immigrant policies affect the migrant’s chosen 
destination countries. That is, variations between migrant groups’ patterns of migration reflect 
differences in the freedom of movement and ease of getting a job in the migrants’ prospective 
adopted countries (Hussein et al., 2013). On the other hand, European countries are increasingly 
concerned with their capacity to integrate newcomers and adapt to increasing religious and 
ethnic diversity (Kogan, 2016), some countries even making their polices stricter over time 
(Stielkowski et al., 2016) coinciding with a rise in nationalism among European countries 
(Postelnicescu, 2016). 
In an optimal scenario for the migrants, their integration into a new labor market would 
allow them unrestricted rights to access jobs in the private or public sector, become self-
employed and have their qualifications from abroad equally recognized. An ideal integration 
environment allows migrants to direct their skills in a job development direction of their 
choosing (Ozgen, 2012).  
In reality, however, this is made difficult, as the majority of European countries place 
labor restrictions on migrants (especially unskilled migrants) (“European Commission, Migration 
and Home Affairs”, 2019). These limitations are becoming increasingly restrictive and come in 
the form of formal policies pertaining to migrant access to the labor market (e.g., is a migrant 
allowed to work upon arrival in a country), labor market support (e.g., public employment 
services), and labor market mobility (e.g., freedom to change job sectors) (“European 
Commission, Migration and Home Affairs”, 2019).  
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One approach to measuring levels of integration and labor market inclusion is the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). MIPEX is measure funded by the European 
Commission’s European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals, a directorate 
general of the European Commission in charge of migration affairs (“European Commission, 
Migration and Home Affairs”, 2019). MIPEX has been used to measure the favorability of a 
country to asylum seeking migrants (Niessen et al., 2007; Strielkowski et al., 2016), migrant’s 
inclusion and integration in the formal labor market (Koopmans et al., 2012), and the degree to 
which countries’ policies correspond to the ideal migrant situation (Niessen et al., 2007). It 
identifies and measures integration outcomes, laws, and other contextual factors that can impact 
the effectiveness of national policies, including the effects of these policies on nationals, foreign 
born residents, or third country nationals. It is also used as a reference point for evaluating, 
comparing, and improving the overall situation of immigrants in the respective host countries 
(“What is MIPEX”, 2015).  
The MIPEX index contains 148 policy indicators across 38 countries (including the 28 
countries in the European Unions as well as non-European countries such as Canada, South 
Korea, and Australia) which describe the conditions that a legal migrant has to fulfill in order to 
participate economically and politically in the life of their respective host society. This index 
allows its users to establish whether third country nationals are treated in the same way as locals. 
In general, the MIPEX index analyzes eight policy areas: Labor Market Mobility (such as 
workers’ rights, access to jobs, discussed below in greater detail), Family Reunion (e.g., 
eligibility to reunite with families, conditions for families of foreign residents to acquire legal 
status), Education (e.g., access to education and new opportunities), Political Participation (e.g., 
measures of whether immigrants have the same electoral rights and freedoms as locals), 
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Permanent Residence (e.g., eligibility and conditions for the acquisition of residential status), 
Access to Nationality (e.g., eligibility to naturalize), Anti-discrimination Laws (e.g., the 
existence and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws), and Health (e.g., access to health 
services). The benchmark for every policy indictor is the highest EU or international standard 
that guarantees equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for all residents in a given country 
(nationals, foreign born, or third country nationals) (“What is MIPEX”, 2015).  
Of specific relevance to this research is the MIPEX Labor Market Mobility index, which 
is comprised of items asking about labor market access, support, and workers’ rights. As 
research on the effects of immigration policies on immigrant’s labor market outcomes are 
generally inconclusive (Kogan, 2016) and more work is needed in this domain I argue that it is 
worthwhile to examine labor market access, labor market support, and workers’ rights policies in 
the context of my study. Specifically, these three policy groupings may be elemental to the 
integration and success of migrants in the paid labor force as they dictate what a migrant can and 
cannot do in the workforce. Therefore, I ask- as the MIPEX labor market mobility scores 
increase, do migrants human and social capital accumulations follow suit? To better understand 
this question, I intend to integrate the MIPEX Labor Market Mobility scores into my study in an 
exploratory fashion. Using MIPEX will allow for additional cross-national comparisons of 
migrants’ human and social capital, post migration, in the context of differing national policies.  
The above patterns of relationships that I predicted in this chapter introduce contextual 
variables into my existing moderated mediation model. Contextual variables take into account 
the higher order (also called group level) in which the data are nested (Livert et al., 2001) 
thereby making my model consistent with a multilevel moderated mediation model. Macro-level 
variables are important to explore as they provide a framework (e.g., country specific 
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information) which can help interpret any differences I find between migrant groups across 
countries. Figure C contains a visual depiction of my model containing only the macro level 
moderators. In Figure C, the path from the macro-level moderators to the line depicting 
Hypothesis 1 reflects the interaction of the IV and the contextual moderating variables on the 
mediating variables (Hypotheses 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 18 and Research Questions 4,5,6,8, 
and 9).  
The next chapter will address the methodology which I will use to test my predictions 
and provide preliminary analysis results.  
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As introduced in previous chapters, I developed a multilevel model of migrant 
employment success. On the Micro level, my model addressed three migrant types (ESE, SIE, 
AGM) which are rarely studied together or directly compared in the existing literature. At this 
level, my model also included individual level factors (gender, perceived discrimination, cultural 
distance) which according to the aforementioned literature, are associated with career-related 
resources such as human or social capital. Based on the previously mentioned literature review, I 
hypothesized that career-related resources will mediate the relationship between migrants and 
career outcomes. Furthermore, increased perceptions of discrimination, greater cultural distance, 
and being female will hamper career-related resources and outcomes. 
At the macro level, my model also included several country-level factors identified by 
prior literature as having the potential to vary career-related resources. These include salient 
aspects of national context such as national culture (GE, PD, and IC), standard of living (GDP 
per capita) and public social welfare support (Social expenditure). I also explored how labor 
market laws (MIPEX) may alter migrant career-related resources. At this level, I hypothesized 
that all but three (PD, IC, and MIPEX) macro-level contextual variables will be positively 
associated with career-related resources. I propose that PD is negatively associated with career-
related resources, the relationship between IC and career-related resources is mixed, and MIPEX 
will be included in an exploratory fashion. The following chapter is structured such that it starts 
with a discussion of the individual level data and measures followed by a discussion of the 
country level data and measures. The last section of this chapter addresses my analytic plan.  
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Individual-level (Micro) Data 
Sample and Dataset  
The current study used microdata from the Eurostat European Union (EU) Labor Force 
Survey (EULFS) and its 2014 Ad-hoc module titled Migration and Labor Market. The EULFS is 
the largest European household sample survey, providing annual data on labor force participation 
of people ages 15 and over and on persons outside the labor force. The data were collected in 
2014 (“Evaluation of the 2014 Labor Force Survey”, 2015), published in 2015, and provide 
cross-sectional, standardized information on labor force participation, employment, and 
unemployment, core demographics information, migration information, and educational 
background. I chose this dataset because of its large sample size, which is believed to ensure 
good representation of immigrant populations (Kogan, 2006) as well as its broad array of items 
pertaining specifically to migrants. Descriptive details such as sample age and immigrant types 
are discussed in greater detail below and can be viewed in Tables 4.1-4.8.  
The EULFS Microdata collected includes responses from participants in 25 European 
Countries, including: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland* and the United Kingdom. 








Table 4.1  
Sample Size by Country 
 EU LFS Original Sample EU LFS Study Sample 
Country n % n % 
Austria (AT) 23,463 2.49% 1035 5.95% 
Belgium (BE) 24,816 2.64% 722 4.15% 
Bulgaria (BG) 33,846 3.60% 11 0.06% 
Switzerland (CH) 9,723 1.03% 1068 6.14% 
Cyprus (CY) 10,403 1.11% 772 4.44% 
Czech Republic (CZ) 26,626 2.83% 241 1.38% 
Estonia (EE) 12,075 1.28% 31 0.18% 
Spain (ES) 105,914 11.25% 2023 11.62% 
Finland (FI) 53,158 5.65% 284 1.63% 
France (FR) 12,998 1.38% 329 1.89% 
Greece (GR) 59,090 6.28% 1235 7.10% 
Croatia (HR) 9,261 0.98% 125 0.72% 
Hungary (HU) 64,096 6.81% 177 1.02% 
Italy (IT) 150,966 16.04% 4488 25.79% 
Lithuania (LT) 15,017 1.60% 34 0.20% 
Luxembourg (LU) 13,831 1.47% 1279 7.35% 
Latvia (LV) 10,592 1.13% 22 0.13% 
Malta (MT) 6,791 0.72% 61 0.35% 
Poland (PL) 53,980 5.74% 39 0.22% 
Portugal (PT) 41,665 4.43% 283 1.63% 
Romania (RO) 56,533 6.01% 4 0.02% 
Sweden (SE) 19,843 2.11% 444 2.55% 
Slovenia (SI) 15,526 1.65% 269 1.55% 
Slovakia (SK) 24,603 2.61% 7 0.04% 
United Kingdom (UK) 86,405 9.18% 2420 13.91% 
Total 941,221 100.00% 17,403 100.00% 
Note. England and the United Kingdom are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
 
 




Age, by Country  









Age M SD 
Austria (AT) 15- 19 60-64 40.95 13.95 25-29 50-54 41.31 7.99 
Belgium (BE) 0 -4 95-99 38.60 21.92 25-29 50-54 39.51 7.93 
Bulgaria (BG) 0 -4 95-99 46.87 22.36 30-34 45-49 39.27 4.10 
Switzerland (CH) 15- 19 60-64 41.28 13.60 25-29 50-54 40.92 8.06 
Cyprus (CY) 0 -4 95-99 40.23 22.55 25-29 50-54 38.68 7.71 
Czech Republic (CZ) 15- 19 60-64 41.76 14.10 25-29 50-54 39.28 7.96 
Estonia (EE) 0 -4 95-99 37.79 21.42 25-29 50-54 47.48 6.63 
Spain (ES) 0 -4 95-99 44.19 23.53 25-29 50-54 40.27 7.17 
Finland (FI) 0 -4 95-99 38.72 22.41 25-29 50-54 39.96 7.89 
France (FR) 15- 19 60-64 41.72 13.73 25-29 50-54 41.22 7.32 
Greece (GR) 0 -4 95-99 47.01 23.45 25-29 50-54 40.13 7.61 
Croatia (HR) 0 -4 95-99 44.22 23.24 25-29 50-54 45.52 6.09 
Hungary (HU) 0 -4 95-99 43.82 23.29 25-29 50-54 41.27 6.85 
Italy (IT) 0 -4 95-99 47.27 24.08 25-29 50-54 40.77 7.35 
Lithuania (LT) 0 -4 95-99 41.79 21.53 25-29 50-54 46.56 7.11 
Luxembourg (LU) 0 -4 95-99 40.41 22.33 25-29 50-54 41.58 7.38 
Latvia (LV) 0 -4 95-99 44.73 23.86 30-34 50-54 48.14 5.76 
Malta (MT) 0 -4 75-79 41.33 22.27 25-29 50-54 40.44 7.56 
Poland (PL) 15- 19 60-64 40.89 14.55 25-29 50-54 40.21 8.47 
Portugal (PT) 0 -4 95-99 43.84 23.02 25-29 50-54 41.51 7.40 
Romania (RO) 0 -4 95-99 47.04 21.93 35-39 50-54 45.75 7.50 
Sweden (SE) 15- 19 60-64 41.00 14.32 25-29 50-54 42.87 7.63 
Slovenia (SI) 0 -4 95-99 42.69 22.46 25-29 50-54 44.57 7.89 
Slovakia (SK) 0 -4 95-99 43.45 22.44 25-29 45-49 34.14 6.99 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 
0 -4 95-99 39.97 23.97 25-29 50-54 37.86 7.63 
























Age Bands, by Country, Sample Data 
 EU LFS Sample Data 
 Age Bands and Percentages by age band 
Country 25-29 %  30-34 %  35-39 %  40-44 %  45-49 %  50-54 % 
Austria 102 6.41%  137 4.79%  177 5.06%  207 5.64%  210 6.57%  202 7.81% 
Belgium 94 5.91%  122 4.26%  147 4.21%  144 3.92%  116 3.63%  99 3.83% 
Bulgaria 0 0.00%  1 0.03%  5 0.14%  4 0.11%  1 0.03%  0 0.00% 
Switzerland 110 6.91%  168 5.87%  173 4.95%  197 5.36%  231 7.22%  189 7.31% 
Cyprus 110 6.91%  146 5.10%  173 4.95%  132 3.59%  139 4.35%  72 2.79% 
Czech 
Republic 
31 1.95%  46 1.61%  47 1.34%  50 1.36%  33 1.03%  34 1.32% 
Estonia 1 0.06%  1 0.03%  2 0.06%  3 0.08%  7 0.22%  17 0.66% 
Spain 135 8.49%  329 11.50%  495 14.16%  466 12.69%  339 10.60%  259 10.02% 
Finland 22 1.38%  71 2.48%  48 1.37%  44 1.20%  58 1.81%  41 1.59% 
France 20 1.26%  49 1.71%  62 1.77%  81 2.21%  65 2.03%  52 2.01% 
Greece 114 7.17%  217 7.58%  246 7.04%  262 7.13%  231 7.22%  165 6.38% 
Croatia 1 0.06%  5 0.17%  17 0.49%  25 0.68%  36 1.13%  41 1.59% 
Hungary 11 0.69%  17 0.59%  39 1.12%  54 1.47%  32 1.00%  24 0.93% 
Italy 326 20.49%  673 23.52%  934 26.72%  1020 27.77%  913 28.55%  622 24.06% 
Lithuania 2 0.13%  0 0.00%  4 0.11%  3 0.08%  9 0.28%  16 0.62% 
Luxembourg 71 4.46%  185 6.47%  235 6.72%  310 8.44%  245 7.66%  233 9.01% 
Latvia 0 0.00%  1 0.03%  2 0.06%  0 0.00%  7 0.22%  12 0.46% 
Malta 6 0.38%  8 0.28%  14 0.40%  11 0.30%  15 0.47%  7 0.27% 
Poland 5 0.31%  8 0.28%  3 0.09%  10 0.27%  6 0.19%  7 0.27% 
Portugal 16 1.01%  39 1.36%  60 1.72%  61 1.66%  56 1.75%  51 1.97% 
Romania 0 0.00%  0 0.00%  1 0.03%  1 0.03%  0 0.00%  2 0.08% 
Sweden 27 1.70%  50 1.75%  62 1.77%  95 2.59%  100 3.13%  110 4.26% 
Slovakia 2 0.13%  2 0.07%  2 0.06%  0 0.00%  1 0.03%  0 0.00% 
Slovenia 16 1.01%  23 0.80%  33 0.94%  34 0.93%  61 1.91%  102 3.95% 
United 
Kingdom 
369 23.19%  563 19.68%  514 14.71%  459 12.50%  287 8.97%  228 8.82% 
Total 1591 100.00%  2861 100.00%  3495 100.00%  3673 100.00%  3198 100.00%  2585 100.00% 






















Age, by Country, Original Sample  
 EU LFS Original Sample 
 Age Range 


























n.a. n.a. n.a. 2034 1978 1977 2101 2092 2559 3001 2929 2662 2130 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Belgium 
(BE) 
1480 1547 1480 1540 1587 1486 1609 1622 1747 1792 1992 1767 1640 1527 1146 610 168 52 19 5 
Bulgaria 
(BG) 
945 1331 1322 1405 1598 1556 1811 2315 2392 2374 2593 2723 2852 2748 2171 1826 1206 533 137 8 
Switzerland 
(CH) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 845 681 697 844 1025 1177 1333 1231 1002 888 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Cyprus 
(CH) 




n.a. n.a. n.a. 1891 2266 2150 2401 2998 3013 2697 2721 2948 3541 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Estonia (EE) 702 765 707 856 796 772 741 846 950 869 916 910 769 672 559 115 72 34 21 3 
Spain (ES) 4404 5485 5470 5284 5470 4832 5471 7575 8255 8612 8239 7426 6488 6294 5135 4437 3862 2157 841 177 
Finland (FI) 2945 3122 3437 4807 2767 2571 2756 3086 3249 4056 4011 3724 3808 3385 2116 1490 1014 557 218 39 
France (FR) n.a. n.a. n.a. 1044 790 977 1305 1454 1589 1435 1449 1515 1440 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Greece (GR) 1804 2535 2729 2734 2681 2897 3408 3713 4138 4287 4149 4273 4160 4189 3555 3401 2649 1289 417 82 
Croatia 
(HR) 
373 458 435 515 470 500 540 564 553 644 690 756 711 574 536 454 332 114 40 2 
Hungary 
(HU) 
2718 3090 3225 3590 3731 3377 3618 4806 4301 4079 3939 4996 4954 4047 3690 2813 1978 826 280 38 
Italy (IT) 5687 6838 7199 7193 6840 6291 6567 9058 10987 11824 11277 10360 10245 10367 9268 8453 6586 3920 1696 310 
Lithuania 
(LT) 
589 640 759 1299 797 670 652 835 1130 1373 1590 1313 1036 854 808 353 184 99 31 5 
Luxembourg 
(LU) 
706 881 886 791 725 586 792 908 1089 1118 1124 1115 998 766 607 392 229 104 13 1 
Latvia (LV) 429 566 566 497 573 533 557 546 727 675 819 827 705 639 705 584 383 196 57 8 
Malta (MT) 348 319 352 377 455 393 463 466 455 421 491 481 503 472 294 501 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Poland (PL) n.a. n.a. n.a. 4931 4774 4776 5364 5302 4982 4861 5661 6825 6504 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Portugal 
(PT) 






















Age, by Country, Original Sample  
Romania 
(RO) 
960 1530 2195 3076 3045 3004 2912 3755 4416 4449 3774 4809 4693 3904 3615 3142 2100 901 236 17 
Sweden 
(SE) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 2034 1713 1215 1654 1997 2276 2426 2200 2121 2207 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia 
(SI) 
742 710 681 736 948 978 977 1023 983 1206 1277 1266 1186 840 745 585 406 181 48 8 
Slovakia 
(SK) 




5780 5642 5084 4991 4431 4816 5414 5101 5762 6033 5932 5394 5299 5508 4023 3275 2171 1233 454 62 
Note. n.a. means no data was collected for the age group in the cell. England and the United Kingdom are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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Table 4.5 
Reason for Migrating 
Study Sample 
Migrant Type n % 
Employment, Job Found Before Migrating (ESE) 5,432 31.2 
Employment, No job found before migrating (SIE) 10,292 59.1 
International Protection or Asylum (AGM) 1,679 9.6 



























Sample Size, Migration Status by Country  
EU LFS Original Sample  
Employment, 
job found before 
migrating 
Employment, no 
job found before 
migrating 
Family reasons Study International 
Protection or 
Asylum 
Other Not applicable Total 
Country n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n 
Austria 
(AT) 
395 1.68% 647 2.76% 2308 9.84% 232 0.99% 401 1.71% 151 0.64% 19329 82.38% 23463 
Belgium 
(BE) 
281 1.14% 336 1.36% 1585 6.43% 160 0.65% 259 1.05% 228 0.92% 21816 88.45% 24665 
Bulgaria 
(BG) 
5 0.01% 8 0.02% 49 0.14% 16 0.05% 2 0.01% 6 0.02% 33760 99.75% 33846 
Switzerland 
(CH) 
763 7.86% 400 4.12% 1739 17.92% 115 1.19% 135 1.39% 361 3.72% 6190 63.79% 9703 
Cyprus 
(CY) 




132 0.50% 148 0.56% 448 1.68% 47 0.18% 4 0.02% 37 0.14% 25808 96.94% 26624 
Estonia (EE) 82 0.68% 29 0.24% 658 5.45% 22 0.18% 0 0.00% 8 0.07% 11276 93.38% 12075 
Spain (ES) 610 0.58% 1664 1.57% 2912 2.75% 129 0.12% 28 0.03% 405 0.38% 100024 94.57% 105772 
Finland (FI) 163 0.31% 46 0.09% 1083 2.04% 96 0.18% 136 0.26% 126 0.24% 51423 96.89% 53073 
France (FR) 118 0.91% 235 1.81% 1871 14.40% 210 1.62% 116 0.89% 135 1.04% 10311 79.34% 12996 
Greece (GR) 101 0.17% 1358 2.32% 775 1.33% 38 0.07% 8 0.01% 176 0.30% 56000 95.80% 58456 
Croatia 
(HR) 
31 0.33% 62 0.67% 398 4.30% 25 0.27% 98 1.06% 6 0.06% 8640 93.30% 9260 
Hungary 
(HU) 
71 0.11% 152 0.24% 316 0.49% 28 0.04% 16 0.02% 79 0.12% 63424 98.97% 64086 
Italy (IT) 826 0.55% 4284 2.84% 5755 3.81% 199 0.13% 56 0.04% 189 0.13% 139637 92.51% 150946 
Lithuania 
(LT) 
46 0.31% 44 0.29% 279 1.86% 7 0.05% 0 0.00% 21 0.14% 14620 97.36% 15017 
Luxembourg 
(LU) 
1031 7.50% 565 4.11% 1794 13.05% 32 0.23% 36 0.26% 267 1.94% 10018 72.90% 13743 
Latvia (LV) 30 0.28% 24 0.23% 510 4.82% 38 0.36% 1 0.01% 25 0.24% 9959 94.07% 10587 
Malta (MT) 45 0.66% 17 0.25% 119 1.75% 22 0.32% 12 0.18% 138 2.03% 6438 94.80% 6791 
Poland (PL) 16 0.03% 22 0.04% 75 0.14% 24 0.04% 7 0.01% 12 0.02% 53824 99.71% 53980 
Portugal 
(PT) 






















Sample Size, Migration Status by Country 
Romania 
(RO) 
0 0.00% 6 0.01% 7 0.01% 5 0.01% 0 0.00% 3 0.01% 56512 99.96% 56533 
Sweden 
(SE) 
132 0.67% 93 0.47% 1358 6.87% 107 0.54% 418 2.11% 154 0.78% 17514 88.56% 19776 
Slovenia 
(SI) 
213 1.37% 218 1.40% 554 3.57% 54 0.35% 30 0.19% 25 0.16% 14432 92.95% 15526 
Slovakia 
(SK) 




















EU LFS Study Sample 
 n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n 
Austria 
(AT) 
297 28.70% 436 42.13% n/a n/a n/a n/a 302 29.18% n/a n/a n/a n/a 1035 
Belgium 
(BE) 
233 32.27% 280 38.78% n/a n/a n/a n/a 209 28.95% n/a n/a n/a n/a 722 
Bulgaria 
(BG) 
3 27.27% 6 54.55% n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 18.18% n/a n/a n/a n/a 11 
Switzerland 
(CH) 
647 60.58% 309 28.93% n/a n/a n/a n/a 112 10.49% n/a n/a n/a n/a 1068 
Cyprus 
(CY) 




107 44.40% 130 53.94% n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 1.66% n/a n/a n/a n/a 241 
Estonia (EE) 16 51.61% 15 48.39% n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 31 
Spain (ES) 545 26.94% 1457 72.02% n/a n/a n/a n/a 21 1.04% n/a n/a n/a n/a 2023 
Finland (FI) 143 50.35% 37 13.03% n/a n/a n/a n/a 104 36.62% n/a n/a n/a n/a 284 
France (FR) 70 21.28% 178 54.10% n/a n/a n/a n/a 81 24.62% n/a n/a n/a n/a 329 
Greece (GR) 73 5.91% 1155 93.52% n/a n/a n/a n/a 7 0.57% n/a n/a n/a n/a 1235 
Croatia 
(HR) 
17 13.60% 34 27.20% n/a n/a n/a n/a 74 59.20% n/a n/a n/a n/a 125 
Hungary 
(HU) 
61 34.46% 109 61.58% n/a n/a n/a n/a 7 3.95% n/a n/a n/a n/a 177 






















Sample Size, Migration Status by Country 
Lithuania 
(LT) 
15 44.12% 19 55.88% n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 34 
Luxembourg 
(LU) 
819 64.03% 426 33.31% n/a n/a n/a n/a 34 2.66% n/a n/a n/a n/a 1279 
Latvia (LV) 12 54.55% 9 40.91% n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 4.55% n/a n/a n/a n/a 22 
Malta (MT) 38 62.30% 12 19.67% n/a n/a n/a n/a 11 18.03% n/a n/a n/a n/a 61 
Poland (PL) 15 38.46% 19 48.72% n/a n/a n/a n/a 5 12.82% n/a n/a n/a n/a 39 
Portugal 
(PT) 
75 26.50% 192 67.84% n/a n/a n/a n/a 16 5.65% n/a n/a n/a n/a 283 
Romania 
(RO) 
0 0.00% 4 100.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 
Sweden 
(SE) 
91 20.50% 68 15.32% n/a n/a n/a n/a 285 64.19% n/a n/a n/a n/a 444 
Slovenia 
(SI) 
7 100.00% 0 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 7 
Slovakia 
(SK) 




854 35.29% 1252 51.74% n/a n/a n/a n/a 314 12.98% n/a n/a n/a n/a 2420 
Total 5,432 - 10,292 - n/a n/a n/a n/a 1,679 - n/a n/a n/a n/a 17,403 
Note. England and the United Kingdom are used interchangeably throughout this paper. An n/a appears in cells where data is not applicable to the group in 
question (the study sample).   
 
Table 4.7 
Sample Size, by Sex       
  EU LFS Original Sample EU LFS Study Sample 
Gender n % n % 
Male 452,568 48.08% 9,858 56.65% 
Female 488,653 51.92% 7,545 43.35% 
Total 941,221 100.00% 17,403 100.00% 






















Sample Size, Sex, By Country 
  EU LFS Original Sample EU LFS Study Sample  
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Country n % n % n % n % n % n %              
Austria (AT) 11,555 49.25% 11,908 50.75% 23,463 100.00% 642 62.03% 393 37.97% 1,035 100.00% 
Belgium (BE) 12,326 49.67% 12,490 50.33% 24,816 100.00% 439 60.80% 283 39.20% 722 100.00% 
Bulgaria (BG) 16,457 48.62% 17,389 51.38% 33,846 100.00% 7 63.64% 4 36.36% 11 100.00% 
Switzerland (CH) 4,712 48.46% 5,011 51.54% 9,723 100.00% 612 57.30% 456 42.70% 1,068 100.00% 
Cyprus (CY) 4,922 47.31% 5,481 52.69% 10,403 100.00% 280 36.27% 492 63.73% 772 100.00% 
Czech Republic 
(CZ) 
12,957 48.66% 13,669 51.34% 26,626 100.00% 143 59.34% 98 40.66% 241 100.00% 
Estonia (EE) 5,906 48.91% 6,169 51.09% 12,075 100.00% 21 67.74% 10 32.26% 31 100.00% 
Spain (ES) 50,984 48.14% 54,930 51.86% 105,914 100.00% 1,056 52.20% 967 47.80% 2,023 100.00% 
Finland (FI) 26,679 50.19% 26,479 49.81% 53,158 100.00% 175 61.62% 109 38.38% 284 100.00% 
France (FR) 6,036 46.44% 6,962 53.56% 12,998 100.00% 216 65.65% 113 34.35% 329 100.00% 
Greece (GR) 28,781 48.71% 30,309 51.29% 59,090 100.00% 741 60.00% 494 40.00% 1,235 100.00% 
Croatia (HR) 4,452 48.07% 4,809 51.93% 9,261 100.00% 73 58.40% 52 41.60% 125 100.00% 
Hungary (HU) 30,064 46.90% 34,032 53.10% 64,096 100.00% 95 53.67% 82 46.33% 177 100.00% 
Italy(IT) 71,567 47.41% 79,399 52.59% 150,966 100.00% 2,555 56.93% 1,933 43.07% 4,488 100.00% 
Lithuania (LT) 6,877 45.79% 8,140 54.21% 15,017 100.00% 20 58.82% 14 41.18% 34 100.00% 
Luxembourg (LU) 6,629 47.93% 7,202 52.07% 13,831 100.00% 731 57.15% 548 42.85% 1,279 100.00% 
Latvia (LV) 4,705 44.42% 5,887 55.58% 10,592 100.00% 10 45.45% 12 54.55% 22 100.00% 
Malta (MT) 3,355 49.40% 3,436 50.60% 6,791 100.00% 39 63.93% 22 36.07% 61 100.00% 
Poland (PL) 25,899 47.98% 28,081 52.02% 53,980 100.00% 18 46.15% 21 53.85% 39 100.00% 
Portugal (PT) 19,710 47.31% 21,955 52.69% 41,665 100.00% 156 55.12% 127 44.88% 283 100.00% 
Romania (RO) 27,178 48.07% 29,355 51.93% 56,533 100.00% 4 100.00% 0 0.00% 4 100.00% 
Sweden (SE) 9,942 50.10% 9,901 49.90% 19,843 100.00% 244 54.95% 200 45.05% 444 100.00% 
Slovenia (SI) 7,678 49.45% 7,848 50.55% 15,526 100.00% 173 64.31% 96 35.69% 269 100.00% 
Slovakia (SK) 11,714 47.61% 12,889 52.39% 24,603 100.00% 6 85.71% 1 14.29% 7 100.00% 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 













Note. England and the United Kingdom are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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Participating countries are each responsible for collecting data through their national 
labor force survey and then submitting them to the Eurostat. Data are collected using interviews. 
Interview techniques include personal visits, telephone interviews, web interviews, and self-
administered questionnaires, with the majority of countries using primarily computerized 
questionnaires (“What is the EU labor force survey?”, n.d.). The majority of countries added the 
ad-hoc module questionnaire at the end of the core EULFS. The exceptions were the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, and the United Kingdom which integrated the module’s 
questions within the core EULFS by topic (“Evaluation of the 2014 Labor Force Survey”, 2015). 
As such, this paper will refer to the Labor Force Survey and its ad-hoc module collectively as 
EULFS. Each country’s national statistical institute is responsible for collecting these data from a 
nationally representative sample and forwarding the results to Eurostat in accordance with the 
requirements of the regulation. To ensure that the statistical results are comparable across 
countries and over time, the EULFS verified that the same variables are recorded in each country 
with comparable concepts and definitions across surveys. This allowed Eurostat to create a large 
harmonized cross nationally comparable aggregate dataset at European levels in terms of 
concepts, definitions and sets of characteristics in each country.  
The main EULFS module includes questions about labor status (e.g., employed, 
unemployed, self-employed), occupation, income, and demographic information (e.g., sex, year 
of birth, nationality, country of birth). The 2014 ad-hoc module includes items such as last 
country worked abroad, reason or migration, did the migrant already have a job offer prior to 
migration, and perceived obstacles to labor market progression.  
In addition to the EULFS, I also obtained data from the Occupational Information 
Network (O*NET). O*NET is a database sponsored by the United States Department of Labor 
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containing hundreds of standardized occupation specific descriptors (“The O*NET-SOC 
Taxonomy”, 2018). Each occupational classification contains data including, but not limited to, 
job descriptions and qualifications corresponding to most jobs in the United states (“O*NET 
Resource Center”, 2018). Data from O*NET was primarily used to measure social capital and 
career achievement. Use of O*NET, respective to each of these two variables, is addressed in the 
measures section of this chapter.  
Measures 
Immigrant Type  
Immigrant type for each respondent was defined as per the EULFS item “What was the 
main reason [for coming to country name]?” Respondents who selected “international protection 
or asylum” will be coded as AGMs. Respondents who selected “employment, job found before 
migrating” will be coded as ESEs, and respondents who selected “employment, no job found 
before migrating” will be coded as SIEs.  
Human Capital 
 Human capital accumulation is a product of knowledge and skills acquired through 
education and experience (Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1961). A measure of HC as it relates to the 
migrants’ adopted country was created using items from the EULFS. These items are relevant to 
the country in which the migrant lives and include “highest level educational attainment” (rated 
per the International Standard Classification of Education [ISCED], an index of information on 
education maintained by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
[UNESCO]) (“International Standard Classification of Education”, 2019), “skills in host country 
language” (response options include: language is mother tongue, advanced, intermediate, 
beginner or less), “participation in language courses of host country language since arrival in 
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host country?” (response options include: yes, no was not necessary, no for other reason) “Main 
[professional] Status.” (response options include: self-employed with employees, employee, 
family worker, unemployed) and “age”. Age was acquired from an EULFS item which asks, 
“age of interviewed person.” Age is a common indicator of human capital (Cohen & Soto, 2007; 
Cuaresma & Mishra, 2011). Additional work experience and education add to one’s human 
capital (Bodman & Le, 2013; Hall & Jones, 1999). Similarly, age and human capital have a 
curvilinear relationship such that human capital increases until old age, when it starts to decline 
(Glaeser et al., 2000). As older workers are likely to have more years of work experience and by 
extension increased human capital than their younger counterparts, a logical extension is that 
they are also likely to attain greater income and career achievement. Moreover, as my sample is 
limited to prime age workers, they are unlikely to be subject to the decline in human capital that 
comes with old age.  
Social Capital 
 A measure of social capital was created using items from the EULFS and O*NET. SC 
resources include the individual’s network of social connections which can help the migrant 
achieve paid labor related objectives (Coleman, 1990). Items from the EULFS included “Marital 
Status” (response options include: single, married, widowed, divorced or legally separated) and 
“frequency of working from home” (response options include: person usually works at home, 
person sometimes works at home, person never works at home). The item from O*NET asked: 
“How much does this job require the worker to be in contact with others (face to face, by 
telephone, or other) in order to perform it?” (response options include: no contact with others, 
occasional contact with others, contact with others about half the time, contact with others most 
of the time, constant contact with others). Although marital status may be less commonly 
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associated with social capital than the other items in my scale, there is evidence that marital 
status can be beneficial to the accumulation of social capital (Lin, 1999; Song, 2012). 
Perceived Discrimination  
      Perceived Discrimination is operationalized as the discrimination perceived by the migrants 
themselves and will be assessed using one item from the EULFS. This item reads “Main obstacle 
to getting a job corresponding to the person’s qualifications or getting a job at all. A response of 
“origin, religion or social background” will be considered perceived discrimination.  
Gender 
Respondent gender will be extracted from a single item in the EULFS which asks 
participants their sex (male or female). While sex and gender are not identical terms by 
definition, sex will act as a proxy for gender in this study. A person’s sex is a product of their 
biological attributes, while gender is a social construct. That is gender is defined by the roles and 
identities expressed by individuals (Johnson et al., 2009).  
Cultural Distance 
 Cultural distance was measured using an adapted Kogut and Singh (1988) Index (KSI). 
The original KSI is based in a measure of distance based in Hofstede’s (1980) original four 
dimensions of national culture. These four dimensions are Individualism vs. Collectivism 
(preference for a loosely knit or tightly knit societal framework), Power Distance (degree to 
which less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally), 
Masculinity vs. Femininity (preference for competitive vs consensus-oriented society), 
Uncertainty Avoidance (degree wot which members of society feel uncomfortable with 
ambiguity or uncertainty) (Hofstede, 1980).  
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In this study, I have chosen to slightly modify the KSI. That is to say, I did not change the 
KSI formula (discussed in greater detail below), however, I used scores from project GLOBE’s 
“as is” typology rather than Hofstede’s dimensions. The reasons for using project GLOBE scores 
rather than scores from Hofstede’s model are two-fold. First, contrasts between project GLOBE 
and Hofstede’s models reveal that the project GLOBE model is generally richer than Hofstede’s 
and offers a better understanding of relationships between national culture and work-related 
behaviors (Posthuma, 2009; Xiumei & Jinying, 2011). Second, I used project GLOBE’s “as is” 
scores elsewhere in this paper to describe the local culture at the country to which the immigrant 
migrated. Therefore, I chose to use project GLOBE scores to calculate cultural distance to 
maintain consistency in both language and theory throughout this paper. 
 Cultural Distance scores were calculated for project GLOBE’s dimensions of In-Group 
Collectivism (the degree to which individuals prioritize their in-groups over their out-groups), 
Institutional Collectivism (the degree to which group loyalty is encouraged by an organizational 
or societal institutions), Power Distance (the degree to which less powerful members of a society 
accept and expect that power is distributed unequally) (House & Javidan, 2004; Marcus & Le, 
2013), and Gender Egalitarianism (the degree to which a society promotes gender equality 
(Steers et al., 2010) using the formula detailed below.  
This formula to calculate KSI has been used by over 300 empirical studies and remains 
the most frequently used measure of this construct to date (Ambos & Hakanson, 2014; Curypers 
et al., 2018; Beugelsdijk et al., 2016; Dow & Larimo, 2011; Hakanson & Ambos, 2010; Shenkar 
et al., 2008) exploring topics such as expatriate performance (Tung, 1998), expatriate staffing 
(Gong, 2003), and conformity to local organizational practices (Luo, 2001)  
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 The original KSI was constructed such that each individual’s cultural distance score is a 
Euclidian Distance (defined as distance between two points) (D’agostino & Dardanoni, 2008) 
score between two countries based on Hofstede’s (1980) four aforementioned dimensions. The 
Euclidian distance index takes the differences on the national score on each of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions and then aggregates these indexes into one overall index. In other words, 
cultural distance is calculated as the distance to a single country from a single country based on 
all four cultural dimensions. As my study examines multiple countries which have accepted 
migrants, the distance to each of the host countries will be calculated using the formula below. 
That is, holding host country constant, each host country will have multiple scores- one for each 
country from which migrants arrive.  
The formula based in Kogut and Singh’s work (1988) is as follows: 
 
 
CDj is the cultural distance of the j
th country from a base country (denoted by subscript 
a), Iij indicates the national Hofstede (1980) score on the i
th dimension of country j and Vi is the 
variance of the score per cultural dimension i, used to make the calculated distances on the 
separate dimensions commensurable before summation. The number 4 in the formula reflects the 
calculations based on the KSI as it is typically restricted to Hofstede’s (1980) original four 
dimensions. The 4 remain unchanged in my study as I will be using the four aforementioned 
dimensions of [project GLOBE to calculate the KSI. 
 The EULFS variable used to indicate the immigrant’s country of origin was single item 
which asked for the respondents “country of residence one year before the survey”. As not all 
countries responding to the EULFS collected this data and many respondents were already living 
𝐶𝐷𝑗 = ∑4 {(𝐼𝑖𝑗 − 𝐼𝑖a)2 /Vi}/4 
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in their host country longer than one year, the sample group for this variable is smaller (n= 153) 
than the original sample size with data for 12 of the 25 of the aforementioned host countries. 
Table 4.9 details how many migrants traveled into the 25 countries examined in this study and 
from which country. Table 4.10 contains the list of cultural distance scores from the migrants’ 
home countries to their host countries.  
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Table 4.9 
Number of Migrants Traveling from Home Country to Host Country 
Home Country Host Country n 
Austria Switzerland 1 
Australia United Kingdom 7 
Brazil Portugal 3 
Canada United Kingdom 4 
Switzerland Austria 1 
China 
Switzerland 1 
United Kingdom 4 




United Kingdom 1 
Spain 
Austria 2 
United Kingdom 8 
France 
Switzerland 4 
United Kingdom 1 




United Kingdom 10 
Ireland United Kingdom 1 
Israel 
Spain 2 
United Kingdom 1 
India 
Italy 1 
United Kingdom 9 




United Kingdom 7 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 1 




United Kingdom 13 
Portugal 
Switzerland 3 
United Kingdom 2 
Qatar United Kingdom 2 
Russia Switzerland 1 
Slovenia Austria 1 
Turkey Austria 2 
United Kingdom Switzerland 3 
United States 
Switzerland 1 
United Kingdom 4 
Total  153 
Note. England and the United Kingdom are used interchangeably through this paper. 
 
 



















Table 4.10  
KSI Scores                          




Republic England France Greece Hungary Italy Poland Portugal Slovenia Spain Switzerland 
Australia 0.44 2.95 0.35 0.65 2.53 2.92 1.38 1.71 1.67 1.70 1.99 0.46 
Austria 0.00 5.05 0.93 0.98 2.11 3.11 0.85 1.89 1.29 1.76 0.83 0.44 
Brazil 0.61 5.90 1.06 0.50 0.52 1.27 0.07 1.71 0.31 0.93 0.24 1.14 
Canada 0.87 3.20 0.17 0.54 2.69 2.31 1.70 0.99 1.42 1.11 2.46 1.17 
China 0.70 8.36 2.32 2.54 3.77 4.47 2.19 1.82 1.90 2.23 1.49 2.16 
Czech 
Republic 5.05 0.00 3.98 4.28 6.25 6.74 6.02 6.41 6.70 6.32 7.99 3.89 
England 0.93 3.98 0.00 0.22 2.18 1.82 1.22 1.20 1.14 0.99 2.02 1.06 
France 0.98 4.28 0.22 0.00 1.05 0.99 0.54 1.37 0.59 0.73 1.32 1.10 
Germany 0.75 4.63 0.94 0.62 1.36 2.61 0.45 3.29 1.61 2.37 0.98 0.29 
Greece 2.11 6.25 2.18 1.05 0.00 0.80 0.40 2.92 0.71 1.50 0.93 2.42 
Hungary 3.11 6.74 1.82 0.99 0.80 0.00 1.36 1.65 0.56 0.58 2.25 3.87 
India 0.88 9.79 2.66 2.35 2.55 3.71 1.30 2.54 1.43 2.26 0.50 2.16 
Iran 1.13 8.90 2.77 1.98 1.22 2.60 0.67 2.76 0.94 1.97 0.15 2.21 
Ireland 0.26 6.67 1.04 1.28 2.81 3.21 1.34 1.27 1.21 1.44 1.10 1.21 
Israel 0.13 4.24 0.87 1.18 2.86 3.60 1.46 1.73 1.72 1.92 1.57 0.57 
Italy 0.85 6.02 1.22 0.54 0.40 1.36 0.00 2.36 0.54 1.33 0.27 1.09 
Netherlands 1.80 1.60 1.50 2.29 5.12 5.38 3.75 3.12 4.03 3.65 4.72 1.54 
Poland 1.89 6.41 1.20 1.37 2.92 1.65 2.36 0.00 0.88 0.30 2.72 3.40 
Portugal 1.29 6.70 1.14 0.59 0.71 0.56 0.54 0.88 0.00 0.24 0.81 2.30 
Qatar 0.67 3.76 0.46 0.87 2.88 2.60 1.82 0.72 1.35 1.05 2.29 1.35 
Russia 2.49 8.38 1.55 1.54 2.87 1.34 2.39 0.23 0.78 0.27 2.66 4.15 
Slovenia 1.76 6.32 0.99 0.73 1.50 0.58 1.33 0.30 0.24 0.00 1.81 2.95 
Turkey 1.08 9.67 2.79 2.12 1.67 3.08 0.80 2.98 1.19 2.25 0.15 2.13 
United States 0.29 3.39 0.31 0.46 2.03 2.57 0.95 1.74 1.35 1.54 1.48 0.32 
Note. Bolded scores indicate migration from the home country to the host country included in this study (n=153). The terms England and the United 
Kingdom are used interchangeably.  
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It is worth noting that project GLOBE provides scores for England while the EULFS data 
was collected for the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is made up of four countries, 
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (“Which countries make up the United 
Kingdom?”,n.d.). However, as all four countries are geographically close, governed by the same 
prime minister and cabinet (“How government works”, n.d.), and share exposure to important 
elements of culture, such as the British royal family (“The house of Windsor”, n.d.), England’s 
project GLOBE scores will be used as a proxy for the United Kingdom. Similarly, project 
GLOBE scores for Germany are divided into East and West Germany. As Germany was reunited 
in 1990 with western Germany absorbing eastern Germany to form the single country of 
Germany as we know it today, I will use the west Germany project GLOBE scores in my study. 
Compensation. Compensation was acquired from one item on the EULFS which reads 
“monthly take home pay from main job.” These data are provided in 10 deciles that range from 
“below the 1st decile” to “more or equal to the 9th decile.” Income decile data are standardized by 
the EULFS such that deciles are comparable to each other cross-nationally (“Labor Force Survey 
user guide”, 2017).  
Career Achievement 
Career achievement was ranked per the O*NET job zone categories. O*NET job zones 
consist of a group of occupations that are similar in responses to items asking: “how much 
education people need to do the work”, “how much related experience people need to do the 
work”, and “how much on the job training people need to do the work.” There are five job zone 
categories ranging from 1 (occupations that need little or no preparation) to 5 (occupations that 
need extensive preparation).  
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In order to classify an individual’s job into one of the O*NET job categories, occupation was 
obtained from the EULFS item that reads “Occupation.” The EULFS does not code occupations 
per O*NET, but rather uses the ISCO-08 coding system. The ISCO-08 is the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations, an international classification structure for the 
organization of information about labor and jobs. The most recent version, and the version 
relevant to my study, is from 2008, hence the 08 numbering (“International Labor Organization”, 
2016). A crosswalk between ISCO and SOC-10 data was adapted from an existing United States 
Bureau of Labor statistics (BLS) crosswalk which matched these data. The SOC-10 is the 
Standard Occupational Classification System, a federal standard used by federal agencies to 
classify occupational categories (“U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics”, n.d.). Occupation codes used 
in the SOC coded data are equivalent to the codes used by O*NET (“O*Net Resource Center”, 
2010) and allow for the linkage of the ISCO-08 data collected by the EULFS to the O*NET job 
zones (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).  
Adapting the BLS crosswalk was necessary as the ISCO scores provided by the EULFS were 
coded as three digits and the BLS crosswalk was created using the four digit ISCO scores. That 
is, in order to use this crosswalk, I had to reduce the level of detail of the ISCO code from four 
digits to three digits.  
Specifically, the ISCO codes occupations into one of many unit groups at the most detailed 
level of the classification hierarchy (“ISCO”, 2012) where each occupation is described by a four 
digit code. Digit one corresponds with the most general group category (e.g., Services and Sales 
Workers) known as the Major group, digit two corresponds with the Sub-Major group and 
provides increased specificity (e.g., Personal Service Workers), digit three corresponds with the 
Minor Group and provided even more occupational specificity (e.g., travel attendants, 
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conductors and guides) and digit four, the Unit Groups, provide the most specificity in 
occupational category (e.g., travel guides, transport conductors). Thus, for example, rather than 
using code 1111 (Legislators) and 1112 (Senior Government Officials) as separate groups, I had 
to categorize them both under code 111 (Legislators and Senior Officials).  
The SOC taxonomy is organized similarly and includes four levels of aggregation: Major 
groups, minor groups, broad occupations, and detailed occupations, each with an increased level 
of occupational specificity. The numerical codes used for SOC categorization contain six digits 
where the first and second digits represent the major group, the third digit represents the minor 
group, the fourth and fifth digits represent the broad occupation and the sixth digit represents the 
detailed occupation (O*NET, 2010). To modify the BLS crosswalk and compare the EULFS 
provided ISCO data to data provided by SOC and usable with O*NET, I had to reduce the six 
digits SOC code such that the last three digits were adjusted to zero. As an example, SOC code 
11-1031 (Legislators) and 11-1011 (Chief Executives) were categorized under code 11-1000 
(Top Executives).  
When adapting the BLS crosswalk to fit with data provided by the EULFS, I followed the 
same steps detailed in the BLS Crosswalk Guide (“BLS”, 2012). The steps were as follows: 
download the existing BLS linkage file which detailed ISCO codes and their corresponding SOC 
titles. Next, examine that each of the ISCO detailed definitions match with the SOC titles and 
reduce their level of coded specificity as per what was detailed above. Lastly, review all matches 
second time to determine whether they represent a one to one correspondence between the ISCO 
and SOC titles. If a 4 digit ISCO code matched with more than one SOC code, the detailed 
definition subcategories were examined to see which SOC code was a better fit based on the 
descriptions of the occupations. Once these steps were completed, the ISCO codes in the EULFS 
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main dataset were transformed into their appropriate SOC codes which were then matched to 
their corresponding O*NET job zone category. The job zone category data was acquired from 
O*NET 15.1, the version of O*NET which corresponds to the SOC 10 (O*NET Data Dictionary, 
2011).  
Control Variables 
Both hours worked and time in country acted as covariates in my analyses and were 
controlled for. These are discussed below.  
Hours Worked. The number of hours worked at the main job (per week) was collected from 
the EULFS item which read “Number of hours per week usually worked in the main job”. Hours 
worked may confound human and social capital as well as career achievement and 
compensation. This is because larger number of hours worked would presumably result in a 
broader accrual of work experience and an increased opportunity to make work related social 
connections, thereby improving HC and SC resources, respectively. Similarly, both career 
achievement and annual compensation are likely to rise with time invested in the labor force 
(Lazear, 2018).  
Time in Country. Time in country was acquired by looking at two variables from the 
EULFS. They asked the respondents their current age and the “Age at which person last 
established their usual residence in the country.” These data were provided in five-year bands. 
To compute time in country, I subtracted the respondent’s age at which they arrived in the 
country from their current age, resulting in the length of time the respondent has been in the 
country (also in five-year bands). The concern about time in country confounding human and 
social capital as well as career achievement and compensation were based in similar logic to the 
potentially confounding nature of hours worked. That is to say, the longer an individual is 
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established in a particular country, the more likely they are to develop their work and education 
experiences (human capital), social networks (social capital) and achieve increased work success 
and by extension income.  
Country-level (Macro) Data 
Dataset  
In addition to the EULFS, my study also incorporated data from the project GLOBE, the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The OECD is a 36-member intergovernmental forum of countries which 
discuss and develop social and economic policies (“About the OECD”, 2018). Project GLOBE 
dimensions are typologies of cultural values. MIPEX is a composite index based on a variety of 
policies about integrating migrants into EU member states as well as other countries (e.g., Japan, 
Turkey, United States). All but the OECD were discussed in greater detail in chapter 3. The 
OECD is discussed in the Measures section of this chapter.  
Measures 
Cultural Dimensions 
     “As is” (also referred to as “practice”) cultural dimension scores for Power Distance, 
Individualism Collectivism, and Gender Egalitarianism were obtained from House et al.’s (2004) 
scores for each country on the from project GLOBE.  
GDP Per Capita 
GDP per capita was acquired from the OECD’s GDP per capita indicator. These values 
are in United States Dollars and are internationally comparable across countries for any single 
year. As the EULFS data was collected in 2014, GDP per capita scores were collected for the 
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prior year (2013). This is because GDP from 2014 will not likely have had time to impact 
migrants’ experiences in their adopted country.  
Social Expenditure 
 Social expenditure data was acquired from the OECD’s social expenditure indicators. 
These values are in United States Dollars and are internationally comparable across countries for 
any single year. As the EULFS data were collected in 2014, social expenditure scores were 
collected for the prior year (2013) as social expenditure policies enacted in 2014 may not have 
taken effect when the data were collected. 
Labor Market Mobility 
An overall Labor market mobility score was obtained from MIPEX 2014. The items of 
relevance to this measure read: “can legal migrants have comparable workers’ rights and 
opportunities like nationals to access jobs and improve their skills?” (this item asks about labor 
market access), “can legal migrants have their specific needs addressed as workers born and 
trained abroad?” (this item refers to labor market support) and “Do legal migrants have the same 
work and social security rights like EU nationals or locals?” (this item addresses workers’ rights) 
(“MIPEX”, 2015). 
Analytical Strategy  
In the following section, I discuss my analytical strategy including how measures were 
created for each variable, some very preliminary results pertaining to the creation of measures, 
and my main analyses. All analyses were conducted using SPSS, unless otherwise stated.  
Measure Creation  
To determine if the items in the human and social capital measures should be treated as a 
composite measure, I performed a type of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) known as a 
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Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis (NLPCA) on these scores. A Principal Component 
Analysis is a technique used to reduce a larger set of variables into a smaller set of “artificial” 
variables (known as principal components) which contain most of the variance of the original 
variables (Linting & Van der Kooij, 2012). NLPCA is appropriate for variables using mixed 
measurement levels (i.e., nominal, ordinal, or numeric) which may not be linearly related to each 
other (Manisera et al., 2010).  
To conduct the NLPCA, I primarily referenced a tutorial by Linting and van der Kooij (2012) 
and an article by Saukani and Ismail (2018) which used NLPCA to create a measure of SC. 
NLPCA does not make assumptions about the data (i.e., distributions, skewness) nor is it 
concerned with strong correlations between the categorical variables in the analysis (Linting & 
van der Kooij, 2012). However, to work properly, NLPCA requires that the data must not 
include zero coded response options or negative scores, that outliers be removed (outliers fall 
beyond the plotted range of -3.5 to 3.5 in the principal component space), and response options 
with very low response rates (within a variable) be merged with other response options within 
the same variable. The definition of “low” is debated, but authors argue that a good rule of 
thumb for an acceptable response rate is an n of 8 or more (Linting & van der Kooij, 2012; 
Markus, 1994).  
Prior to conducting the NLPCA, I ran preliminary analyses and modified data according to 
the recommendations detailed in the previous paragraph. Specifically, variables with zero coded 
responses were recoded such that the value was one or greater, data were checked to ensure no 
negative responses, and outlier cases were removed. In total, 29 cases were removed as they 
were outliers, meaning they had scores that fell a large distance from other component scores in 
the principal component space (or exceeding the plotted range of -3.5 to 3.5). Additionally, three 
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variables were recoded so that they will fit the aforementioned criteria. The first, “Contact with 
Others” had two of its response options recoded into one. The original response options were 
“Occasional contact with others”, “Contact with others most of the time” and “Constant contact 
with others.” As the response rate for “occasional contact with others” was chosen by only 0.1% 
of respondents (n = 13), this response option was combined with “Contact with others most of 
the time” to create a dichotomous variable (newly defined as “Constant contact with others” and 
“Contact with others most of the time or less”). Similarly, “Main professional status” was 
recoded such that the response options “self-employed” and “employee” were merged, thus 
creating a dichotomous variable containing the response options “employed” or “unemployed.” 
Lastly the variable participation in language courses was reverse coded so that it’s directionality 
will align with the rest of the variables to be analyzed in the NLPCA.  
To conduct the NLPCA, I used the CATPCA (categorical principal component analysis) 
function on SPSS. CATPCA analyses were conducted for both the human and social capital 
measures separately. As mentioned earlier in my paper, I attempted to extract two primary 
factors, one representing human capital and the other representing social capital. Overall, both 
attempts were unsuccessful and alternative attempts were made. These attempts are discussed 
below after an overview of how to interpret CATPCA output.  
Interpreting the output of a CATPCA is similar to the interpretation of traditional Principal 
Component Analysis (Linting & Van der Kooij, 2012). As a general rule of thumb, any 
eigenvalue greater than one should be retained as it is indicative that the variables load on that 
factor (Tabachnick et al., 2007). However, the CATPCA also provides a Cronbach’s alpha score 
and the variance accounted for (VAF) by the component, both of which should be considered as 
well when deciding on the number factors to be extracted (Saukani & Ismail, 2019). Saukani and 
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Ismail (2019) argue that in CATPCA, the VAF should be considered the main criterion in 
variable selection for factor extraction and is the most important indication of fit for both the 
principal components and the quantified variables. The rule of thumb for VAF in variable per 
component is such that 10% is poor, 20% is fair, 30% is good, 40% is very good, and 50% or 
greater is excellent.  
The attempt to extract factor(s) representing human capital, as defined earlier in my 
dissertation, resulted in a Cronbach’s alpha of .337 with an eigenvalue of 1.370 and a VAF of 
27.40%. While the eigenvalue in this case is above one, both the Cronbach’s alpha and the VAF 
are less than ideal. Similarly, the output for the social capital factor(s) were unacceptable, albeit 
slightly better than the human capital results. That is, results for social capital indicated a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.486, an eigenvalue of 1.480 with the total variance explained at 49.33%.  
In an attempt to better the model’s component loadings, I rotated my models using both 
orthogonal (e.g., varimax) and oblique (e.g., oblimin) rotations (Brown, 2009). Neither type of 
rotation provided a better fit over the other or over the original results. Next, I examined multiple 
combinations of variables which logically or theoretically made sense to explore together. Some 
examples of attempts at re-examining these data include the removal of the age variable from the 
creation of the human capital composite variable (which improved results slightly showing a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.248, eigenvalue of 1.198, and VAF of 39.93%), the creation of a language 
based variable (by examining the factor loadings of the variables “ skills in host country 
language” and “participation in language courses”; resulting in a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.316, 
eigenvalue of 1.187, and VAF of 59.35%) and the shifting of the “participation in language 
courses” variable from the human capital grouping to the social capital grouping (resulting in a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.051, an eigen value of 1.035 and a VAF of 34.5% for the newly attempted 
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human capital measure, and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.313, eigenvalue of 1.306 and VAF of 
43.55% for the newly attempted social capital measure). The rationale for shifting the 
“participation in language courses variable” was that participation in language courses may 
expose individuals to more people, thereby improving social capital. Ultimately, I decided on the 
use of a single composite variable instead of the human and social capital measures I initially 
sought to create. This measure consists of the variables “Main [professional] Status” (initially 
thought to be part of the human capital composite variable), “Frequency of working from home” 
and “Contact with Others” (both initially slated for the social capital composite variable). 
Combined in the CATPCA analysis, these variables resulted in a perfect single factor extraction 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of 1.00, eigenvalue of 3.00, and VAF of 100%. I then combined the 
ratings on these three items to create a new composite variable which I will hereby refer to as 
Revised Social Capital (RSC). By definition, this variable is a form of Social Capital. It is 
composed of items which examined whether this person was employed or unemployed at the 
time of survey, time spent working inside or outside the home, and an individual’s contact with 
others at work. This fits into the definition of Social Capital as a network of norms, relationships, 
and trust with others which are effective towards achieving a common objective (Becker, 1962; 
Schuller, 2000). Figure D shows the updated hypothesized multilevel model in its entirety.  
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Figure D 
Hypothesized Multilevel Model 
 
 
Main Analyses Description 
As previously stated, the micro-level patterns of relationships that I predicted were consistent 





Institutional Collectivism  
 
National Policies: 
GDP per capita 
Social Expenditure 
 
 Labor Market Mobility: 

























MIGRATION AND WORK 88 
 
element to my model. More specifically, on the micro-level, moderation refers to an interaction 
where the effect of a predictor variable (i.e., migrant type) on an outcome variable (i.e., career 
outcome) varies across the levels of another predictor (i.e., gender) (Cohen et al., 2013). A 
mediation effect is one where the effect of a predictor variable (e.g., migrant type) on an 
outcome variable (e.g., career outcome) is carried by a third variable which acts as a mediator 
(e.g., career-related resources) (Cohen et al., 2013). A moderated mediation is a model in which 
the mediated effects on an outcome variable are dependent upon the level of one or more 
moderator variables (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). The multilevel component existed at the macro 
level in my model because my data could not be analyzed on an individual level alone as 
migrants are nested within another structure (country level data) (Livert et al., 2001; Rindskopf, 
2010).  
In cases where data were nested within another structure, it was important to consider the 
higher order level (country level characteristics) in which the data are nested (Livert et al., 2001; 
Zyphur et al., 2019). Multilevel models help ensure that the interpretation of analysis is done at 
the correct level for the given study. Multilevel modeling considers the country level 
characteristics level (or higher order level data), called level 2 data, within which the individual 
level data (level 1 data) are nested (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). When working with nested data, 
the assumption of independence of observations is not ensured due the relationships that exist 
among the individual level variables nested within the same country (Hofmann, 1997; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In other words, there may be characteristics of one country (e.g., 
national policies), which are not present in another, and are biasing responses of all participants 
from that country. Using multilevel data can reduce concerns about aggregation bias, which can 
occur when correlations at a high level (e.g., country level) are not equivalent to those at an 
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individual level (e.g., migrant level) (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In the case of my study, I 
predicted that there may be links between level 1 predictors (immigrant type) and level 2 
predictors (national culture, national policies). Put another way, RSC, career achievement and 
compensation may be products of similarities between migrant types in a particular country (e.g., 
products of the same cultural dimensions and policies).  
When groups (migrants in my study) are nested in countries, different variances and effects 
are mixed (between group and within group) (Cronbach, 1976; Zhang et al., 2009). Between 
group variances are related to group means. Within group variances are related to deviations 
away from the mean. In other words, when making inferences on the data analysis, within group 
terms represent individuals (migrants) within their migrant group (i.e., SIEs, ESEs, AGMs,) 
within a country and between group terms represent the migrants within their migrant groups 
(i.e., SIEs, ESEs, AGMs) between countries.   
To test my predictions, I used MLMED version 2.0. This is a computational macro for SPSS 
that can be used to test multilevel models containing more than one mediator (Rockwood, 2019). 
This version of MLMED was released in May 2019 and can test up to three continuous partial 
mediations, multilevel analysis of moderation of fixed effects, and three covariates on both levels 
one and two (Rockwood, 2019), meeting the anticipated analytical needs of my model. Relying 
on MLMED rather than traditional multilevel techniques (e.g., hierarchical linear modeling) 
made it possible to analyze and properly interpret these data (McCullagh & Nelder, 2018). Other 
benefits to MLMED are that it allows the user to substantially reduce data manipulation (and the 
possibility of user error) when compared to traditional multilevel techniques by automatically 
categorizing level-1 predictors into within and between level cluster components, calculates the 
indirect effects for relationships both within and between levels, generates Monte Carlo 
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Confidence Intervals (which require extra analytical steps in SPSS when not using MLMED) for 
the index of moderated mediation (discussed below) and for conditional indirect effects, and 
organizes output by equation level and level of analysis (Hayes & Rockwood, 2020).  
The first part of my analysis examined the mechanism by which a work related outcomes 
(i.e., financial compensation, career achievement) operated while the second part of my analysis 
examined the boundary conditions of the aforementioned effects (Hayes & Rockwood, 2020). 
That is, the first part of my analysis examined any mediation effects between the predictor and 
the outcome variables and the second part of my analysis examined moderation effects on all 
stages of my model. Once these analyses were complete, I tested to see if my model showed 
evidence of a moderated mediation. Each step is discussed in detail below.  
Mediation Description  
As mentioned above, I started my main analyses by examining whether the predictor (i.e., 
immigrant type) related to the outcome (i.e., financial compensation, career achievement through 
the mediator (i.e., revised social capital), and if so, was the mediation effect full (meaning that 
without the mediator variable present, the predictor will not have an effect on the outcome) or 
partial (meaning that the mediator variable explains part of the variation in the outcome variable; 
H1b, H3, H5 RQ1b). Note that hypotheses testing the effects of HC (H1a, RQ1a, H2, H4) are 
now omitted from my model as they cannot be tested.  
To determine whether a mediator was present in my model, MLMED output provided details 
of both the direct (e.g., the relationship between immigrant type and financial compensation) and 
indirect effects (e.g., the relationship between immigrant type and financial compensation 
through any effects of RSC). This output indicated whether any changes in the mediator and/or 
outcome variable are likely to be a statistically significant product of the predictor variables. 
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Specifically, the p value provided in the output was used to indicate with a certain degree of 
confidence (e.g., 5% if the p value is set at 0.05) that the null hypothesis (direct or indirect) can 
be rejected. As my sample size contained thousands of respondents, it had high levels of 
statistical power. Therefore, I expected that many of my analyses will be statistically significant 
(Sullivan & Fine, 2012), increasing the likelihood of a type I error. A type I error occurs when 
the null hypothesis is falsely rejected (Sullivan & Fine, 2012). My next step was to examine the 
effect size of both the direct and indirect effects. To calculate the effect sizes, the coefficient of 
the indirect effect was divided by the sum of the direct and indirect coefficients. This result 
provided the proportion of the total effect that immigrant type has on financial compensation 
indirectly, through the mediator. Subtracting this percentage from 100 provided the remaining 
percentage amount indicating the direct effect of immigrant type on financial compensation. 
It is worth noting that MLMED uses a within-group centering approach prior to estimating 
the within group effects and uses group means to estimate the between-group effects (Rockwood, 
2019). This is done so that the coefficients produced by MLMED will be interpretable with the 
range of the data. Centering has no effect on the value or size of the index of moderated 
mediation (Hayes, 2015; Rockwood, 2019) 
Moderation Description 
The second part of my analysis was a conditional process analysis. That is, it examined when 
or for whom do the direct or indirect relationships between the predictor and outcome variables 
exist (Hayes & Rockwood, 2020). The variables used to examine these boundary conditions, 
known as moderating variables, stemmed from both level one (i.e., respondent marital status) 
and level two (i.e., respondent’s current host country) of my model (See Figure D for current 
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hypothesized model). They were tested as first- or second- stage moderators, depending on the 
variable using MLMED’s a first- or second-stage conditional process model.  
As was stated in an earlier chapter, a first-stage moderator operates in the first step of the 
mediator process, meaning as a moderating variable between the independent variable and the 
mediating variable. In first-stage moderation, the effect of the mediator on the outcome variable 
is fixed and independent of the moderator or other variables in the model. Similarly, in the 
second-stage moderation, the moderating variable only operates on the relationship between the 
mediating variable and the outcome variable, but the effect of the independent variable on the 
mediator is fixed and independent of the moderator (Hayes & Rockwood, 2020). A first- and 
second-stage conditional process model examines whether both the first and second stage of a 
mechanism (mediator) are moderated by a common variable (Hayes & Rockwood, 2020). These 
analyses applied to hypotheses 6b, 7, 8b, 9, 10b, 12, 13, 14b and Research Questions 2, 3, 4b, 5b, 
and 6b. Hypotheses 6a, 8a, 10a, 11, and 14a and Research Questions 4a, 5a and 6a were not 
tested as they pertained to Human Capital.  
Moderated Mediation Description  
To test if a variable moderated the indirect effect between the predictor on the outcome 
variables (moderated mediation), I used the index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015). This 
index also estimated the strength of the moderation on the indirect effect. Support for the index 
of moderated mediation (and the existence of moderated mediation) was found if the Monte 
Carlo confidence interval did not include zero. In the case of my micro level variables, I tested 
for moderated mediation twice for each hypothesized moderating variable: once to test for 
moderated mediation using a first stage moderating variable and once using a second stage 
moderating variable. This was done because MLMED does not allow to test for both first and 
MIGRATION AND WORK 93 
 
second stage moderated mediation simultaneously using a single variable. Testing twice for 
moderated mediation was not the case for my Macro level moderating variables as these were 
only hypothesized as first stage mediators.  
Collectively, therefore, the use of MLMED provided a method for testing my model that 
improved the efficiency of analysis and reduced the potential for user error. These analyses 
applied to hypotheses 15b, 16, 17b, and 18b and Research Questions 7, 8b, and 9b. Hypotheses 
15a, 17a, and 18a, and Research Questions 8a, and 9a were not tested as they applied to Human 
Capital. In the next chapter I describe my analyses, both preliminary and main. 
 





This chapter describes my preliminary and main analysis results. First, I discuss my 
preliminary analyses on the micro level, then on the macro level and finally I discuss my main 
study findings. All results can be seen in Tables 5.1-5.99. Tables 5.87-5.99 serve as summary 
tables, consolidating my findings for each of my analyses. Specifically, tables 5.87-5.94 detail 
results for analyses completed on the micro level while tables 5.95-5.99 detail results for my 
model including the macro level moderating variables. Table 5.100 offers a summary of my 
hypotheses and states whether they were supported. The summary tables can be found towards 
the end of this chapter. The rest of the tables are interspersed throughout the chapter, where 
appropriate.  
One important note about the interpretation of these results, some Standard Deviation and 
Standard Error coefficients are very large and indicate that there may be extreme values in the 
data and/or some parameters may not have been estimated well. This occurs throughout many of 
the results but particularly when testing models with moderating variables and especially when 
these models include career achievement as the outcome. The dispersion of scores for many of 
the moderating variables and for career achievement were heavily skewed in one direction 
(either positive or negative skew, depending on the variable) which may be the reason for the 
larger than expected Standard Deviations and Standard Errors. Attempts at correcting these 
skews were made, unsuccessfully (discussed later in this chapter). Therefore, caution is 
warranted when interpreting these results.  
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Preliminary Analyses: Micro Level 
Descriptive analyses were examined for each item in the level 1 portion of my model and 
consisted of descriptive statistics and tests of variable interrelationships. All descriptive results 
are consolidated here as well. These descriptive analyses were performed for the full sample of 
immigrants (i.e., ESEs, AGMs, and SIEs) (n = 17,403) which included immigrants who met the 
following criteria: (1) aged 25-54 (to ensure adults were of prime working age as these are adults 
in their most productive working years) (Boushey, 2005; Lyness et al., 2012) and (2) emigrants 
into European Countries who fall into one of three focal immigrant groups (employer sponsored 
expatriates, asylum granted migrants, self-initiated expatriates). The number of respondents, by 
country are displayed in Table 4.1. The respondent’s age, by country, are displayed in Tables 
4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 with the tables showing the respondents age mean and standard deviation, age 
bands by percentage, and sample n, respectively. Respondents’ reason for migrating are 
displayed in Table 4.5 where ESEs represented just under one-third of the sample (31.2%), SIEs 
represented just under two-thirds of the sample (59.1%) and AGMs represented roughly the 
remaining ten percent (9.6%). Reason for migration is further broken down in Table 4.6 which 
displays each group’s reason for migrating, by country. Respondent sex is displayed in Table 4.7 
where males accounted for a little more than half of the sample (56.5%) and females accounted 
for a little less than half of the sample (43.35%) while Table 4.8 provides an overview of the 
respondent sex by country. Lastly, Table 4.9 indicates the number of migrants from home 
country to host country and Table 4.10 offers the cultural distance scores for each country 
pairing. For comparison, Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 also provide data for the original 
EULFS sample, prior to selecting respondents based on the criteria mentioned above.  
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To examine variable interrelationships, the Chi-square test was used to examine the 
relationships between my categorical variables. As the Chi-square test is sensitive to sample size 
such that a very large sample size (an n of ~500 or more) may produce a type I error (Rosenthal 
& Rosnow, 2008) and my sample size exceeds an n of 500, Cramers’ V or the Phi coefficient 
were used to examine the effect sizes of these interrelationships. The Phi coefficient was 
examined in analyses containing two variables with two levels each and Cramer’s V was used in 
analyses where one of the variables had three or more levels.  
Overall, most of the relationships showed some significant associations with each other, but 
the effect sizes were generally weak (under 0.3) meaning that any relationships are, at best, 
marginally existent (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). The relationships between immigrant type 
and: perceived discrimination X2 (2, n = 17,207) = 54.795, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.056, p = 
0.000), revised social capital X2 (2, n = 12,873) = 85.600, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.082, p = 
0.000), career achievement X2 (8, n = 12,902) = 1713.980, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.258, p = 
0.000), and financial compensation X2 (18, n = 15,830,) = 1,636.076, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 
0.227, p = 0.000, are presented in Tables 5.2-5.5 respectively. Unlike the above detailed 
relationships, migrant type and gender showed no significant association between the two 
variables X2 (2, n = 17,403) = 4.966, p = 0.83 (presented in Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 
Crosstabulation of Reason for Migration and Gender 
Reason for 
Migration 
Gender     
Male Female df X2 V 
ESE 3118 2314 2 4.966 0.017 
SIE 5828 4464    
AGM 912 767      
Note. Results were not statistically significant. n= 17,403 
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Table 5.2 
Crosstabulation of Reason for Migration and Perceived Discrimination 
Reason for 
Migration 
Perceived Discrimination   
No Yes df X2 V 
ESE 5324 64 2 54.795* 0.056* 
SIE 9845 317    
AGM 1614 43    
Note. *= p=0.00. n= 17,403 
 
Table 5.3 




Capital    
Low High df X2 V 
ESE 1107 3305 2 85.6* 0.82* 
SIE 1361 6154    
AGM 175 771    
Note. *= p=0.00. n= 12,873 
 
Table 5.4 
Crosstabulation of Reason for Migration and Career Achievement 
Reason for 
Migration 
Job Zones    
Job 






Zone 5 df X2 V 
ESE 863 1079 569 1546 368 8 1713.980* 0.258* 
SIE 2329 3343 980 748 123    
AGM 172 414 171 152 45    
Note. *= p=0.00. n= 12,902. Job Zone 1 through 5 are defined as follows: occupations that need 
little to no preparation, some preparation, medium preparation, considerable preparation, and 
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Table 5.5 



































higher df X2 V 
ESE 1211 478 304 333 331 327 306 315 353 300 585 20 1636.076* .227* 
SIE 3629 951 1071 1009 725 640 483 381 307 235 166    
AGM 804 88 92 83 73 69 50 50 33 30 18    
Note. *= p=0.00. n= 15,830. Deciles are monthly take home pay after the deduction of income tax and insurance 
contributions. They are not defined in dollar amounts but rather are a standardized approach by the EULFS to measure 
income 
 
Likewise, the relationships between revised social capital and: gender X2 (1, n =12,873) = 
196.136, p = 0.000, Φ = 0.123, p = 0.000, career achievement X2 (4, n = 12,873) = 421.429, p = 
0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.181, p = 0.000, and financial compensation X2 (10, n = 11,405,) = 
239.720, p=0.00, Cramer’s V= 0.145, p = 0.000 are presented in Tables, 5.6, 5.8, and 5.9, 
respectively. The relationship between revised social capital and perceived discrimination 
showed no significant association between the two variables X2 (1, n =12,822) = 1.873, p =0.171 
and is presented in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.6 
Crosstabulation of Revised Social Capital and Gender  
Revised Social 
Capital 
Gender    
Male Female df X2 Φ 
Low 1866 777 1 196.136* 0.123* 
High 5683 4547    
Note. *= p=0.00, n= 12,873 
 
  




Crosstabulation of Revised Social Capital and Perceived Discrimination 
Revised Social 
Capital 
Perceived Discrimination   
No Yes df X2 Φ 
Low 2609 25 1 1.873 0.12 
High 10058 130    
Note. Results were not statistically significant. n= 12,822 
 
Table 5.8 
Crosstabulation of Revised Social Capital and Career 




Job Zone    
1 2 3 4 5 df X2 V 
Low 688 753 220 816 166 4 421.429* .181* 
High 2667 4075 1498 1623 367      























Crosstabulation of Revised Social Capital and Take Home Pay     
























higher df X2 V 
Low 377 177 252 292 208 172 150 127 149 146 269 10 239.720* .145* 
High 1183 1318 1161 1087 888 835 661 582 513 401 457    
Note. *= p=0.00. n= 12,873. Deciles are monthly take home pay after the deduction of income tax and insurance contributions. They are 
not defined in dollar amounts but rather are a standardized approach by the EULFS to measure income. 
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A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test the relationships between RSC (a categorical variable) 
and cultural distance (a continuous variable) as well as the relationship between immigrant type 
(categorical) and cultural distance (continuous). The Kruskal-Wallis test was selected after 
attempting to test these relationships in other ways. Specifically, I initially intended to use a 
point-biserial correlation which tests for relationships between categorical and continuous 
variables but found that my data did not meet the necessary assumptions. A point biserial 
correlation assumes that the continuous variable is normally distributed and homoscedastic 
(Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). Testing the assumption of normal distribution, I found that both 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test (indicators of normal distribution, where 
a significant p value indicates normal distribution) were statistically significant p = 0.00, 
however the data itself appeared positively skewed in Stem & Leaf Plot and the Q-Q plot did not 
visually represent normally distributed data. Therefore, despite the significant p value, I 
interpreted the data as being skewed and the p value as an artifact of the large sample size. To 
correct for the positive skew, I made three attempts at transforming the data using the Log 
transformation method, Square root transformation method, and Reciprocal transformation 
method (Field, 2009) but none were successful.  
As the data violated the assumption of normality, I tested the aforementioned relationships 
using the Kruskal-Wallis test (Field, 2009; Kruskal & Wallis, 1952), a non-parametric test. The 
result for the relationship between RSC and cultural distance was not statistically significant 
H(1) = 0.997, p = 0.323 meaning that there was no significant relationship between the two 
variables. Put another way, the null hypothesis which states that the distribution of cultural 
distance scores is the same across both levels of RSC should be retained. However, the test of the 
relationship between immigrant type and cultural distance scores was statistically significant, 
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indicating there is a relationship between the two variables H(2) = 6.202, p = 0.045. That is, the 
distribution of cultural distance scores is not the same across the three immigrant types.  
Lastly, I attempted to examine the relationship between cultural distance and career 
achievement using an ordinal logistic regression. I chose an ordinal logistic regression as cultural 
distance is a continuous predictor, career achievement is a categorical outcome variable, and this 
analysis will allow me to see if cultural distance predicts financial compensation.  
An ordinal logistic regression holds a number of assumptions. First, it assumes that the 
dependent variable is measured at an ordinal level (as is the case with financial compensation). 
Second, it assumes that the independent variable is continuous (as is the case with cultural 
distance). Third, it assumes no multicollinearity (that is, two or more independent variables that 
are highly correlated with each other; this assumption does not need to be tested in this case as I 
only have one independent variable), and lastly, it assumes that there are proportional odds. 
Proportional odds means that each independent variable has an identical effect at each 
cumulative split of the ordinal dependent variable. The assumption of proportional odds is tested 
as part of the ordinal regression analysis and will be discussed below.  
The results of the ordinal regression show a marginally, if at all, existent relationship 
between cultural distance and financial compensation. That is, the output shows a negative effect 
where ?̂? = -0.170 which was not statistically significant p = 0.309. Similarly, the Pseudo-R2 = 
0.008 meaning that the model may explain 0.8% of the variance in financial compensation. The 
assumption of proportional odds was met X2 (9, n = 132) = 6.377, p = 0.702 
Preliminary Analyses: Macro Level 
Preliminary analyses were also completed for level 2 of my model. Like the micro level 
analyses, the macro level analyses consisted of descriptive statistics and tests of variable 
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interrelationships. The relationships between migrant type and gender egalitarianism, power 
distance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, GDP per capita, social expenditure, 
and MIPEX were all tested as well as the relationships between RSC and gender egalitarianism, 
power distance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, GDP per capita, social 
expenditure, and MIPEX.  
The relationship between migrant status (categorical) and the scale variables: gender 
egalitarianism, power distance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, GDP per capita, 
and social expenditure, and MIPEX were tested using a Kruskal-Wallis test. I originally intended 
to use a one-way ANOVA to test these interrelationships, but my data did not meet the necessary 
assumptions. A one-way ANOVA tests for relationships between categorical predictors with 3 or 
more levels and continuous outcomes. It assumes that all observations are independent, the 
dependent variable is normally distributed, and that there is homogeneity of variance (meaning 
that the variance within each of the groups being tested is equal) (Field, 2009). Gender 
egalitarianism, power distance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, GDP per capita, 
and social expenditure were not normally distributed. In all cases, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
for these variables was statistically significant p = 0.00. However, in all cases, the Stem & Leaf 
Plots and the Q-Q plots did not visually represent normally distributed data. This led me to 
interpret these data as being skewed despite the significant p value, which I believe may have 
been an artifact of the large sample size. MIPEX was the only variable which appeared to be 
normally distributed. It will be discussed below.  
The variables gender egalitarianism, institutional collectivism, and GDP per capita were 
positively skewed. The variables power distance, in-group collectivism, and social expenditure 
were negatively skewed. To attempt and correct for skews, I first conducted a reverse score 
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transformation on the negatively skewed variables only. This was done by subtracting each score 
from the highest obtained score and adding 1 (so that no scores will be zero) (Field, 2009). As all 
variables were now positively skewed, I made three attempts at transforming them using the Log 
transformation method, Square root transformation method, and Reciprocal transformation 
method (Field, 2009) but none were successful.  
As mentioned above, MIPEX was the only aforementioned variable which was normally 
distributed. Nevertheless, it did not meet the assumption of homogeneity of variance. Levene’s 
test, an indicator of homogeneity of variance, was statistically significant for MIPEX resulting in 
the use of the Kruskal-Wallis test to examine all interrelationships in the variables mentioned 
above.  
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests (Field, 2009; Kruskal & Wallis, 1952) between 
migrant status and these variables were as follows: gender egalitarianism H(2) = 230.78, 
p=0.000, power distance H(2) = 2214.04, p = 0.000, in-group collectivism H(2) = 1884.130, 
p=0.000, institutional collectivism H(2) = 2874.67, p = 0.000 , GDP per capita H(2) = 2364.48, 
p=0.000, social expenditure H(2) = 436.61, p = 0.000, and MIPEX H(2) = 595.59, p = 0.000. 
The results in all cases were statistically significant meaning that in all cases the null hypothesis 
should be rejected. The null hypothesis states that the distribution of these scores is the same 
across all three migrant groups which is not the case as per these results.  
To examine the relationships between the scale predictors gender egalitarianism, power 
distance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, GDP per capita, social expenditure, 
and MIPEX and the categorical outcome RSC, I chose to use an ordinal logistic regression. As 
noted earlier, an ordinal logistic regression assumes that the independent variable is continuous 
(as is the case with gender egalitarianism, power distance, in-group collectivism, institutional 
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collectivism, GDP per capita, social expenditure, and MIPEX), the dependent variable is 
measured at an ordinal level (as is the case with RSC), there is no multicollinearity (this 
assumption does not need to be tested in this case as I am testing one independent variable at a 
time), and lastly, that there are proportional odds (to be tested and discussed below).  
The results of the ordinal regression show that the assumption of proportional odds was met 
and there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the outcome (RSC) and 
the predictors: power distance (?̂? = 0.314, p = 0.000, Pseudo-R2 = 0.003) and in-group 
collectivism (?̂? = 0.270, p = 0.000, Pseudo-R2 = 0.006) meaning that across the entire sample, an 
increase in either of these variables will result in an increase in RSC. A statistically significant 
and negative relationship was found between the outcome (RSC) and the predictors: gender 
egalitarianism (?̂? = -0.497, p = 0.000, Pseudo-R2 = 0.005) and institutional collectivism (?̂? =       
-0.439, p = 0.000, Pseudo-R2 = 0.008) meaning that an increase in one of these variables was 
associated with a decrease in RSC. See table 5.10 for more details and assumption of 
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Table 5.10 
Ordinal Regression and Assumption of Proportional Odds  











R2 X2 df 
Assumption 
Met? 
Gender Egalitarianism -0.497* 0.005 1.146 1 Yes 
Power Distance 0.314* 0.003 0.469 1 Yes 
In-group collectivism 0.270* 0.006 0.73 1 Yes 
Institutional collectivism -0.439* 0.008 0.391 1 Yes 
GDP per capita -a 0.015 11.224* 1 No 
Social Expenditure -0.061* 0.006 10.779* 1 No 
MIPEX 0.008* 0.002 7.413* 1 No 
Note. *=p<0.05, n ranges from 10,461 to 12,873. a analysis did not produce result 
 
Nevertheless, the assumption of proportional odds was not met for the relationships between 
RSC (outcome variable) and the predictors GDP per capita, social expenditure, and MIPEX (see 
table 5.10). As it is not uncommon for this assumption to fail when sample sizes are large (large 
defined as an n of a few hundred or more) (Allison, 1999; Long & Freese, 2014) and 
restructuring this dataset to relax these assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper, I decided 
to examine these relationships using a multinomial logistic regression. This type of regression 
makes no assumptions about linearity, homogeneity of variance, or normality (Williams, 2016). 
Nevertheless, it does assume a nominal dependent variable (RSC is ordinal, but will be treated as 
nominal for the purposes of this analysis), and an independence of cases (appropriate for my 
dataset as data were collected from individuals with no repeated measures) (Starkweather & 
Moske, n.d.) The outcomes of this analysis show that in relation to RSC, GDP per capita (?̂? = 
128.20 p = 0.000, Pseudo-R2 = 0.016), social expenditure (?̂? = 61.78, p = 0.000, Pseudo-R2 = 
0.008), and MIPEX (?̂? = 25.49, p = 0.000, Pseudo-R2 = 0.003) all make a statistically significant 
and positive contribution to the model. The next section will discuss my main analyses.  
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Main Analyses 
MLMED makes no assumptions about the data. However, it is a parametric test requiring that 
variables be continuous (Rockwood, 2019). The exploration of these variables in the preliminary 
analyses indicated that many nominal or ordinal variables had to modified to be used with 
MLMED. Specifically, on the micro level, my predictor (migrant type) was nominal, and my 
mediating (RSC) and outcome variables (compensation and career achievement) were ordinal.  
As multiple predictors could not be entered into MLMED and examined simultaneously, I 
found it necessary to modify my predictors for ease of use with the program. I dummy coded 
them such that each group was compared against the other (ESEs [coded as 0] compared with 
SIEs [coded as 1]; AGMs [coded as 0] compared with ESEs [coded as 1]; SIEs [coded as 0] 
compared with AGMs [coded as 1]). The variables were dummy coded in this way, rather than a 
traditional reference group dummy coding approach where one variable is compared against all 
others, as this approach allowed for a clear comparison of one group to another.  
I adjusted my mediating variable (RSC) by creating an approximate continuous scale for it. 
This was done by summing the scores of the three measures making up RSC (Main 
[professional] Status, Frequency of Working from Home, and Contact with Others) for employed 
individuals only, resulting in a four point scale ranging from four to seven and representing low 
to high RSC. Unemployed individuals were not included in the initial summation as they did not 
have meaningful scores for Frequency of Working from Home and Contact with Others. That is, 
while employed individuals were assigned scores for these two scales, unemployed individuals 
were marked as “not applicable.” They were therefore assigned a score of three. These variables 
were then recoded such that the scores ranged from one to five. 
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 My outcome variables (compensation and career achievement) were left as is. They were 
ordinal and each contained five or more categories meaning that they could be used as 
continuous without any adverse effect to the analysis (Johnson & Creech, 1983; Norman, 2010; 
Sullivan & Artino, 2013; Zumbo & Zimmerman, 1993). The variables perceived discrimination 
and gender (moderators) were nominal but dichotomous and therefore did not need to be 
adjusted (as it was possible to clearly compare the results of one level of these variables against 
the other), the variable cultural distance (moderator) was scale and fine to use as is, and the 
control variables (hours worked and time in country) were scale and ordinal, respectively, where 
time in country did not need to be modified as it had five or more categories. Lastly, the 
variables on the Macro level did not need to be adjusted as they were all continuous. These 
included gender egalitarianism, power distance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, 
GDP per capita, social expenditure, and the labor market mobility scores (MIPEX scores) which 
would all be tested as moderators.  
My hypotheses were tested in two stages. First, I tested the direct and indirect effects of my 
predictor on my mediating variable and my mediating variable on my outcome (H1-H5, RQ1). 
These analyses were performed 12 times in total, once for each of my three dummy variable 
pairings without the covariates (hours worked and time in country) and once with the covariates 
for each of my two outcome variables. The comparison of the results with and without the 
covariate variables was done to determine if the covariates should be included in the conditional 
indirect effects model. The covariates could be removed from the moderated mediation models if 
they were found to have no effect on the inferences. This step was crucial as the inclusion of 
unnecessary control variables or those not supported by theory can bias research findings 
(Bernerth & Aguinis 2016; Spector & Brannick, 2011). Next, I tested the effects of the 
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moderating variables (both on the micro and macro levels) on my primary variables (micro: H6-
H9, H15-H16, RQ2-RQ3, RQ7; macro: H10-H14, H17-H18, RQ4-RQ6, RQ8-RQ9) and 
examined the results to see if moderated mediation was occurring. These analyses are discussed 
in detail below.  
Also of note, is that the effect sizes could not be calculated for my analyses with the 
exception of my mediation analyses. This is because while the MLMED output produces beta 
weights and standard errors, it does not produce a measure of effect size such as R2 which is 
commonly used in regression models to determine effect sizes (Field, 2009; Lorah, 2018) nor 
does it provide enough information to calculate R2 (e.g., residual coefficients, sum of squares). 
As a result, I decided to make qualitative comparisons of my results using the beta coefficients 
and the standard deviations (which were not provided by MLMED but rather calculated from the 
standard error scores by multiplying the square root of the sample size by the standard error) 
(Field, 2009). I was able to make these comparisons for two reasons: First, as noted above, my 
predictors were all dummy coded as 0 and 1, in effect standardizing my analyses and allowing 
for a one to one comparison of results between migrant groups. Second, with each hypothesis 
test, my model remained constant with the exception of the migrant group (predictors, which 
were all coded the same) reinforcing a test of a standardized model allowing for the comparison 
of migrant groups. As an example, H7a which tests the moderating of gender on financial 
compensation across migrant groups was analyzed three times, once for each migrant group. The 
model being tested remained identical with each analysis, except for the group variable predictor 
which changed. Therefore, a comparison of the beta weights and standard deviations between the 
results of each of the three analyses (one for each migrant group) is an appropriate way to gauge 
differences among migrant groups given the limitations of MLMED.  
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Levels of RSC Among Migrant Groups.  
Hypothesis 1b anticipated that AGMs would have lower levels of RSC resources than ESEs 
or SIEs while Research Question 1b asked whether RSC resources would differ between ESEs 
and SIEs. Prior to the addition of the covariates, results were supportive of hypothesis 1b as they 
indicated that the relationship between AGMs and RSC was the weakest. Specifically, the 
relationship between AGM’s migrant status and RSC was negative such that AGMs appear to 
have the highest reduction in levels of RSC (β = -0.75, p = 0.000, SD = 6.50) when compared to 
SIEs (β = -0.21, p = 0.000, SD = 3.67) and ESEs (β = 1.04, p = 0.000, SD = 4.11). While there 
were differences in the standard deviations (smallest for SIEs, followed by ESEs, and AGMs) all 
three SDs were small (especially when accounting for sample sizes in the thousands), indicating 
that the dispersion of scores among these three groups is small. These results also provide a 
response to RQ1 such that SIEs had the weaker relationship RSC than ESEs.  
After controlling for the covariates, H1b still showed the same patterns of relationships noted 
above for AGMs. That is, AGMs’ migrant status reduced levels of RSC the most, but this 
relationship was weakened (β = -0.09, p = 0.009, SD =3.51). Interestingly, the inclusion of 
covariates changed the relationships between ESE, SIEs and RSC such that the relationship 
between ESEs and RSC was no longer significant (β = 0.01, p = 0.725, SD = 2.43) and being an 
SIE was now beneficial to RSC (β = 0.07, p = 0.000, SD = 2.25). Together, these results change 
the RQ1 conclusion such that being an SIE is now more beneficial to RSC than being an ESE. 
Moreover, while the patterns of SDs remained the same as above (that is, highest SD for AGMs 
and lowest for SIEs), the SDs themselves were reduced, indicating that these covariates reduce 
data volatility with values closer to the mean. 
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The between group findings were not statistically significant and did not provide any sign of 
a contextual effect for these relationships (H1b and RQ1) regardless of covariate inclusion in the 
analyses. That is to say, these results did not differ by country for these migrant groups. The 
results prior to the inclusion of the covariates were smallest for AGMs (β = -1.15, p = 0.127, SD 
= 76.96), followed by SIEs (β = 0.38, p = 0.681, SD = 113.371), and ESEs (β = 0.88, p = 0.299, 
SD = 67.40), mimicking the above pattern of within-group results. The SD results here indicated 
a larger dispersion of scores between countries than within countries, with SD coefficients 
highest for SIEs (not AGMs like the data within-groups) and the smallest for AGMs (not SIEs as 
was the case within groups). These results make sense as it is logical that scores will vary more 
between countries than within countries. Also of note is that the dispersion of scores among SIEs 
was slightly more than one and half times that of ESEs.  
The results after the inclusion of covariates, coefficients were smallest for AGMs (β = -0.04, 
p = 0.838, SD = 18.62), followed by ESEs (β = 0.08, p = 0.680, SD = 15.40), and SIEs (β = 0.27, 
p = 0.309, SD = 31.51) and none were significant. Interestingly, again the variability in the 
scores was different between groups when compared to within groups such that the SD was 
highest for SIEs (not AGMs as was the case within groups) and lowest for ESEs (not SIEs as was 























Relationship between Migrant Status and Social Capital Resources With and Without the Covariate Inclusion, Within Effects 
 No Covariate 
 
Covariate 
Variable β SE p-value SD LL UL β SE p-value SD LL UL 
Constant 3.48* 0.53 0.000 66.01 2.37 4.59 1.71* 0.47 0.003 57.42 0.70 2.72 
SIE -0.21* 0.03 0.000 3.67 -0.27 -0.15 0.07* 0.02 0.000 2.24 0.04 0.11              
Constant 2.89* 0.65 0.000 53.42 1.50 4.28 1.83* 0.35 0.000 28.37 1.08 2.57 
ESE 1.04* 0.05 0.000 4.11 0.94 1.13 0.01 0.03 0.725 2.43 -0.06 0.79              
Constant 3.70* 0.24 0.000 26.01 3.19 4.22 2.07* 0.37 0.000 39.55 1.28 2.86 
AGM -0.75* 0.06 0.000 6.50 -0.86 -0.64 -0.09* 0.03 0.009 3.51 -0.15 -0.02 
             
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per 




Relationship between Migrant Status and Social Capital Resources With and Without the Covariate Inclusion, Between Effects 
 No Covariate Covariate 
Variable β SE p-value SD LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE 0.38 0.92 0.681 113.37 -1.52 2.29 0.27 0.26 31.51 0.309 -0.28 0.82 
ESE 0.88 0.82 0.299 67.40 -0.85 2.61 0.08 0.19 15.40 0.680 -0.35 0.51 
AGM -1.15 0.71 0.127 76.96 -2.67 0.37 -0.04 0.17 18.62 0.838 -0.41 0.34 
             
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and 
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The Relationship Between Social Capital and Career Outcomes 
Hypothesis 3 anticipated that social capital resources positively relate to 3a) financial 
compensation and 3b) career achievement such that migrants with greater RSC will obtain 
greater financial compensation and career achievement. Starting with H3a (where the outcome is 
financial compensation), prior to the addition of the covariates, results indicated that the effects 
of social capital on financial compensation were strong and positive across all three groups. This 
relationship was strongest for ESEs (β = 0.96, p = 0.000, SD = 1.96), followed by SIEs (β = 0.87, 
p = 0.000, SD = 1.63) and AGMs (β = 0.82, p = 0.000, SD = 1.34). Additionally, all SDs were 
very small indicating consistent data patterns. H3a asked if the migrant group with greatest RSC 
will also have the greatest financial compensation. I reviewed these results in the context of the 
outcomes for RQ1. According to RQ1, ESEs had the largest positive effect on RSC. According 
to the results noted above, revised social capital was also the most impactful on financial 
compensation for ESEs. Therefore, collectively and prior to the inclusion of covariates, H3a is 
supported as the group with the greatest RSC also has the strongest relationship between RSC 
and financial compensation.  
After the inclusion of the control variables, the strength of the relationships was weakened 
across all three comparison groups and the relationship patterns between RSC and financial 
compensation changed. RSC had the strongest effect on financial compensation for ESEs (β = 
0.33, p = 0.000, SD = 1.94) followed by AGMs (β = 0.29, p = 0.000, SD = 1.33) and then SIEs 
(β = 0.26, p = 0.000, SD = 1.61) with SD number shrinking slightly but still showing the same 
patterns of data dispersion (highest for ESEs, lowest for AGMs). As RQ1 concluded that being 
an SIE was more beneficial to RSC than being an ESE, and ESEs were the group with the 
strongest relationship between RSC and financial compensation, H3a was no longer supported.  
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The between group results indicated that country level factors are likely influencing this 
relationship (between RSC and financial compensation) for all three migrant groups. Results 
were statistically significant and positive for all three groups prior to the inclusion of covariates 
with the strongest relationships for ESE (β = 1.19, p = 0.000, SD = 23.98), followed by SIEs (β = 
1.18, p = 0.000, SD = 31.27), and lastly AGMs (β = 1.06, p = 0.000, SD = 21.35). After the 
inclusion of covariates, results were statistically significant for two of the three migrant groups 
SIE (β = 0.53, p = 0.073, SD = 30.87), and AGMs (β = 0.56, p = 0.008, SD = 21.06) but not 
statistically significant for ESEs (β = 0.46, p = 0.133, SD = 23.65). SDs for the between group 
results were larger than within group results and showed a pattern different than within group 
results (with group SDs were highest for ESEs and lowest for AGMs while between group 
results are highest for SIEs and lowest for AGMs) lending further support to the idea that 
countries play a role in the relationship between RSC and financial compensation, particularly 























Relationship between Social Capital Resources and Financial Compensation with and without the Covariate Inclusion, within effects 
             
 No Covariate Covariate  
Variable β SE p-value SD LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
Constant -0.82 1.06 0.444 130.76 -2.99 1.35 -2.53 2.53 129.11 0.330 -7.82 2.76 
SIE 0.87* 0.01 0.000 1.63 0.84 0.89 0.26* 0.02 1.61 0.000 0.22 0.31 
             
Constant -1.75 1.27 0.181 104.77 -4.37 0.87 -2.30 2.34 103.33 0.339 -7.22 2.62 
ESE 0.96* 0.02 0.000 1.96 0.91 1.00 0.33* 0.04 1.94 0.000 0.26 0.41 
             
Constant -1.24 0.79 0.126 85.28 -2.84 0.37 -3.35 1.62 84.10 0.057 -6.81 0.10 
AGM 0.82* 0.01 0.000 1.34 0.79 0.84 0.29* 0.02 1.33 0.000 0.25 0.33 
             
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per 





The relationship between Social Capital Resources and Financial Compensation with and without the covariate inclusion, between effects 
 No Covariate Covariate  
Variable β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE 1.18* 0.25 31.27 0.000 0.66 1.70 0.53 0.28 30.87 0.073 -0.05 1.10 
ESE 1.19* 0.29 23.98 0.000 0.59 1.78 0.46 0.30 23.65 0.133 -0.15 1.08 
AGM 1.06* 0.20 21.35 0.000 0.66 1.46 0.56 0.20 21.06 0.008 0.16 0.97 
             
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week 
and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Results for H3b were quite different and indicated that the effects of social capital on career 
achievement were strong, but negative, across all three groups (as in, having higher social capital 
was actually detrimental to career achievement). This relationship was strongest for AGMs (β =  
-276.74, p = 0.000, SD = 64.82), followed by SIEs (β = -270.26, p = 0.000, SD = 78.37) and 
ESEs (β = -263.37, p = 0.000, SD = 90.68) with the highest variability of scores for ESEs.  
Similar to the discussion around H3a, H3b asked if the migrant group with greatest RSC will 
also have the strongest relationship between social capital and career achievement. According to 
RQ1, ESEs had the largest positive effect on RSC and according to H3b, the relationship 
between revised social capital and career achievement was the least negative for ESEs. 
Therefore, taken together, and prior to the inclusion of covariates, H3b was supported.  
After the inclusion of the control variables, the strength of the relationships was mildly 
weakened across all three comparison groups, but the general relationship patterns remained the 
same. RSC had the strongest impact on financial compensation for AGMs (β = -238.53, p=0.000, 
SD =102.10) followed by SIEs (β = -224.28, p = 0.000, SD = 113.74) and then ESEs (β =           
- 206.94, p = 0.000, SD = 123.05) with the data variability highest for ESEs (similar to the 
results prior to the inclusion of the covariates). Support for H3b did not change as the 
relationship between social capital and career achievement remained the least negative for ESEs 
after the inclusion of the covariates.  
The between group results indicated that country level factors are likely influencing this 
relationship (between RSC and financial compensation) both within countries and between 
countries for all three migrant groups. Results were statistically significant prior to the inclusion 
of covariates (ESE [β = -297.64, p = 0.000, SD = 677.82], SIE [β = -292.52, p = 0.000, SD = 
846.99], and AGM [β = -291.35 p = 0.000, SD = 656.68]) and after the inclusion of the 
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covariates, although the strength of the relationship changed across the groups (AGMs (β =          
-247.16, p = 0.000, SD = 705.06], SIE [β = -242.25 , p = 0.000, SD = 843.68], and ESEs [β =       
-227.43, p = 0.000, SD = 648.74]). Standard deviations were very large between groups, 
indicating a large dispersion of data within each migrant group across countries around the 
sample mean. Interestingly, the addition of covariates changed the patterns of SDs such that the 
effects of RSC on financial compensation between groups became more varied for AGMs after 
the inclusion of the covariates and less varied for SIEs and ESEs. Detailed results can be viewed 
























Relationship between Social Capital Resources and Career Achievement with and without the Covariate Inclusion, within effects 
             
 No covariate  Covariate 
Variable β SE p-value SD LL UL β SE p-value SD LL UL 
Constant 1359.83* 29.23 0.000 3614.03 1301.14 1418.53 1198.40* 50.51 0.000 6165.77 1094.57 1302.24 
SIE -270.26* 0.63 0.000 78.37 -271.50 -269.02 -224.28* 0.93 0.000 113.74 -226.11 -222.46 
 
            
Constant 1400.96* 32.92 0.000 2705.57 1334.63 1467.28 1323.71* 47.31 0.000 3835.05 1226.33 1421.10 
ESE -263.37* 1.10 0.000 90.68 -265.53 -261.20 -206.94* 1.52 0.000 123.05 -209.91 -203.96 
 
            
Constant 1399.57* 24.14 0.000 2616.40 1351.24 1447.91 1336.42* 41.08 0.000 4390.85 1250.01 1422.83 
AGM -276.74* 0.60 0.000 64.81 -277.92 -275.57 -238.53* 0.96 0.000 102.10 -240.40 -236.65 
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and 






 The relationship between Social Capital Resources and Career Achievement with and without the covariate inclusion, between effects 
 No Covariate Covariate  
Variable β SE p-value SD LL UL β SE p-value SD LL UL 
SIE -292.52* 6.85 0.000 846.99 -306.31 -278.72 -242.25* 6.91 0.000 843.68 -256.06 -228.45 
ESE -297.64* 8.25 0.000 677.82 -314.12 -281.17 -227.43* 8.00 0.000 648.74 -243.34 -211.53 
AGM -291.35* 6.06 0.000 656.68 -303.46 -279.23 -247.16* 6.60 0.000 705.06 -260.29 -234.04 
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week 
and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Testing for Mediation 
 Hypothesis 5 predicted that RSC will mediate the relationship between immigrant type and 
financial compensation (H5a) and career achievement (H5b).  
H5a was supported across all three migrant groups in the initial analyses which did not 
include covariates as there was evidence of partial mediation. By first examining the indirect 
effect coefficient only, the output provided evidence of a negative mediation effect of RSC on 
financial compensation among SIEs (IE = -0.18, p = 0.000, SD = 3.19) and AGMs [IE = -0.61, p 
= 0.000, SD =5.05) and a positive mediation among ESEs (IE = 0.99, p = 0.000, SD = 4.41). 
When examined in the context of the direct effect coefficients (of migrant type on financial 
compensation), it became clear that the negative coefficients did not mitigate the effect of the 
predictor on the outcome. The reason for this is that the directionality of these indirect effects 
was the same as the directionality of the direct effects for each group. Put another way, the 
direction of both the direct and indirect effect coefficients were the same where the direct effect 
coefficients were negative for SIEs (β = -0.95, p = 0.000, SD = 6.17), and AGMs (β = -0.37, p = 
0.000, SD = 8.44) and positive for ESEs (β =1.66, p = 0.000, SD = 8.51).  
To better understand the effect of RSC on the relationship between migrant type and 
financial compensation, I calculated its effect size. I did this by dividing the indirect effect by the 
sum of the direct and indirect effects (Hu et al., 2020). The results indicated that the effect of 
RSC on the relationship between immigrant status and financial compensation was the strongest 
for the AGMs (RSC accounted for 62.26% of the variance in this relationship), followed by 
ESEs (37.42%), and then SIEs (16.04%). As the directionality of the direct and indirect 
relationships was the same across all three groups, the mediating variable (RSC) partially 
accounted for the effect of my predictor on my outcome but did not hinder this effect (as will be 
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the case once the covariates are included, noted below). See Tables 5.17 and 5.18 for more 
details. 
In line with prior analyses, the introduction of the control variables shifted these 
relationships. The indirect effect of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC was 
now positive for SIEs (IE = 0.02, p = 0.000, SD = 0.62) and not statistically significant (as well 
as almost non-existent) for ESEs (IE = 0.00, p = 0.727, SD = 0.92). The directionality and 
statistical significance of the AGMs coefficient remained the same (IE = -0.02, p = 0.010, SD = 
1.04). Unlike the results mentioned above, the directionality of the coefficients of the direct 
effects (in comparison to the indirect effects) of migrant status on financial compensation 
(mediated by RSC) were the same for ESEs (β = 1.19, p = 0.000, SD = 8.51) and AGMs [β =      
-.30, p = 0.000, SD = 8.08), but not the same for SIEs (β = -0.81, p = 0.000, SD = 5.91). This 
meant that for SIEs, RSC was actually detrimental (albeit only slightly, as the effect size was 
small) to financial compensation outcomes (Blalock, 1969; Davis, 1985; MacKinnon et al., 
2000). Effect sizes were as follows: 7.70% for AGMs, 0.34% for ESEs (not statistically 
























Test for Direct Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation and Indirect Effects as a Product of 






Effect and Migrant Group IE SE SD p-value LL MCLL UL MCUL Effect Size 
Direct effect, SIE  -0.95* 0.05 6.17 0.000 -1.05 - -0.85 - 16.04% 
Indirect Effect, SIE  -0.18* 0.03 3.19 0.000 - -0.23 - -0.13 - 
Direct effect, ESE  1.66* 0.10 8.51 0.000 1.46 - 1.86 - 37.42% 
Indirect Effect, ESE 0.99* 0.05 4.41 0.000 - 0.89 - 1.10 - 
Direct effect, AGM  -0.37* 0.08 8.44 0.000 -0.52  -0.22  62.26% 
Indirect Effect, AGM  -0.61* 0.05 5.05 0.000  -0.70  -0.52 - 
 Covariate 
Direct effect, SIE  -0.81* 0.05 5.91 0.000 -0.91 - -0.72 - -2.34% 
Indirect Effect, SIE  0.02* 0.01 0.62 0.000 - 0.01 - 0.03 - 
Direct effect, ESE  1.19* 0.11 8.51 0.000 0.98 - 1.39 - 0.34% 
Indirect Effect, ESE 0.00 0.01 0.92 0.727 - -0.02 - 0.03 - 
Direct effect, AGM  -0.30* 0.08 8.08 0.000 -0.45 - -0.15 - 7.70% 
Indirect Effect, AGM  -0.02* 0.01 1.04 0.010 - -0.04 - -0.01 - 
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average 
hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored 
Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant; RSC= Revised Social Capita. 




























Test for Direct Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation and Indirect Effects as a Product of Revised Social Capital on the Relationship 
Between Immigrant Type and Financial Compensation, Between Groups 
                 
 No Covariate Covariate 
Effect and Migrant Group IE SE SD 
p-
value LL MCLL UL MCUL IE SE SD 
p-
value LL MCLL UL MCUL 
Direct effect, SIE  -1.19 1.16 142.98 0.313 -3.59 - 1.20 - -0.70 1.41 172.39 0.624 -3.62 - 2.22 - 
Indirect Effect, SIE 0.45 1.11 137.51 0.685 - -1.72 - 2.69 0.14 0.17 20.98 0.405 - -0.13 - 0.54 
Direct effect, ESE  0.52 1.12 91.85 0.647 -1.83 - 2.87 - 0.26 1.30 104.88 0.844 -2.48 - 3.00 - 
Indirect Effect, ESE  1.04 1.03 84.60 0.312 - -0.84 - 3.21 0.04 0.11 8.75 0.724 - -0.16 - 0.29 
Direct effect, AGM  -0.49 0.69 74.38 0.482 -1.95 - 0.96 - -0.07 0.72 77.28 0.928 -1.62 - 1.48 - 
 Indirect Effect, AGMs -1.22 0.80 86.61 0.127 - -2.88 - 0.26 -0.02 0.10 11.13 0.844 - -0.24 - 0.19 
Note. No effects were statistically significant. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant; RSC= Revised Social Capita. Effect size is the proportion of migrant status effect on income, mediated by RSC 
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None of the between group tests were statistically significant regardless of the covariate 
inclusion indicating no contextual effects which may interact with this mediation. Specifically, 
the results for the indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation were as follows 
without the covariates SIEs (IE = 0.45, p = 0.685, SD = 137.51), ESEs (IE = 1.04, p = 0.312, SD 
= 84.60) and AGMs (IE = -1.22, p = 0.127, SD = 86.61) and with the covariates were SIE (IE 
=0.14, p = 0.405, SD = 20.98), ESE (IE = 0.04, p = 0.724, SD = 8.75) and AGMs (IE = -0.02, p 
= 0.844, SD = 11.13). Interestingly, the covariates substantially reduced the dispersion of scores 
for this relationship. See Tables 5.17 and 5.18 for more details.  
H5b which predicted that RSC will mediate the relationship between immigrant type and 
career achievement was supported across all three migrant groups in the analyses which did not 
include covariates as there was evidence of partial (almost complete in the case of ESEs) 
mediation. By first examining the indirect effect coefficient only, the output provided evidence 
of a negative mediation effect of RSC on career achievement among ESEs (IE = -272.98, p = 
0.000, SD = 1,079.21) and a positive mediation coefficient among SIEs (IE = 56.71, p = 0.000, 
SD = 991.48) and AGMs (IE = 207.52, p = 0.000, SD = 1,679.52). Like the results for H5a, 
these negative mediation coefficients did not reduce the effect of migrant type on RSC as the 
directionality of the indirect effects was the same as the directionality of the direct effects for 
each group. That is, the direct effect of migrant type on RSC was also negative for ESEs (β =      
- 67.32, p= 0.000, SD = 381.19), and positive for SIEs (β = 19.60, p = 0.000, SD = 287.72), and 
AGMs (β = 16.71, p = 0.000, SD = 395.84). The effect sizes indicated that the effects of RSC on 
the relationship between immigrant status and career achievement were much larger than those 
for financial compensation and strongest for AGMs (RSC accounted for 92.55% of this 
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relationship), followed by ESEs (80.22%), and then SIEs (74.32%). See Tables 5.19 and 5.20 for 
more details.  
 
Table 5.19 
Test for Direct Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement and Indirect Effects on this relationship through 
Revised Social Capital, Within Groups 
 No Covariate 
Effect and Migrant Group IE SE SD p-value LL MCLL UL MCUL Effect Size 
Direct effect, SIE 19.60 2.33 287.72 0.000 15.04 - 24.16 - 74.32% 
Indirect Effect, SIE 56.71 8.02 991.48 0.000 - 41.23 - 72.28 - 
          
Direct effect, ESE -67.32 4.64 381.19 0.000 -76.41 - -58.22 - 80.22% 
Indirect Effect, ESE -272.98 13.13 1079.21 0.000 - -298.54 - -247.43 - 
          
Direct effect, AGM 16.71 3.65 395.84 0.000 9.56  23.87  92.55% 
Indirect Effect, AGM 207.52 15.49 1679.53 0.000  177.55  237.74 - 
 Covariate 
Direct effect, SIE 7.59 2.0919 255.36 0.000 3.49 - 11.69 - 68.64% 
Indirect Effect, SIE -16.62 4.13 503.83 0.000 - -24.84 - -8.79  
          
Direct effect, ESE -30.20 4.19 339.78 0.000 -38.42 - -21.98 - 7.61% 
Indirect Effect, ESE -2.49 7.06 572.42 0.725 - -16.58 - 10.94  
          
Direct effect, AGM 6.59 3.34 357.34 0.049 0.04 - 13.15 - 75.66% 
Indirect Effect, AGM 20.49 7.8142 835.24 0.009 - 4.96 - 35.36  
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,755 to n=15,284. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; 
SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant; RSC= Revised Social Capital. Effect size is the 
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Table 5.20  
Test for Direct Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement and Indirect Effects on this relationship 
through Revised Social Capital, Between Groups 
 No Covariate 
Effect and Migrant Group IE SE SD p-value LL MCLL UL MCUL 
Direct effect, SIE 55.78 26.45 3269.57 0.048 0.623  110.94  
Indirect Effect, SIE -111.67 268.32 33172.40 0.677 - -633.23 - 409.75 
 
        
Direct effect, ESE 12.19 23.26 1912.11 0.606 -36.50 - 60.89 - 
Indirect Effect, ESE -260.83 242.83 19958.10 0.283 - -731.99 - 211.41 
 
        
Direct effect, AGM 1.67 15.34 1662.54 0.915 -30.78 - 34.12 - 
Indirect Effect, AGMs 336.26 207.81 22524.60 0.106 - -72.13 - 737.29 
 Covariate 
Direct effect, SIE 72.94 28.62 3493.55 0.017 13.97 - 131.92 - 
Indirect Effect, SIE -65.87 62.57 7638.33 0.292 - -188.34 - 57.30 
         
Direct effect, ESE 23.96 23.44 1900.42 0.323 -25.91 - 73.84 - 
Indirect Effect, ESE -18.69 43.24 3505.38 0.666 - -104.84 - 65.72 
         
Direct effect, AGM -11.98 17.30 1849.07 0.500 -49.18 - 25.21 - 
Indirect Effect, AGMs 9.02 43.08 4604.95 0.834 - -74.59 - 95.10 
Note. No effects were statistically significant. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=15,284. Models 
controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in 
country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant; RSC= Revised Social Capita. Effect size is the proportion of migrant status effect on career 
achievement, mediated by RSC 
 
As has been the case for all analyses thus far, the introduction of the control variables shifted 
these relationships. After the inclusion of the covariates, the effect of migrant status on career 
achievement through RSC was now weakened and not statistically significant for ESEs (IE =       
-2.49, p = 0.725, SD = 572.42), weakened and negative (but still significant) for SIEs (IE =         
-16.62, p = 0.000, SD = 503.83), and weakened and positive for AGMs (IE = 20.49, p = 0.009, 
SD = 835.24).  
Similar to the results for H5a, the directionality of the direct effect coefficients in comparison 
to the indirect effect coefficients of migrant status on career achievement (mediated by RSC) 
were the same for ESEs (β = -30.20, p = 0.000, SD = 339.78) and AGMs (β = 6.59, p = 0.000, 
SD = 357.34), but not the same for SIEs (β = 7.59, p = 0.000, SD = 255.37). This meant that for 
SIEs, RSC was substantially detrimental to career achievement outcomes as effect sizes were as 
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follows: 75.66% for AGMs, 7.61% for ESEs (not statistically significant) and -68.64% for SIEs. 
See Tables 5.19 and 5.20 for more details.  
Like the results for H5a, the between group tests were not statistically significant regardless 
of covariate inclusion, indicating no contextual (country level) effects on this mediation. 
Specifically, the results for the indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation were 
as follows without the covariates SIEs (IE = -111.67, p = 0.677, SD = 33,172.40), ESEs (IE =      
-260.83 p = 0.283 , SD = 19,958.10) and AGMs (IE = 336.26, p = 0.106, SD = 22,524.60) and 
with the covariates were SIE (IE = -65.87, p = 0.292, SD = 7,638.33), ESEs (IE = -18.69, p = 
0.666, SD = 3505.38) and AGMs (IE = 9.02, p = 0.834, SD = 4,604.95) See Tables 5.19 and 
5.20 for more details.  
Moderators and Moderated Mediation 
Once my primary model was examined, I explored it in the context of my hypothesized 
moderators. As the control variables were impactful on all prior non-conditional relationship 
tests, they will be included in all analyses moving forward. 
To explore the effect of my hypothesized moderators on my model, I examined three types of 
output in MLMED, the conditional process analysis, the index of moderated mediation produced 
by MLMED, and the role of the moderator on the indirect effect of the predictor (migrant status) 
on the outcome (i.e., financial compensation, career achievement) through the mediator (RSC).  
A statistically significant conditional process analysis indicates that there was an interaction 
between the moderator and the predictor on the outcome variable in question, such that the 
moderating variable is, in fact, moderating the relationship between the two variables and 
changes the strength or direction of the predictor on the outcome (Hayes & Rockwood, 2020). A 
statistically significant index of moderated mediation with a coefficient different than zero 
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indicates that a moderated mediation is occurring. A positive coefficient indicates that the 
indirect effect is systematically larger for some value of the moderator on the model while a 
negative coefficient indicates that the indirect effect is systematically smaller (for example, if 
gender was assigned as the moderator this would means that the magnitude of the conditional 
indirect effects differ for men and women) (Hayes, 2015). A statistically significant coefficient 
for the indirect effect of the predictor on the outcome indicates the strength or direction of the 
effect of the predictor on the outcome through the mediator may change due to the moderator. In 
the case of the inclusion of a second stage moderator in the model, this output holds the non-
tested path (first stage moderation) constant in the model (Hayes, 2015). 
As noted earlier, MLMED does not allow for the same variable to be examined as both a first 
and second stage moderator in an analysis simultaneously and produce an index of moderated 
mediation (Hayes, 2015; Rockwood, 2019). Therefore, each test for moderation or moderated 
mediation using micro level variables had to be conducted twice for each migrant group (six 
times total), once positioning the moderator as a first stage moderator and once positioning the 
moderator as a second stage moderator. This was not the case for the macro variables which 
were only hypothesized to affect the model as first stage moderators. These analyses (with the 
moderator at the macro level) were conducted three times (once for each migrant group). The 
process outlined above was repeated for all proposed moderating variables in my model. 
Gender as a Moderator  
Hypotheses 6b and H7 argued for the moderating effects of gender on both first and 
second stage mediation, respectively. Specifically, H6b argued that gender will moderate the 
relationship between immigrant type and social capital such that being male will result in higher 
levels of social capital for AGMs than for SIEs and ESEs (first stage moderation) and H7 posed 
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that gender moderates the relationship between career-related resources (RSC) and career 
outcomes such that being male will result in higher levels of both H7a) financial compensation 
and H7b) career achievement for SIEs when compared to AGMs and ESEs (second stage 
moderation). Similarly, RQ2 asked how will the effect of gender on career related resources 
(RQ2a) and career outcomes (RQ2b) differ by immigrant type?  
An examination of the moderating effects of gender on the direct relationship between 
migrant type and RSC indicated that gender did, in fact, interact with migrant status and alter the 
strength or direction of the relationship. Specifically, being male likely lowered the levels of 
RSC for ESEs (β = -0.24, p = 0.000, SD = 5.19), helped male AGMs (β = 0.28, p = 0.000, SD = 
6.87), and did not affect this relationship for SIEs (β = -0.06, p = 0.104, SD = 4.42). The between 
group results were statistically significant for AGMs (β = 0.19, p = 0.04, SD = 10.00), but not for 
ESEs (β = -0.10, p = 0.333 , SD = 8.50), SIEs (β = 0.04, p = 0.595, SD = 9.64) with standard 
deviations showing that the relationship between migrant type and RSC as a product of gender 
varies more between countries than within. Moreover, the migrant group with the largest 
variability in scores differed in the within countries and within countries results where SIEs had 
the largest variability within countries and AGMs had the highest variability between. See Table 























The Effects of Gender on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage Moderation 
    
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL 
SIE -0.06 0.04 4.42 0.104 -0.13 0.01 0.04 0.08 9.64 0.595 -0.11 0.20 
ESE -0.24*** 0.06 5.18 0.000 -0.37 -0.12 -0.10 0.10 8.49 0.333 -0.31 0.10 
AGM 0.28*** 0.06 6.87 0.000 0.15 0.40 0.19* 0.09 10.00 0.040 0.01 0.38 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of 
average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= 
Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Results from the index of moderated mediation were statistically significant (indicating a 
moderated mediation) in the case of ESEs (β = -0.08, 95% CI [-0.13, -0.04]) and AGMs (β = 
0.08, 95% CI [0.04, 0.120]), but not SIEs (β = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.00]). These results show 
that the mediation process likely behaves differently and is more impactful for male AGMs, less 
impactful for ESEs and does not differ by gender among SIEs. Put another way, the relationship 
between immigrant type and financial compensation is gender conditional for AGMs and ESEs 
but not for SIEs. Similarly, the between effects coefficients were found to be statistically 
significant for AGMs (β = 0.11, 95% CI [0.003, 0.27]) but not for ESEs (β = -0.05, 95% CI [        
-0.21, 0.06] or SIEs (β = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.14]) meaning that there may be country level 
factors affecting these relationships for AGMs. See Table 5.22 for more details 
Table 5.22 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender as Moderator, Financial Compensation as an Outcome 
 Within Between 
 Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -0.02 -0.03 0.00 No 0.02 -0.07 0.14 No 
SIE, Second Stage 0.01 0.01 0.02 Yes 0.13 -0.10 0.42 No 
         
ESE, First Stage -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 Yes -0.05 -0.21 0.06 No 
ESE, Second Stage 0.00 -0.01 0.02 No 0.02 -0.09 0.17 No 
         
 AGM, First Stage 0.08 0.04 0.12 Yes 0.11 0.003 0.27 Yes 
 AGM, Second 
Stage 
-0.02 -0.30 -0.003 Yes -0.01 -0.12 0.09 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
 
The indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC and as a 
product of gender as a first stage moderating variable were statistically significant and negative 
for AGMs (β = -0.07, p = 0.000 , SD = 1.60) (meaning that being male was slightly harmful to 
this relationship) and statistically significant and positive ESEs (β = 0.05, p = 0.007, SD = 1.42) 
and SIEs (β = 0.03, p = 0.000, SD = 0.92) (meaning that being male was slightly helpful to these 
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relationships). The between effects coefficients were found to be more variable and not 
statistically significant for any of the three groups, AGMs (β = -0.08, p = 0.505, SD = 12.36), 
ESEs (β = 0.06, p = 0.586, SD = 9.15) or SIEs (β = 0.15, p = 0.407, SD = 21.48). See Table 5.23 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Gender Included as a First Stage Moderator 
             
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant Status β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.03* 0.01 0.92 0.000 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.18 21.48 0.407 -0.13 0.56 
ESE 0.05* 0.02 1.42 0.007 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.11 9.15 0.586 -0.13 0.33 
AGM -0.07* 0.02 1.60 0.000 -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 0.12 12.36 0.505 -0.33 0.14 
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; 
AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant; RSC= Revised Social Capital. A test for First Stage Moderation in this model tests for the effects 
of gender on the relationship between migrant status and RSC. A test for Second Stage Moderation in this model tests for the effects 
of gender on the relationship between RSC and financial compensation.  
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Collectively, these results partially support hypothesis H6b which argued that gender will 
moderate the relationship between immigrant type and social capital and primarily benefit male 
AGMs. The index of moderated mediation was statistically significant and positive for AGMs 
both within and between countries (supporting this hypothesis), but negative or non-significant 
for ESEs and not significant for SIEs both within and between countries (not supporting this 
hypothesis). A deeper dive into the results showed that being male was beneficial to AGMs in 
the conditional process analysis, both within and between groups. However, the indirect effects 
on financial compensation indicate that gender as a first stage moderating variable is ultimately 
harmful to AGMs’ financial compensation (β = -0.07, p = 0.000) within groups and had no effect 
on financial compensation between groups. Details are in Table 5.23 
The results for H7a were examined by shifting gender from a first to a second stage 
moderator in my model. An examination of the moderating effects of gender on the direct 
relationship between RSC and financial compensation (the conditional process analysis) 
indicated that gender did, in fact, interact with RSC and alter the strength or direction of the 
relationship such that being male was beneficial for all migrant groups, SIE (β = 0.20, p = 0.000 , 
SD = 3.08), ESE (β = 0.22, p = 0.000, SD = 3.57), and AGMs (β = 0.18, p = 0.000, SD = 2.52) 
in the within country results. The between group results were statistically significant for SIEs (β 
= 0.48, p = 0.000, SD = 14.26) and AGMs (β = -0.26, p = 0.032, SD = 13.30), but not for ESEs 
(β = 0.26, p = 0.149, SD = 14.71) providing evidence of country level factors which may alter 
these statistically significant relationships as well as the stability of these relationships by 






















The Effects of Gender on the Relationship Between Revised Social Capital and Financial Compensation, Second Stage 
Moderation 
 Within Effects  Between Effects 
Migrant 
Type β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL 
SIE 0.20 0.03 3.08 0.000 0.15 0.25 0.48 0.1168 14.26 0.000 0.25 0.71 
ESE 0.22 0.04 3.57 0.000 0.14 0.31 0.26 0.1815 14.71 0.149 -0.09 0.62 
AGM 0.18 0.02 2.52 0.000 0.13 0.23 -0.26 0.1244 13.30 0.032 0.02 0.51 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ 
main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= 
Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Results from the index of moderated mediation were statistically significant (indicating a 
moderated mediation) and positive in the case of SIEs (β = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.02]), negative 
in the case of AGMs (β = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.003]), and not statistically significant for 
ESEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.02]) indicating a moderated mediation for two of the three 
migrant groups. The between effects moderated mediation coefficients were not statistically 
significant any of the groups where coefficients were as follows, SIEs (β = 0.13, 95% CI [-0.10, 
0.42]), AGMs (β = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.09]) and ESEs (β = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.17]). See 
Table 5.22 
The indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC and as a 
product of gender as a second stage moderating variable were statistically significant for SIEs (β 
= 0.02, p = 0.000, SD = 0.57) (meaning that being male was slightly helpful to this relationship) 
and AGMs (β = -0.02, p = 0.011, SD = 0.94) (meaning that being male was slightly harmful to 
this relationship), but not statistically significant for ESEs (β = 0.00, p = 0.729, SD = 0.74). The 
between effects coefficients were found not to be statistically significant for any of the three 
groups, SIEs (β = 0.10, p = 0.472, SD = 17.55), ESEs (β = 0.03, p = 0.751, SD = 7.72) or AGMs 
(β = -0.02, p = 0.847, SD = 10.07). See Table 5.25.  
Table 5.25 
Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Gender Included as a Second Stage 
Moderator 
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant Status β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.02* 0.00 0.57 0.000 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.14 17.55 0.472 -0.12 0.45 
ESE 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.729 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 7.72 0.751 -0.14 0.26 
AGM -0.02 0.01 0.94 0.011 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 10.07 0.847 -0.21 0.17 
Note. *=p<0.05. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; 
SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant; RSC= Revised Social Capital.  
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Taken together, the index of moderated mediation supports H7a for SIEs, results for ESEs 
were not statistically significant, and patterns of relationships were negative for AGMs, within 
groups only. A look at the interrelationships within the model reveals that the direct effect of 
RSC on financial compensation as a product of gender is beneficial to male SIEs (both within 
and between countries) as was the indirect effect of migrant status on financial compensation 
through RSC (within countries only), lending further support to H7a for SIEs only.  
The response to RQ2a (which asked how gender will affect career related resources and 
financial compensation by migrant type) is that it depends on the positioning of the gender 
moderator in the model. When gender in considered as a first stage moderator, it is beneficial to 
male AGMs only. However, when it is introduced as second stage moderator, it becomes 
beneficial to male SIEs.  
Shifting the focus from financial compensation to career achievement, H7b argued that 
gender moderates the relationship between career-related resources (RSC) and career outcomes 
such that being male will result in higher levels of career outcomes for SIEs compared to AGMs 
and ESEs. Similarly, RQ2b asked about the effect of gender on career outcomes, by immigrant 
type. The results for these questions are addressed below.  
The results of the conditional process analysis (that is, the moderating effects of gender on 
the direct relationship between RSC and career achievement) indicated that there was, in fact, an 
interaction between RSC and gender with respect to their effects on career achievement. 
Specifically, being male was beneficial to all migrant groups where male ESEs (β = 13.88, p = 
0.000, SD = 150.42) benefitted the most (but also had the greatest dispersion of scores), SIEs (β 
= 10.85, p = 0.000, SD = 137.83), benefitted slightly less, and male AGMs benefitted (β = 7.59, 
p = 0.000, SD = 116.56) the least. The between group results were statistically significant for 
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AGMs (β = 17.52, p = 0.002, SD = 606.76) and SIEs (β = 13.23, p = 0.010 , SD = 626.73), but 
not for ESEs (β = 9.34, p = 0.219, SD = 615.95) with standard deviations showing that the 


































The Effects of Gender on the Relationship Between Revised Social Capital and Career Achievement, Second Stage 
Moderation 
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant Status β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE 10.85*** 1.13 137.83 0.000 8.63 13.06 13.23*** 5.13 626.73 0.010 3.17 23.30 
ESE 13.88*** 1.86 150.42 0.000 10.24 17.51 9.34 7.60 615.95 0.219 -5.56 24.23 
AGM 7.59*** 1.09 116.56 0.000 5.45 9.72 17.52*** 5.68 606.76 0.002 6.40 28.65 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of 
average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; 
SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Results from the index of moderated mediation were statistically significant (indicating a 
moderated mediation) in the case of SIEs (β = 0.80, 95% CI [0.40, 1.25]) and AGMs (β = -0.66, 
95% CI [-1.21, -0.15]), but not ESEs (β = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.78, 1.12]). These results show that 
the mediation process likely behaves differently and is most impactful for male SIEs, less 
impactful for AGMs and does not differ by gender among ESEs. Said otherwise, the relationship 
between RSC and career achievement is gender conditional for SIEs (where it is beneficial) and 
AGMs (where it may be harmful to these relationships) but not for ESEs where it is. The 
between effects coefficients were not found to be statistically significant any of the groups 
meaning that country level factors likely do not affect these relationships. Specifically, results 
were as follows: SIEs (β = 3.60, 95% CI [-2.82, 12.85]), AGMs (β = -0.64, 95% CI [-7.11, 5.77] 
and ESEs (β = 0.77, 95% CI [-3.51, 6.45]). See Table 5.27. 
Table 5.27 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender as Moderator, Career Achievement as the Outcome 
 Within Between 
 Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 





Stage 0.80 0.40 1.25 Yes 3.60 -2.82 12.85 No 
         
ESE, 
Second 
Stage 0.17 -0.78 1.12 No 0.77 -3.51 6.45 No 
         
AGM, 
Second 
Stage -0.66 -1.207 -0.15 Yes -0.64 -7.11 5.77 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= 
Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
The indirect effects relationship between migrant status and career achievement through RSC 
and as a product of gender as a second stage moderator were statistically significant for AGMs (β 
= 20.77, p = 0.009, SD = 846.75) (showing that this relationship is highly variable, but beneficial 
to males), SIEs (β = -16.94, p = 0.000, SD = 513.91) (indicating that there was a benefit for 
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females in this relationship as the coefficient was negative, but with a lot of variance), and not 
statistically significant for ESEs (β = -2.56, p = 0.725, SD = 588.75) The between effects 
coefficients were not statistically significant for any of the three groups, AGMs (β = 9.25, p = 
0.834, SD = 4,726.49), SIEs (β = -67.31, p = 0.293, SD = 7,805.36) or ESEs (β = -19.07, p = 






















Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Gender Included as a Second Stage Moderator  
Migrant Status Within Between 
 β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -16.94*** 4.21 513.91 0.000 -25.27 -8.69 -67.31 63.94 7805.36 0.293 -193.50 54.64 
ESE -2.56 7.26 588.75 0.725 -16.93 11.71 -19.07 44.13 3576.97 0.666 -105.86 65.45 
AGM 20.77*** 7.92 846.75 0.009 5.168 36.33 9.25 44.22 4726.49 0.834 -78.80 93.55 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant; RSC= Revised Social Capital. 
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Collectively, the index of moderated mediation partially supports H7b within groups only. 
Specifically, it showed support (meaning a positive and statistically significant result) for male 
SIEs but not for AGMs or ESEs. Results for ESEs were not significant while the results for 
AGMs indicated a benefit to female AGMs. Nevertheless, a deeper dive into the model shows 
that direct relationships between RSC on career achievement as a product of gender is beneficial 
to males regardless of migrant groups within countries and to SIEs and AGMs (but not ESEs) 
between countries indicating that there may be may an untested relationship occurring during the 
first stage moderation which alters the index of moderated mediation. Alternatively, there are 
other reasons for these inconsistent results such as another untested variable. These results 
should be explored in future research. Nevertheless, taken together these results lend support to 
H7b for SIEs only.  
Results for RQ2b (which asked how gender will affect career related resources and career 
achievement by migrant type) were somewhat clearer. As a second stage moderator, being male 
is beneficial to SIEs, within countries, only.  
Perceived Discrimination as a Moderator 
 Hypotheses H8 and H9 and RQ3 proposed that the moderating effects of perceived 
discrimination on as both first and second stage mediation should be tested. Specifically, H8 
posed that immigrant perceived discrimination will moderate the relationship between immigrant 
type and social capital (H8b) such that high levels of perceived discrimination will lead to lower 
levels of human and social capital among AGMs in comparison to both SIEs and ESEs. H9 
posed that immigrants’ reported perceived discrimination will moderate the relationship between 
career related resources and career related outcomes such that higher levels of perceived 
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discrimination will lead to lower financial compensation and career success for SIEs when 
compared to both ESEs and AGMs.    
 RQ3 asked how the effects of perceived discrimination on career related resources 
(RQ3a) and career outcomes (RQ3b) will differ by migrant type. To clarify, I ultimately had to 
code perceived discrimination as 0 = no perceived discrimination reported and 1= perceived 
discrimination reported, as the data provided by the EULFS was not refined enough to make the 
distinction between low or high perceived discrimination. This slightly changes the interpretation 
these hypotheses and their results such that the comparison groups either report or do not report 
perceived discrimination (rather than report low or high). The hypothesized low perceived 
discrimination will be tested as no reported perceived discrimination while high perceived 
discrimination will be addressed as reported perceived discrimination.  
An examination of the output for these hypotheses found partial support for H8b among 
AGMs only. Specifically, the conditional process analysis results showed that reported perceived 
discrimination interacted with migrant status in the case of AGMs and ESEs to affect RSC, but 
not for SIEs. That is, reported perceived discrimination was likely slightly harmful to RSC for 
AGMs (β = -0.43, p = 0.092, SD = 26.99), but not so for ESEs (β = 0.45, p = 0.075, SD = 20.39), 
and did not affect this relationship for SIEs (β = -0.14, p = 0.326, SD = 16.81) within countries. 
Interestingly, the between group results were statistically significant and negative, for SIEs (β =  
-0.79, p = 0.036, SD = 45.74) only, suggesting that reports of perceived discrimination may be 
harmful to SIEs across countries. Results for the other two groups were as follows: ESEs (β = -
0.32, p = 0.390 , SD = 29.76) and AGMs (β = 0.43, p = 0.132, SD = 30.48) with standard 
deviations showing greater variability between countries than within, as has been the pattern thus 






















The Effects of Perceived Discrimination on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage Moderation      
Migrant 
Group Within Between 
 β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE -0.14 0.14 16.81 0.326 -0.41 0.13 -0.79* 0.3747 45.74 0.036 -1.52 -0.05 
ESE 0.45** 0.25 20.39 0.075 -0.04 0.94 -0.32 0.3672 29.76 0.390 -1.04 0.40 
AGM -0.43** 0.25 26.99 0.092 -0.92 0.07 0.43 0.2852 30.48 0.132 -0.13 0.98 
              
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Results from the index of moderated mediation did not show evidence of a mediation within 
or between groups and provided no proof that the relationship between immigrant type and 
financial compensation was conditional on perceived discrimination. Results within groups were 
as follows: AGMs (β = -0.12 , 95% CI [-0.27, 0.019]), ESEs (β = 0.15 95% CI [-0.02, 0.320]), 
and SIEs (β = -0.04, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.04]). Results between groups were as follows: AGMs (β = 
0.24, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.69]), SIEs (β = -0.41, 95% CI [-1.16, 0.06])and ESEs (β = -0.15, 95% CI 
[-0.70, 0.23]). See Table 5.30 for more details 
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Table 5.30 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Perceived Discrimination as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
         
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Within Between 
 Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -0.04 -0.11 0.04 No -0.41 -1.16 0.06 No 
SIE, Second Stage -0.01 -0.02 0.00 No -0.24 -0.93 0.21 No 
         
ESE, First Stage 0.15 -0.02 0.32 No -0.15 -0.70 0.23 No 
ESE, Second Stage 0.00 -0.03 0.02 No -0.05 -0.52 0.31 No 
         
AGM, First Stage -0.12 -0.27 0.02 No 0.24 -0.07 0.69 No 
AGM, Second Stage 0.01 -0.00 0.03 No 0.03 -0.28 0.34 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,566 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= 
Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
The indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC and as a 
product of perceived discrimination as a first stage moderating variable were statistically 
significant and negative for AGMs (β = -0.02, p = 0.020 , SD = 1.05) (meaning that reports of 
perceived discrimination were slightly harmful to this relationship) and statistically significant 
and positive SIEs (β = 0.02, p = 0.000, SD = 0.63) (meaning that perceived discrimination 
benefitted SIEs ever so slightly). Results for ESEs were not statistically significant and almost 
nonexistent (β = 0.0008, p = 0.942, SD = 0.93). Generally, the variability around the mean seem 
to be very small for this relationship, regardless of migrant type, indicating that scores largely 
center around the mean. The between effects coefficients were not statistically significant 
indicating no intercountry differences and with a dispersion of scores greater between groups 
than within groups. These between group results were as follows: AGMs (β = -0.04, p = 0.738, 
SD = 11.67), ESEs (β = 0.04, p = 0.700, SD = 9.09), or SIEs (β = 0.17, p = 0.348, SD = 22.58). 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Perceived Discrimination Included as a First 
Stage Moderator               
Migrant Group Within Between 
 β SE SD 
p-
value MCLL MCUL β SE SD 
p-
value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.02* 0.01 0.63 0.000 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.19 22.58 0.348 -0.10 0.62 
ESE 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.942 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.11 9.09 0.700 -0.16 0.31 
AGM -0.02* 0.01 1.05 0.020 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.11 11.67 0.738 -0.26 0.18 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,566 to n=14,899. Models controlled for 
number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer 
Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Taken as a whole, these results partially support H8b for AGMs only. Specifically, both the 
conditional process analysis and the indirect effect of migrant status on financial compensation 
through RSC and as a product of perceived discrimination as a first stage moderator were 
statistically significant and negative for AGMs, within groups. The index of moderated 
mediation was not supported. Details can be found in Tables 5.29-5.31. 
To examine H9a I moved perceived discrimination from a first to a second stage moderator 
in my analyses. The conditional process analysis results (exploring whether perceived 
discrimination moderates the direct relationship between RSC and financial compensation) 
showed that perceived discrimination did, in fact, interact with RSC and alter the direction of the 
relationships such that reporting perceived discrimination was similarly harmful to both SIEs (β 
= -0.13, p = 0.064, SD = 8.63) and AGMs (β = -0.13, p = 0.057, SD = 7.09), but had no effect on 
ESEs (β = -0.24, p = 0.127 , SD = 12.80) within groups. Likewise, the between group results 
were statistically significant (albeit, more variable) and harmful for the same groups, that is SIEs 
(β = -0.90, p = 0.043, SD = 54.09) and AGMs (β = -0.76, p = 0.039, SD = 39.37), but not for 
ESEs (β = -0.63, p = 0.401, SD = 60.45) providing evidence of country level factors which may 
alter these statistically significant relationships as well as the variability of these relationships by 






















The Effects of Perceived Discrimination on the Relationship Between Revised Social Capital and Financial Compensation, Second 
Stage Moderation 
    
Migrant 
Group Within Effects  Between Effects 
 β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE -0.13** 0.07 8.63 0.064 -0.27 0.01 -0.90* 0.44 54.09 0.043 -1.76 -0.028 
ESE -0.24 0.16 12.80 0.127 -0.55 0.07 -0.63 0.75 60.45 0.401 -2.09 0.84 
AGM -0.13** 0.07 7.09 0.057 -0.26 0.00 -0.76** 0.37 39.37 0.039 -1.48 -0.04 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average 
hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Similar to the first stage index of moderated mediation results, moving perceived 
discrimination to a second stage moderator did not produced a moderated mediation within or 
between groups. None of the effects were statistically significant. Results were as follows within 
groups: SIEs (β = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.00]), AGMs (β = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.03]), and 
ESEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.02]) and between groups: SIEs (β = -0.24, 95% CI [-0.93, 
0.21]), AGMs (β = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.28, 0.34]) and ESEs (β = -0.05, 95% CI [-0.52, 0.31]). See 
Table 5.30 for more details.  
The indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC and as a 
product of perceived discrimination as a second stage moderating variable were statistically 
significant for SIEs (β = 0.02, p = 0.000, SD = 0.62) (meaning that perceiving discrimination 
was slightly helpful to this relationship), and for AGMs (β = -0.02, p = 0.010, SD = 1.04) 
(meaning that perceiving discrimination was slightly harmful to this relationship), but not 
statistically significant, and almost nonexistent, for ESEs (β = 0.00, p = 0.727, SD =0.90). The 
between effects results were not statistically significant for any of the three groups, SIEs (β = 
0.17, p = 0.385, SD = 23.28), AGMs (β = -0.02 p = 0.842, SD = 12.74) or ESEs (β = 0.04, p = 
































Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Perceived Discrimination Included as a Second 
Stage Moderator 
             
Migrant 
Group Within Between 
 β SE SD 
p-
value MCLL MCUL β SE SD 
p-
value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.02*** 0.01 0.62 0.000 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.19 23.28 0.385 -0.14 0.61 
ESE 0.00 0.01 0.90 0.727 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.11 9.01 0.722 -0.17 0.30 
AGM -0.02*** 0.01 1.04 0.010 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 12.74 0.842 -0.26 0.22 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of 
average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored 
Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Taken together, the index of moderated mediation was not supported in any of the analyses 
and therefore there is no support for H9a and no clear response to RQ3a. Nevertheless, a look at 
the other within model analyses shows a similar pattern to the results of H8b (but one which 
extends beyond AGMs), namely that the conditional process analysis shows that perceived 
discrimination is harmful to both SIEs and AGMs within and between groups. Moreover, the 
indirect effect on financial compensation is negative for AGMs meaning that AGMs who 
perceive discrimination likely earn less financial compensation.  
Moving on to the examination of these relationships from financial compensation to career 
achievement, H9b asked if high levels of perceived discrimination will result in lower levels of 
career success for SIEs compared to both other migrant groups (ESEs and AGMs). Similarly, 
RQ3 asked how the effects of perceived discrimination on career outcomes will vary by 
immigrant type.  
An examination of conditional process analysis (the effects of perceived discrimination as a 
moderating variable on the relationship between RSC and career achievement) indicated that 
there was, in fact, an interaction between RSC and perceived discrimination among all three 
migrant groups (within groups only) and that a) the effect was as initially predicted and b) these 
results varied greatly within each of the migrant groups. Specifically, reporting perceived 
discrimination was harmful to all three migrant groups such that the effect was strongest for 
ESEs (β = -19.95, p = 0.002, SD = 509.35) followed by SIEs (β = -14.33, p = 0.000, SD = 
378.50), and lastly AGMs (β = -6.99, p = 0.019, SD = 319.51). The between group results were 
not were statistically significant for any of the groups, indicating no between group effects. 
Results were as follows: ESEs (β = 6.29, p = 0.841, SD = 2,548.64), SIEs (β = -2.30, p = 0.905, 
SD = 2,342.36), and AGMs (β = -4.87, p = 0.770, SD = 1,782.99) with standard deviations 
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showing that the distribution of scores was more varied between countries than within. See Table 
























The Effects of Perceived Discrimination on the Relationship Between Revised Social Capital and Career Achievement, Second Stage 
Moderation 
    
Migrant 
Group Within Effects 
 
Between Effects 
 β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE -14.33*** 3.10 378.50 0.000 -20.41 -8.26 -2.30 19.19 2342.36 0.905 -39.91 35.31 
ESE -19.95*** 6.28 509.35 0.002 -32.27 -7.64 6.29 31.44 2548.63 0.841 -55.34 67.93 
AGM -6.99* 2.99 319.50 0.019 -12.84 -1.127 -4.87 16.68 1782.99 0.770 -37.58 27.82 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average 
hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Results from the index of moderated mediation showed a statistically significant moderated 
mediation for SIEs (β = -1.06, 95% CI [-1.82, -0.45]) and AGMs (β = 0.60, 95% CI [0.05, 1.41]), 
but not ESEs (β = -0.24, 95% CI [-1.75, 1.19]). These results show that the mediation process 
likely behaves differently and is most impactful (and harmful) for SIEs, reporting perceived 
discrimination, less impactful and helpful for AGMs and does not differ among ESEs. Said 
otherwise, the relationship between RSC and career achievement is partially conditional on 
feelings of perceived discrimination for SIEs and AGMs, but it affects them differently. It has no 
effect on ESEs. The between effects coefficients were not found to be statistically significant any 
of the groups meaning that country level factors likely do not affect these relationships. 
Specifically, results were as follows: SIEs (β = -0.63, 95% CI [-17.16, 14.61]), AGMs (β = 0.18, 
























Index of Moderated Mediation, Perceived Discrimination as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome           
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Within Between 
 Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, Second Stage -1.06 -1.82 -0.45 Yes -0.63 -17.16 14.61 No 
         
ESE, Second Stage -0.24 -1.75 1.19 No 0.52 -13.15 15.76 No 
         
AGM, Second 
Stage 
0.60 0.05 1.42 Yes 0.18 -6.35 7.08 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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The indirect effects relationship between migrant status and career achievement through RSC 
and as a product of perceived discrimination as a second stage moderator were statistically 
significant for AGMs (β = 20.41, p = 0.009, SD = 831.84) (showing that this relationship is 
highly variable, but beneficial to AGMs reporting perceived discrimination), SIEs (β = -16.50, p 
= 0.000, SD = 500.56) (indicating that perceived discrimination is harmful to SIEs’ career 
achievement), and not statistically significant for ESEs (β = -2.47, p = 0.725, SD = 569.19). The 
between effects coefficients were not statistically significant for any of the three groups, AGMs 
(β = 8.99, p = 0.834, SD = 4,590.80), SIEs (β = -65.90, p = 0.293, SD = 7,642.21), or ESEs (β = 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, perceived Discrimination Included as a Second Stage Moderator 
             
Migrant 
Group Within Between 
 β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -16.50*** 4.10 500.56 0.000 -24.63 -8.46 -65.90 62.60 7642.21 0.293 -189.69 53.51 
ESE -2.47 7.02 569.19 0.725 -16.38 11.28 -18.74 43.35 3513.87 0.666 -103.98 64.32 
AGM 20.41*** 7.78 831.84 0.009 5.08 35.68 8.99 42.95 4590.80 0.834 -76.55 90.91 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01 Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Collectively, the index of moderated mediation partially supports H9b. This index found that 
there was, in fact, a moderated mediation for SIEs, within groups, where perceiving 
discrimination was harmful to their career achievement. A closer look at the data shows that 
perceiving discrimination directly interacts with RSC to affect career outcomes (conditional 
process analysis) in a way that is harmful to all three migrant groups and indirectly affects the 
relationship between migrant type on career success through RSC for SIEs and AGMs such that 
it is harmful to SIEs. RQ3 asked how the effects of perceived discrimination on career outcomes 
will vary by immigrant type. The index of moderated mediation shows that the answer to this 
depends on the migrant group. That is, perceived discrimination is harmful to SIEs, but has a 
positive relationship with AGMs within groups.  
      Once these two moderators were tested, I transitioned to an examination of my model with 
my macro level moderators. Note that as hypotheses are being tested in the order they were 
presented in my paper, cultural distance, a micro level moderating variable, will be tested later in 
this paper. Macro level moderators were only tested as first stage moderators, as will be detailed 
in the results below.  
Power Distance (PD) as a moderator. Power distance was the first macro moderator 
proposed and tested. Hypotheses 10b argued for the moderating effects of PD (as a first stage 
moderator) such that migrants in lower power distance cultures will have higher levels of RSC 
than those in higher power distance cultures. Similarly, RQ4 asked which migrant group will 
have the highest levels of social capital as power distance increases. 
An examination of the conditional process analysis, that is the moderating effects of PD on 
the direct relationship between migrant type and RSC, indicated that PD only interacted with 
migrant status to affect RSC for SIEs, but not for AGMs or ESEs. Specifically, high PD lowered 
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RSC for SIEs (β = -0.10, p = 0.087, SD = 7.28) and did not affect this relationship (between 
migrant type and RSC) for ESEs (β = 0.23, p = 0.170, SD = 13.33) and AGMs (β = -0.13, p = 
0.436, SD = 17.92). The between group results were not statistically significant for any of the 
groups and were as follows: SIEs (β = 0.97, p = 0.640, SD = 238.89), ESEs (β = 0.15, p = 0.904 , 
SD = 94.21), and AGMs (β = 0.81, p = 0.610, SD = 160.98) with standard deviations showing 
that the relationship between migrant type and RSC as a product of gender varies more between 


























The Effects of Power Distance on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage Moderation 
    
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant 
Group  β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE -0.10** 0.06 7.28 0.087 -0.22 0.01 0.97 1.97 238.89 0.640 -3.84 5.78 
ESE 0.23 0.17 13.33 0.170 -0.10 0.55 0.15 1.17 94.21 0.904 -2.66 2.95 
AGM -0.13 0.17 17.92 0.436 -0.46 0.20 0.81 1.51 160.98 0.610 -2.86 4.48 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; 
AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
MIGRATION AND WORK 162 
  
Results from the index of moderated mediation, for a model naming financial compensation 
as the outcome, were not statistically significant for any of the migrant groups, indicating no 
moderated mediation within or between groups. Results within groups were as follows: SIEs (β = 
-0.03, 95% CI [-0.06, -0.00]), ESEs (β = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.19]), and AGMs (β = -0.04, 95% 
CI [-0.14, 0.56]). While between group results were as follows: SIEs (β = 0.51, 95% CI [-1.80, 
3.21]), ESEs (β = 0.07, 95% CI [-1.32, 1.48], and AGMs (β = 0.46, 95% CI [-1.32, 2.51]). These 
results indicate that the relationship between immigrant type and financial compensation is not 






















Index of Moderated Mediation, Power Distance as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
         
Migrant Group 
and Moderator 
Stage Within Between 
 Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -0.03 -0.06 0.00 No 0.51 -1.80 3.21 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.08 -0.03 0.19 No 0.07 -1.32 1.48 No 
AGM, First Stage -0.04 -0.14 0.06 No 0.46 -1.32 2.51 No         
 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Likewise, when moderated mediation was tested for a model including career achievement as 
the outcome, these results were also not statistically significant, indicating that the relationship 
between immigrant type and career achievement is also not conditional on PD. Results for the 
groups were as follows: SIEs (β = 23.01, 95% CI [-3.01, 49.41]), ESEs (β = -47.11, 95% CI [-
113.40, 20.54]), and AGMs (β = 31.21, 95% CI [ -46.41, 110.09]). While between group results 
were as follows: SIEs (β = -234.1, 95% CI [-1149.10, 715.68]), ESEs (β = -33.55, 95% CI [- 
























Index of Moderated Mediation, Power Distance as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome 
         
 Within Between 
Migrant Group 
and Moderator 
Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 23.01 -3.01 49.41 No -234.10 -1149.08 715.68 No 
ESE, First Stage -47.11 -113.40 20.54 No -33.55 -546.52 500.42 No 
AGM, First Stage 31.21 -46.41 110.09 No -200.50 -936.79 533.72 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main 
job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant.  
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The indirect effects of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC and as a 
product of PD as a first stage moderating variable were statistically significant and positive for 
SIEs only (β = 0.16, p = 0.050, SD = 10.20) (meaning that SIEs fared better in high PD cultures 
than in low PD cultures). This relationship was not significant for ESEs (β = -0.38, p = 0.178, SD 
= 22.82) or AGMs (β = 0.17, p = 0.493, SD = 26.61). The between effects coefficients were 
found to be more variable than the within effects coefficients but were not statistically significant 
for any of the three groups: SIEs (β = -2.63, p = 0.671, SD = 752.50), ESEs (β = -0.41, p = 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Power Distance Included as a First Stage Moderator 
             
Migrant 
Group Within Between 
 β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.16* 0.08 10.20 0.050 0.00 0.33 -2.63 6.19 752.50 0.671 -16.55 9.26 
ESE -0.38 0.28 22.82 0.178 -0.94 0.17 -0.41 3.21 258.47 0.898 -7.40 6.36 
AGM 0.17 0.25 26.61 0.493 -0.31 0.67 -2.14 4.46 476.14 0.632 -12.14 6.58 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of 
average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= 
Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Similarly, the indirect effects of migrant status on career achievement through RSC and as a 
product of PD as a first stage moderator were statistically significant for SIEs within groups only 
(β = -140.14, p = 0.047, SD = 8592.56). However, this relationship was negative, much stronger, 
and less reliable than the relationship between migrant status and financial compensation. Said 
otherwise, these results show that SIEs fared much worse in high PD cultures than in low PD 
cultures when career achievement was the ultimate outcome and that this relationship varied 
greatly within each country. Findings were not significant for ESEs (β = 239.03, p = 0.170, SD = 
14,127.30) or AGMs (β = -140.47, p = 0.491, SD = 21,821.57). The between effects coefficients 
were found to be even more variable than the within effects coefficients (likely as a product of 
PD varying across countries) and were not statistically significant for any of the three groups: 
SIEs (β = 1209.55, p = 0.622, SD = 299,043.57), ESEs (β = 202.60, p = 0.878, SD = 106,777.40) 
































Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Power Distance Included as a First Stage Moderator              
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -140.14* 70.39 8592.56 0.047 -279.19 -2.81 1209.55 2449.70 299043.57 0.622 -3677.74 5918.11 
ESE 239.03 174.28 14127.30 0.170 -106.10 578.74 202.60 1317.24 106777.40 0.878 -2429.08 2724.05 
AGM -140.47 204.15 21821.57 0.491 -544.37 257.65 940.48 1824.95 195064.98 0.606 -2642.54 4547.03 
             
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average 
hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Collectively, these results support H10b, for SIEs, within groups only. That is the results for 
H10b, which argued that migrants in lower power distance cultures will have higher levels of 
social capital than those in higher power distance cultures, found an inverse conditional process 
analysis relationship between PD and SIEs such that SIEs in higher power distance cultures had 
lower levels of RSC, regardless of whether the model included financial compensation or career 
achievement as the model outcome (as this was a test of a first stage conditional process analysis 
only). The index of moderated mediation was not statistically significant for any of the migrant 
groups, showing that this relationship only exists in the direct path between migrant status and 
RSC in high vs. low PD cultures, rather than in the model as a whole. Interestingly, when 
looking at the entire model with financial compensation as the final outcome (that is, the indirect 
effect of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC and as a product of PD as a first 
stage moderator), the results oppose what I noted above. Overall, high power distance cultures 
were actually beneficial (albeit, only slightly) to the financial compensation of SIEs only (this 
relationship was not significant for ESEs or AGMs), contrary to the pattern posed in H10b. 
However, when examining the results of the entire model with career achievement as the final 
outcome (the indirect effect of migrant status on career achievement through RSC and as a 
product of PD as a first stage moderator), the results support the above findings. High power 
distance cultures were harmful to the career achievement of SIEs. The response to RQ4b (which 
asked which migrant group will have higher levels of RSC as PD increases) is not clear. SIEs 
were the only group with a statistically significant result which did not allow for a comparison of 
groups.  
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Institutional Collectivism (INC) as a Moderator  
Hypothesis 12 argued that INC will relate positively to social capital, regardless of migrant 
type such that migrants in higher INC countries will have higher levels of social capital, 
regardless of migrant type.  
A review of the output examining the conditional process analysis, that is, moderating effects 
of INC on the direct relationship between migrant type and RSC indicated that INC and migrant 
status interacted to affect RSC for SIEs only and only within groups. Specifically, cultures high 
in INC slightly raised RSC for SIEs (β = 0.23, p = 0.000, SD = 7.738), but the effects were not 
statistically significant for ESEs (β = -0.06, p = 0.543, SD = 7.60) or AGMs (β = -0.04, p = 
0.709, SD = 10.93). The between group results were not statistically significant for any of the 
groups and were as follows: SIEs (β = 0.05, p = 0.946, SD = 86.07), ESEs (β = -0.27, p = 0.591, 























The Effects of Institutional Collectivism on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage Moderation 
 Within Effects  Between Effects 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE 0.23*** 0.06 7.73 0.000 0.10 0.35 0.05 0.71 86.07 0.946 -1.68 1.78 
ESE -0.06 0.09 7.60 0.543 -0.24 0.13 -0.27 0.47 38.05 0.591 -1.36 0.83 
AGM -0.04 0.10 10.93 0.709 -0.24 0.16 -0.21 0.40 43.03 0.618 -1.19 0.77 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant.  
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 When examining the index of moderated mediation in the context of financial compensation, 
the results were only supportive of a moderated mediation for SIEs (β = 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 
0.09]), within groups. Output for ESEs (β = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.04]) and AGMs (β = -0.01, 
95% CI [-0.07, 0.04]) was not statistically significant and did not support a moderated mediation. 
Similarly, the between group results were not statistically significant and did not support a 
moderated mediation for any of the migrant groups. Results were as follows for each of the 
groups: SIEs (β = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.88, 0.94]), ESEs (β = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.79, 0.38], and AGMs 
(β = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.65, 0.36]). Collectively, the above results show that the relationship 
between migrant type and financial compensation is only conditional on INC for SIEs within 
groups. See Table 5.43 for more details.  
Table 5.43 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Institutional Collectivism as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 




Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 





0.06 0.03 0.09 Yes 0.03 -0.88 0.94 No 
ESE, First 
Stage 
-0.02 -0.08 0.04 No -0.12 -0.79 0.38 No 
AGM, First 
Stage 
-0.01 -0.07 0.04 No -0.12 -0.65 0.36 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= 
Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
Likewise, when testing the moderated mediation using career achievement as the outcome, 
results were only statistically significant for SIEs (β = -50.67, 95% CI [-78.24, -22.60]), within 
groups, indicating that the relationship between immigrant type and career achievement is also 
only conditional on INC for SIEs. Results for the other migrant groups were as follows: ESEs (β 
= 11.89, 95% CI [-26.00, 50.29]) and AGMs (β = 9.11, 95% CI [ -38.20, 57.25]). While between 
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group results were as follows: SIEs (β = -12.14, 95% CI [-345.45, 329.58]), ESEs (β = 60.37, 
95% CI [-148.15, 275.71], and AGMs (β =52.35, 95% CI [-144.21, 247.35]). See Table 5.44 for 
more details 
Table 5.44 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Institutional Collectivism as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome 




Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 





-50.67 -78.24 -22.60 Yes -12.14 -345.45 329.58 No 
ESE, First 
Stage 
11.89 -26.00 50.29 No 60.37 -148.15 275.71 No 
AGM, First 
Stage 
9.11 -38.20 57.25 No 52.35 -144.21 247.35 No 
         
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= 
Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
The indirect effect of migrant status on financial compensation through RSC and as a product 
of PD as a first stage moderator was statistically significant and negative for SIEs, within groups, 
only (β = -0.21, p = 0.002 , SD = 8.36). This result meant that SIEs likely earned slightly reduced 
financial compensation in high INC cultures than in low INC cultures. Within group 
relationships were not significant for ESEs (β = 0.08, p = 0.546, SD = 10.83) or AGMs (β = 
0.02, p = 0.847, SD = 13.50). Likewise, the between group results were not statistically 
significant for any of the migrant groups: SIEs (β = -0.10, p = 0.953, SD = 214.98), ESEs (β = 
0.28, p = 0.802, SD = 90.78), and AGMs (β = 0.82 p = 0.482, SD = 123.83). See Table 5.45 for 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Institutional Collectivism Included as a First Stage 
Moderator              
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -0.21*** 0.07 8.36 0.002 -0.35 -0.08 -0.10 1.77 214.98 0.953 -3.85 3.63 
ESE 0.08 0.13 10.83 0.546 -0.18 0.35 0.28 1.13 90.78 0.802 -1.94 2.91 
AGM 0.02 0.13 13.50 0.847 -0.22 0.28 0.82 1.16 123.83 0.482 -1.34 3.38 
             
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of 
average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; 
SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Interestingly, the indirect effects of migrant status on career achievement through RSC and as 
a product of INC as a first stage moderator were statistically significant, positive, much stronger, 
and much more variable than the relationship noted for financial compensation, for SIEs within 
groups where (β = 180.73, p = 0.001 , SD = 6,913.02). This result meant that SIEs likely 
achieved better career success in high INC cultures than in low INC cultures. This within group 
relationship was not statistically significant for ESEs (β = -50.87, p = 0.543, SD = 6,775.27) or 
AGMs (β = -20.07, p = 0.847, SD = 11,079.36). Consistent with the patterns starting the form in 
the results from the macro level moderators, the between group results were not statistically 
significant for any of the migrant groups. Results for the groups were as follows for SIEs (β = 
47.76, p = 0.947, SD = 87,670.78), ESEs (β = -139.08, p = 0.761, SD = 37,132.98), and AGMs 































Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Institutional Collectivism, Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 180.73*** 56.63 6913.02 0.001 68.83 291.00 47.76 718.18 87670.78 0.947 -1379.32 1434.63 
ESE -50.87 83.58 6775.27 0.543 -216.56 112.00 -139.08 458.08 37132.98 0.761 -1042.81 744.26 
AGM -20.07 103.65 11079.36 0.847 -225.20 181.72 -359.08 466.42 49854.34 0.441 -1260.72 549.17 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant. 
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Taken as a whole, these results provide a small degree of support for H12 (which stated that 
INC will positively relate to levels of social capital across all migrants) among SIEs (β = 0.23, p 
= 0.000, SD = 7.738), within groups only. Put another way, there was a small, but positive 
conditional process analysis relationship between SIEs’ migrant status and RSC as moderated by 
INC.  
The index of moderated mediation shed some additional light on the relationships within my 
model. A statistically significant relationship existed for SIEs (β = 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 0.09]) as 
it related to financial compensation through RSC and as moderated by INC (first stage) such that 
there was a positive moderated mediation. However, when the model included career 
achievement as the outcome (instead of financial compensation), this relationship became 
negative and increased in strength {SIEs (β = -50.67, 95% CI [-78.24, -22.60])} implying that 
financial compensation and career achievement (often assumed to go hand in hand) do not 
always follow the same pattern for SIEs.  
Even more interesting, the test of indirect effects of migrant status on an outcome (financial 
compensation or career achievement) through RSC and as a product of PD provided the reverse 
results. That is, when financial compensation was the outcome, the indirect effect was negative 
for SIEs within groups (β = -0.21, p = 0.002, SD = 8.36) meaning that SIEs likely had slightly 
reduced financial compensation. However, when career achievement was the outcome, these 
patterns reversed, but also increased in strength, such that this relationship (β = 180.73, p = 
0.001, SD = 6,913.02) was now positive and helpful to SIEs.  
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In-Group Collectivism (IGC) as a Moderator  
Hypothesis 13 suggested that there will be an inverse relationship between IGC and RSC 
such that higher levels of IGC will result in lower levels of RSC for all migrant groups. RQ5 
then asked, which migrant group will have the highest levels of RSC?  
A look at the interaction between migrant type and IGC (where IGC acts as a moderator) on 
RSC (the conditional process analysis) indicated that IGC only moderated this relationship for 
SIEs. This relationship (β = -0.10, p = 0.005, SD = 4.18) was negative meaning that as IGC 
levels increase, RSC decreases. The results were not statistically significant for ESEs (β = 0.10, p 
= 0.188, SD = 5.87) or AGMs (β = -0.05, p = 0.482, SD = 7.88). As has been the case with prior 
analyses, the between group results were not statistically significant where SIEs (β = 0.19, p = 
0.798, SD = 85.26), ESEs (β = 0.05, p = 0.922 , SD = 50.37), and AGMs (β = 0.09, p = 0.851, 























The Effects of In-Group Collectivism on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage Moderation 
    
 Within Effects  Between Effects  
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE -0.10*** 0.03 4.18 0.005 -0.16 -0.03 0.19 0.70 85.26 0.798 -1.50 1.88 
ESE 0.10 0.07 5.87 0.188 -0.05 0.24 0.05 0.50 39.79 0.922 -1.16 1.26 
AGM -0.05 0.07 7.88 0.482 -0.20 0.09 0.09 0.47 50.37 0.851 -1.06 1.25 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant.  
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When examining the index of moderated mediation for the model with financial 
compensation as the outcome, results were only statistically significant for SIEs (β = -0.03, 95% 
CI [-0.04, -0.01]), within groups, which is indicative of a slightly negative moderated mediation 
within countries. Moderated mediation results were not statistically significant for ESEs (β = 
0.03, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.08]) or for AGMs (β = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.03]). Similarly, between 
group results were not significant for any of the migrants groups where the data was as follows: 
SIEs (β = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.76, 1.03]), ESEs (β = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.55, 0.62], and AGMs (β = 
0.05, 95% CI [-0.53, 0.66]). Collectively and with the exception of within group SIEs, these 
result show that financial compensation as a product of immigrant type through RSC is not 






















Index of Moderated Mediation, In-Group Collectivism as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
 Within Between 
Migrant Group 
and Moderator 
Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 Yes 0.10 -0.76 1.03 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.03 -0.02 0.08 No 0.02 -0.55 0.62 No 
AGM, First Stage -0.02 -0.06 0.03 No 0.05 -0.53 0.66 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ 
main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant.  
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Testing this model with career achievement in place of financial compensation provided 
similar results. Specifically, a moderated mediation existed for SIEs (β = 21.75, 95% CI [6.80, 
36.90]), within group only, but the effect of this moderated mediation was positive (indicating 
that IGC moderates the model such that high levels of IGC are beneficial to SIE career 
achievement). Results for ESEs (β = -19.91, 95% CI [-49.15, 9.91]), and AGMs (β = 12.39, 95% 
CI [ -21.76, 47.11]) were not statistically significant. Between group results were not statistically 
significant either for any group where, SIEs (β = -45.43, 95% CI [-375.86, 293.53]), ESEs (β =    
-11.53, 95% CI [- 231.14, 213.68], and AGMs (β = -22.87, 95% CI [-252.18, 205.11]). See Table 
5.49 for more details. 
Table 5.49 
Index of Moderated Mediation, In-Group Collectivism as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome 




Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 





21.75 6.80 36.90 Yes -45.43 -375.86 293.53 No 
ESE, First 
Stage 
-19.91 -49.15 9.91 No -11.53 -231.14 213.68 No 
AGM, First 
Stage 
12.39 -21.76 47.11 No -22.87 -252.18 205.11 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
The output showing the indirect effects of migrant groups on financial compensation through 
RSC and as a product of IGC as a first stage moderator was statistically significant and positive 
for SIEs only (β = 0.14, p = 0.001, SD = 5.40), implying that SIEs likely had higher 
compensation in high IGC countries than in low IGC countries. As previous patterns have 
shown, this relationship was not significant for ESEs (β = -0.14, p = 0.200, SD = 8.69) or AGMs 
(β = 0.04, p = 0.645, SD = 10.17). Results between groups were also not statistically significant 
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for the migrant groups where, SIEs (β = -0.35, p = 0.853, SD = 232.93), ESEs (β = -0.15 p = 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, In-Group Collectivism Included as a First Stage 
Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group 
β SE SD 
p-
value 




SIE 0.14*** 0.04 5.40 0.001 0.06 0.23 -0.35 1.92 232.93 0.853 -4.52 3.58 
ESE -0.14 0.11 8.69 0.200 -0.35 0.07 -0.15 1.17 94.25 0.901 -2.71 2.31 
AGM 0.04 0.10 10.17 0.645 -0.14 0.23 -0.17 1.16 123.35 0.880 -2.64 2.20 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number 
of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored 
Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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 Likewise, when the model was examined with career achievement as the outcome, the 
effects of migrant status on career achievement through RSC and as a product of IGC as a first 
stage moderator were statistically significant (but negative) for SIEs within groups only (β =       
-121.66, p = 0.001, SD = 4,446.65). These results show that SIEs career achievement was likely 
reduced in high IGC cultures when compared to low IGC cultures. Findings were not significant 
for ESEs (β = 86.65, p = 0.192, SD = 5,383.67) or AGMs (β =-36.07, p = 0.644, SD = 8,340.79). 
Similarly, the between effects results were not statistically significant for any of the three groups: 
SIEs (β = 163.25, p = 0.833, SD = 94,577.00), ESEs (β = 71.40, p = 0.882, SD = 38,943.67) or 
AGMs (β = 76.60, p = 0.873, SD = 51,204.02). See Table 5.51 for more details.  
Taken together, these results support H13 (which posed an inverse relationship between IGC 
and RSC such that higher levels of IGC will result in lower levels of RSC across all migrant 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, In-Group Collectivism, Included as a First Stage Moderator 
             
 Within  Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -121.66*** 36.43 4446.65 0.001 -193.65 -50.46 163.25 774.75 94577.00 0.833 -1376.47 1655.15 
ESE 86.65 66.41 5383.67 0.192 -44.62 216.02 71.40 480.42 38943.67 0.882 -877.65 1002.99 
AGM -36.07 78.03 8340.79 0.644 -190.82 116.39 76.60 479.04 51204.02 0.873 -856.07 1014.33 
             
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant. 
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The index of moderated mediation provided some additional details about the relationships 
within my model. There was a statistically significant and slightly negative leaning moderated 
mediation for SIEs (β = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.04, -0.01]), within groups, when the model was 
examined with financial compensation as the outcome (which aligned with the general 
directionality predicted by H13. Nevertheless, when the model replaced financial compensation 
with career achievement as the outcome, this relationship flipped (not supporting the patten 
posed by H13 and indicated that High IGC cultures were beneficial to career achievement for 
SIEs (β = 21.75, 95% CI [6.80, 36.90]), once again, indicating that financial compensation and 
career achievement do not always follow the same patterns of results. 
Beyond this, the indirect effects of migrant groups on outcomes (financial compensation and 
career achievement) through RSC and as a product of IGC as a first stage moderator showed 
opposite results depending on the outcome variable being examined. Specifically, the inverse 
relationship posed by H13 was not supported when financial compensation was the outcome 
(where SIEs [β = 0.14, p = 0.001, SD = 5.40]), but was supported when career achievement was 
the outcome (SIEs [β = -121.66, p = 0.001, SD = 4,446.65]), within groups only. 
The response to RQ5, which asked which migrant group will have the highest levels of RSC, 
is not clear. I was not able to compare group results as SIEs were the only group with a 
statistically significant finding.  
Gender Egalitarianism (GE) a Moderator  
Hypothesis 14b posed that GE will moderate the relationship between immigrants and social 
capital resources such that there will be smaller gender based differences in RSC in high gender 
egalitarianism cultures compared to low gender egalitarianism cultures. Likewise, RQ6 asked 
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what effect will immigrant type have on social capital resources as GE increases? And will there 
be gender differences?  
As this hypothesis and research question ask about the effects of GE on migrants as well as 
migrants by gender, the results presented in this section will be slightly different than prior 
sections. Specifically, I conducted these analyses three time for each migrant group, once with 
the migrant group as a whole (to see the effects of GE on the migrant groups regardless of 
gender), and once for each gender, for each migrant group. Thus, for example, analyses 
examining the conditional process analysis effects of GE on financial compensation as a product 
of RSC through GE were conducted once with all SIEs, once with only male SIEs and once with 
only female SIEs. All results are discussed below.  
As has largely been the pattern thus far, the conditional process analysis interaction between 
migrant type and GE (moderator) on RSC for all migrants (men and women) found that GE only 
moderated this relationship for SIEs. The results showed that for SIEs (β = 0.15, p = 0.037, SD = 
8.46), being in a higher gender egalitarianism country was likely beneficial to their RSC than 
being in a low GE country. Similarly, as has been the overall pattern thus far, this relationship 
was not statistically significant for ESEs (β = 0.01, p = 0.944, SD = 9.19) or AGMs (β = -0.05, p 
= 0.689, SD = 12.35). Likewise, there were no statically significant between group findings such 
that SIEs (β =1.45, p = 0.296, SD = 154.47), ESEs (β = -0.46, p = 0.616 , SD = 68.85) and 























The Effects of Gender Egalitarianism on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First 
Stage Moderation 
    
 Within Effects Between Effects  
Migrant 
Group β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL 
SIE 0.15* 0.07 8.46 0.037 0.01 0.28 1.45 1.27 154.47 0.296 -1.62 4.51 
ESE 0.01 0.11 9.19 0.944 -0.22 0.23 -0.46 0.86 68.85 0.616 -2.65 1.73 
AGM -0.05 0.12 12.34 0.689 -0.27 0.18 0.28 0.84 90.06 0.747 -1.72 2.29 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number 
of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored 
Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Interestingly, when these groups were split by gender, the results diverged. For males, the 
results were now statistically significant for SIEs (β = 0.25, p = 0.002, SD = 7.32) and ESEs (β = 
-0.26, p = 0.070, SD = 8.58), but not AGMs, (β = 0.18, p = 0.207, SD = 11.18) within groups. 
However, the results for females were statistically significant for AGMs (β = -0.24, p = 0.031, 
SD = 13.22) but not for SIEs (β = 0.06, p = 0.618, SD = 9.59) or ESEs (β = 0.22, p = 0.113, SD 
= 9.68), within groups. See Tables 5.53 and 5.54 for male and female results, respectively. 
Collectively, these results show that high GE is beneficial to male SIEs and harmful to male 
ESEs and female AGMs. However, as results were only statistically significant for male SIEs 
and ESEs and only female AGMs, I was not able to compare migrant groups by gender and 
answer H14b. Between groups findings were not statistically significant for either gender group. 
Findings for males were as follows, SIEs (β = 3.07, p = 0.126, SD = 167.58), ESEs (β = 0.70, p = 
0.385, SD = 104.48), AGMs (β = -1.42, p = 0.385, SD = 124.18). Findings for females were as 
follows, SIEs (β = 3.26, p = 0.104, SD = 141.15), ESEs (β = 0.96, p = 0.499, SD = 72.75), 
























The Effects of Gender Egalitarianism on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage 
Moderation, Male Sample Only 
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE 0.25*** 0.08 7.32 0.002 0.10 0.41 3.07 1.84 167.58 0.126 -1.04 7.18 
ESE -0.26** 0.14 8.58 0.070 -0.54 0.02 0.70 1.74 104.47 0.699 -3.30 4.69 
AGM 0.18 0.14 11.18 0.207 -0.10 0.45 -1.42 1.55 124.18 0.385 -4.96 2.12 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 3,601 to n=8,334. Models controlled for number of average 
hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
Table 5.54 
The Effects of Gender Egalitarianism on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, 
First Stage Moderation, Female Sample Only 
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migra
nt 
Group β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL 
SIE 0.06 0.12 9.59 0.618 -0.17 0.29 3.26 1.76 141.15 0.104 -0.84 7.36 
ESE 0.22 0.18 9.68 0.113 -2.08 15.96 0.96 1.36 72.75 0.499 -2.19 4.12 
AGM -0.24* 0.19 13.22 0.031 0.38 6.45 -1.39 1.19 84.18 0.274 -4.11 1.33 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,869 to n=6,446. Models controlled for 
number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer 
Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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The index of moderated mediation with financial compensation as the outcome showed a 
positive moderated mediation for SIEs (β = 0.04, 95% CI [0.002, 0.08]), within groups only. 
Moderated mediation results were not statistically significant for the other two groups, 
specifically ESEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.77]) and for AGMs (β = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.08, 
0.05]). Between group results were no different, showing no moderated mediations for any of the 
three migrant groups, where results were as follows: SIEs (β = 0.76, 95% CI [-0.60, 2.77]), ESEs 
(β = -0.21, 95% CI [1.38, 0.67]), and AGMs (β = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.84, 1.25]), meaning that 































Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender Egalitarianism as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 0.04 0.00 0.08 Yes 0.76 -0.60 2.77 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 -0.07 0.08 No -0.21 -1.38 0.67 No 
AGM, First Stage -0.01 -0.08 0.05 No 0.16 -0.84 1.25 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per 
week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
MIGRATION AND WORK 195 
  
Gender based results were slightly different where none were statistically significant except 
for a mediated moderation for male SIEs. Specifically, among males, SIEs (β =0.14, 95% CI 
[0.05, 0.23]) results showed a slight, positive moderated mediation, within groups. Other non-
significant results were as follows: male ESEs (β = -0.17, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.01]), male AGMs (β 
= 0.10, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.26], female SIEs (β = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.04]), female ESEs (β = 
0.02, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.08]), and female AGMs (β = -0.04, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.02]). Likewise, there 
was no moderated mediation within groups or between groups where male SIEs (β = 2.98, 95% 
CI [-0.53, 7.98]), male ESEs (β = 0.59, 95% CI [-2.56, 4.10]), male AGMs (β = -1.29, 95% CI [  
-4.71, 1.52]), female SIEs (β = 1.52, 95% CI [-0.21, 4.26]), female ESEs (β = 0.28, 95% CI [       
-0.78, 1.88]), female AGMs (β = -0.62, 95% CI [-2.04, 0.43]) results were not statistically 
significant. See Tables 5.56 and 5.57 for male and female results, respectively.  
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Table 5.56 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender Egalitarianism as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome, Male 
Sample Only 
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 0.14 0.05 0.23 Yes 2.98 -0.53 7.98 No 
ESE, First Stage -0.17 -0.36 0.01 No 0.59 -2.56 4.10 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.10 -0.06 0.26 No -1.29 -4.71 1.52 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 3,601 to n=8,334. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
 
Placing career achievement in place of financial compensation to test my moderated 
mediation offered very similar, but inverse, results. The index of moderated mediation showed a 
negative moderated mediation for SIEs (β = -32.55, 95% CI [-62.80, -1.79]), within groups only. 
However, like the results above, moderated mediation results were not statistically significant for 
ESEs (β = -1.67, 95% CI [-47.39, 44.81]) or for AGMs (β = 11.05, 95% CI [-42.41, 65.43]). 
Between group results were no different, showing no moderated mediations for any of the three 
migrant groups, where results were as follows: SIEs (β = -350.79, 95% CI [-942.65, 264.97]), 
ESEs (β = 103.93, 95% CI [-269.54, 492.38]), and AGMs (β = -70.12, 95% CI [-479.69, 347.42]. 
See Table 5.58 for more details.   
Table 5.57 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender Egalitarianism as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome, 
Female Sample Only 
 Within Between 
 Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 0.01 -0.02 0.04 No 1.52 -0.21 4.26 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.02 -0.01 0.08 No 0.28 -0.78 1.88 No 
AGM, First Stage -0.04 -0.12 0.02 No -0.62 -2.05 0.43 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,869 to n=6,446. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Table 5.58 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender Egalitarianism as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome 
 Within Between 
Migrant Group 
and Moderator 
Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -32.55 -62.80 -1.79 Yes 
-
350.79 
-942.65 264.97 No 
ESE, First Stage -1.67 -47.39 44.81 No 103.93 -269.54 492.40 No 
AGM, First 
Stage 
11.05 -42.41 65.43 No -70.12 -479.69 347.42 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 11,425 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
When split by gender, a negative moderated mediation existed for male SIEs, (β = -51.33, 
95% CI [-83.21, -19.20]), within group only, showing that increasing levels of GE are harmful to 
male SIE career achievement. All other results across both genders and both within and between 
groups were not statistically significant, where and were as follows: male, within group ESEs (β 
= 48.59, 95% CI [-4.10, 101.69]), male, within group AGMs (β = -38.71, 95% CI [-99.05, 
22.25]), female, within group SIEs (β = -14.47, 95% CI [-71.63, 43.36]), female, within group 
ESEs (β = -48.85, 95% CI [-129.35, 32.54]), female, within group AGMs,(β = 60.57, 95% CI [    
-33.67, 155.64]), male, between group SIEs (β = -717.06, 95% CI [-1582.10, 132.08], male, 
between group ESEs (β = -155.46, 95% CI [-939.97, 609.48]), male, between group AGMs (β = 
344.81, 95% CI [-404.78, 1089.52]), female, between group SIEs (β = -855.96, 95% CI [             
-1789.50, 59.11]), female, between group ESEs (β = -250.54, 95% CI [-966.08, 443.28]), and 
female, between group AGMs (β = 376.01, 95% CI [-267.62, 1010.24]). See Tables 5.59 and 
5.60 for male and female results, respectively.  
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Table 5.59 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender Egalitarianism as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome, 
Male Sample Only 




Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 





-51.33 -83.21 -19.20 Yes -717.06 -1582.14 132.08 No 
ESE, First 
Stage 
48.59 -4.10 101.69 No -155.46 -939.97 609.48 No 
AGM, First 
Stage 
-38.71 -99.05 22.25 No 344.81 -404.78 1089.52 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 3,601 to n=8,421. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
 
An examination of the results of the indirect effects of migrant groups on financial 
compensation through RSC as a product of GE, across genders, as a first stage moderator 
showed that within group results were statistically significant and negative for SIEs only (β =       
-0.10, p = 0.094, SD = 7.54), indicating that within groups, SIEs in higher gender egalitarian 
cultures likely had slightly reduced financial compensation. As has often been the case 
previously, these results were not statistically significant for ESEs (β = -0.01, p = 0.945, SD = 
10.46) or AGMs (β = 0.02, p = 0.839, SD = 12.30). Results between groups were also not 
Table 5.60 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Gender Egalitarianism as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome, 
Female Sample Only 




Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 











32.54 No -250.54 -966.08 443.28 No 
AGM, First 
Stage 
60.57 -33.67 155.64 No 376.01 -267.62 1010.24 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,898 to n=6,466. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= 
Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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statistically significant for the migrant groups where, SIEs (β = -2.59, p = 0.380, SD = 358.70), 
ESEs (β = 0.66, p = 0.703, SD = 140.42), and AGMs (β = -0.49, p = 0.784, SD = 192.97). See 






















Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Gender Egalitarianism Included as a First Stage 
Moderator 
             
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD 
p-
value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -0.10** 0.06 7.54 0.094 -0.23 0.02 -2.59 2.95 358.70 0.380 -9.47 2.12 
ESE -0.01 0.13 10.46 0.945 -0.26 0.25 0.66 1.75 140.42 0.703 -2.51 4.77 
AGM 0.02 0.12 12.30 0.839 -0.20 0.25 -0.49 1.81 192.97 0.784 -4.38 3.10 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,470 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of 
average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; 
SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Results by gender, showed a similar pattern for male SIEs (β = -0.43, p = 0.05, SD = 13.93) 
only where being a male SIEs in a high GE culture had a slightly negative effect on financial 
compensation within group, but no effects were found for females within groups or either sex 
between groups. Results were not statistically significant for male ESEs (β = 0.46, p = 0.148, SD 
= 19.00) or male AGMs (β = -0.31, p = 0.249, SD = 21.41), female SIEs (β = -0.01, p = 0.832, 
SD = 4.31), female ESEs (β = -0.06, p = 0.459, SD = 3.97), and female AGMs (β = 0.10, p = 
0.389, SD = 8.41), within groups. Likewise, between group results were also not statistically 
significant where results showed that: male SIEs (β = -10.60, p = 0.154, SD = 678.69), male 
ESEs (β = -2.13, p = 0.713, SD = 347.31) and male AGMs (β = 4.80, p = 0.392, SD = 448.54), 
female SIEs (β = -5.35, p = 0.172, SD = 314.72), female ESEs (β = -0.97, p = 0.664, SD = 
119.46), and female AGMs (β = 2.17, p = 0.325, SD = 155.85). See Tables 5.62 and 5.63 for 






















Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Gender Egalitarianism Included as a First Stage 
Moderator, Male Sample Only 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -0.43* 0.15 13.93 0.005 -0.74 -0.14 -10.60 7.43 678.69 0.154 -27.89 1.47 
ESE 0.46 0.32 19.00 0.148 -0.17 1.11 -2.13 5.79 347.31 0.713 -14.90 9.40 
AGM -0.31 0.27 21.41 0.249 -0.85 0.22 4.80 5.61 448.54 0.392 -5.33 17.20 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 3,601 to n=8,334. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 





Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Gender Egalitarianism Included as a First Stage 
Moderator, Female Sample Only  
                          
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -0.01 0.05 4.31 0.832 -0.12 0.10 -5.35 3.92 314.72 0.172 -14.71 0.50 
ESE -0.06 0.07 3.97 0.459 -0.23 0.08 -0.97 2.23 119.46 0.664 -6.60 2.84 
AGM 0.10 0.12 8.41 0.389 -0.13 0.35 2.17 2.21 155.85 0.325 -1.54 7.19 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,869 to n=6,446. Models controlled for number of 
average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; 
SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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When the model was examined with career achievement as the outcome, a similar pattern 
emerged across all migrants such that the effects were significant for SIEs (β = 88.62, p = 0.090, 
SD = 6377.22), within groups only and not statistically significant for any of the other groups 
within or between. Results for the other group were as follows: within group ESEs (β = 5.58, p = 
0.945, SD = 6,553.23) and AGMs (β = -19.21, p = 0.839, SD = 10,098.34) and between group 
SIEs (β =1192.64, p = 0.260, SD = 129,287.33), ESEs (β = -325.78, p = 0.640, SD = 56,412.77), 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Gender Egalitarianism, Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 88.62** 52.24 6377.22 0.090 -14.80 190.64 1192.64 1059.09 129287.33 0.260 -909.47 3236.52 
ESE 5.58 80.84 6553.23 0.945 -154.38 163.23 -325.78 695.92 56412.77 0.640 -1722.33 1004.33 
AGM -19.21 94.48 10098.34 0.839 -206.14 164.79 217.85 746.95 79839.75 0.771 -1259.31 1678.22 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant. 
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Nevertheless, when examining these results by gender, a different pattern emerged. Namely, 
the effect of migrant status on career achievement through RSC and as a product of GE as a first 
stage moderator were positive and statistically significant for within group male SIEs (β = 
156.11, p = 0.004, SD = 4969.78), between group male SIEs (β = 2553.89, p = 0.081, SD = 
134,483.36) and female SIEs between groups (β = 3,010.174, p = 0.051, SD = 124,394.59). 
These strong and positive results show that GE matters to migrants both within (in the case of 
male SIEs) and between countries such that higher GE is better for males and female SIEs. 
Moreover, the comparison of male and female SIEs between countries shows that female SIEs 
fare better than males in countries with higher GE than in those with lower GE with respect to 
their career achievement, but the results were highly variable (due to a very large SD). All other 
findings for these groups were not significant where: within group male ESEs (β = -133.98, p = 
0.143, SD = 5,547.38), within group male AGMs (β =121.27, p = 0.246, SD = 8385.37), within 
group female SIEs (β = 20.99, p = 0.829, SD = 7,804.97), within group female ESEs (β = 
121.514, p = 0.385, SD = 7530.51), within group female AGMs (β = -143.41, p = 0.383, SD = 
11,612.69). Likewise, between groups male ESEs (β = 565.48, p = 0.690, SD = 85,774.41), 
between group male AGMs (β = -1283.57, p = 0.346, SD = 109,119.30), between group female 
ESEs (β = 860.13, p = 0.497, SD = 68,135.02), and between group AGMs (β = -1328.79, p = 
0.247, SD = 81,128.78), were not statistically significant. See Table 5.65 and 5.66 for male and 























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Gender Egalitarianism Included as a First Stage Moderator, Male Sample Only 
             
 Within Between  
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 156.11* 54.16 4969.78 0.004 48.93 263.50 2553.89** 1465.50 134483.36 0.081 -338.81 5508.15 
ESE -133.98 91.53 5547.38 0.143 -314.25 48.35 565.48 1415.30 85774.41 0.690 -2234.89 3415.82 
AGM 121.27 104.60 8385.37 0.246 -85.82 328.55 -1283.57 1361.23 109119.30 0.346 -3986.11 1424.53 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 3,763 to n=8,421. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 














Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 20.99 96.95 7804.97 0.829 -170.54 213.08 3010.17** 1545.19 124394.59 0.051 -37.67 6129.68 
ESE 121.52 139.89 7530.51 0.385 -154.18 399.26 860.13 1265.67 68135.02 0.497 -1644.75 3419.87 
AGM -143.41 164.24 11612.69 0.383 -467.27 183.45 -1328.79 1147.45 81128.78 0.247 -3602.67 970.57 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,898 to n=6,481. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant. 
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Taken as a whole, the results for H14b (which argued that GE will moderate the relationship 
between the immigrants’ migrant status social capital resources such that there are smaller 
gender differences in high gender egalitarian countries than in low gender egalitarian countries) 
and the answer to RQ6 (which how these differences will change across migrant groups and 
genders as a product of gender egalitarianism ) were inconclusive and therefore not supported 
with respect to the conditional process analyses effects of migrant status on RSC as a product of 
GE. This is because this relationship was positive and statistically significant for male SIEs (β = 
0.25, p = 0.002, SD = 7.32), and negative but statistically significant for male ESEs (β = -0.26, p 
= 0.070, SD = 8.58) and female AGMs (β = -0.24, p = 0.031, SD = 13.22) within groups, not 
allowing for a comparison of migrant groups between genders. Nevertheless, when looking at 
this relationship as a whole (not by gender), there is some evidence that high GE may slightly 
help RSC for SIEs, within groups (β = 0.15, p = 0.037, SD = 8.46). 
The index of moderated mediation did not shed much additional light on the results as there 
was a positive moderated mediation with financial compensation as the outcome for male SIEs 
(β = 0.14, 95% CI [0.05, 0.23]) but not for female SIEs (β = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.04]) within 
groups. Overall, across genders however, there was a slightly positive leaning moderated 
mediation for SIEs (β = 0.04, 95% CI [0.00, 0.08]) indicating that there is a slight moderated 
mediation with a positive relationship to GE. Likewise, when the model was examined with 
career achievement as the outcome, the results were similar where they were statistically 
significant for male SIEs (β = -51.33, 95% CI [-83.21, -19.20]) but not for female SIEs (β =        
-14.47, 95% CI [-71.63, 43.36]) within groups. Across genders, however, there was a negative 
leaning moderated mediation for SIEs (β = -32.55, 95% CI [-62.80, -1.80]) indicating that the 
model shifts negatively when there is high GE within a country.  
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The most interesting results in this section came out of the indirect effects of migrant status 
on career achievement through RSC and as a product of GE. Here, a comparison of the between 
group results for male and female SIEs showed that there was a stronger positive effect of GE on 
the career achievement of female SIEs (β = 3,010.17, p = 0.051, SD = 123,394.59), as GE 
cultural values increases, than of male SIEs (β = 2,553.89, p = 0.081, SD = 134,483.36) 
indicating that there is some relationship between GE and gender among SIEs between countries 
which may benefit from further exploration. Noteworthy however, were the very large SDs 
indicating that these findings vary greatly.  
Cultural Distance as a Moderator  
As noted earlier, this moderator is a micro level moderator and therefore was tested as both a 
first and second stage moderator. I posed two hypotheses and a research question for cultural 
distance. More narrowly, Hypothesis 15b posed that cultural distance will moderate the 
relationship between immigrant type and social capital resources such that migrants experiencing 
lower levels of cultural distance will have higher levels of RSC than those experiencing higher 
levels of cultural distance. H16 argued that migrants who moved to countries lower in cultural 
distance will have achieve higher financial compensation and career achievement than those 
which moved to countries of higher cultural distance. RQ7 asked if cultural distance will affect 
each migrant group’s career-related resources (RQ7a) career-related outcomes (RQ7b) 
differently 
Unfortunately, attempts at conducting these analyses for most of my migrant groups with and 
without covariates (conducted as attempts to simplify the model and reduce the needed power for 
my analyses) were met with an error stating that the model failed to converge and parameters 
could not be estimated. Nevertheless, the model did produce results for SIEs for both outcomes 
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(financial compensation and career achievement) and AGMs (for financial compensation only), 
but these results were not statistically significant (discussed below) and, therefore, H5b and H16 
were not supported and RQ7 could not be answered. The likely reason for this non-convergence 
error was that my sample size for this specific moderating variable was too small. Non-
convergence often occurs when cell sizes are small. As noted earlier in this paper, not all 
countries participating in the EULFS collected data on the respondents’ country of origin (the 
item I used to measure cultural distance). The ultimate sample size for this variable totaled n = 
153 and only provided data for 12 of the 25 total countries in my sample (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10 
for more details). As I am testing my model for each migrant group separately (that is, I am 
running analyses for SIEs, ESEs, and AGMs separately), the sample size for each group is 
reduced even further (discussed earlier). Specifically, a crosstabs analysis showed that the total 
samples available to test these hypotheses was actually n = 56 for SIEs, n = 89 for ESEs, and n = 
8 for AGMs. This was before other potential data loss due to missing responses for the variables 
in my model. A sample size at level-1 of less than 50 when the level-2 sample size is 12 is 
generally not sufficient for multilevel models (Maas & Hox, 2005; Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009). 
Therefore, and unfortunately, these hypotheses could not be tested.  
Of the data which did produce results, they were indicative of a negative, but not statistically 
significant, conditional process analysis moderating effect for cultural distance on RSC both 
within and between effects where SIEs (β = -0.27, p = 0.178, SD = 24.03) within and SIEs (β =    
-0.66, p = 0.439, SD = 99.75) between. See Table 5.67 for more details. Likewise, when testing 
the model with financial compensation as the outcome, the index of moderated mediation was 
not indicative of a first stage moderated mediation SIEs (β = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.03]) within 
and SIEs (β = -0.35, 95% CI [-1.63, 0.61]) between. See Table 5.68 for more details. No other 
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results were produced for the index of moderated mediation. Lastly, the indirect effect of migrant 
status on financial compensation through RSC and as a product of cultural distance as a first 
stage moderator was not statistically significant, SIEs (β = 0.07, p = 0.438, SD = 10.63) within 
and SIEs (β = -1.28, p = 0.568, SD = 262.78) between. No other results were produced. See 
























The Effects of Cultural Distance on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage 
Moderation 
    
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE -0.27 0.20 24.03 0.178 -0.68 0.13 -0.66 0.85 99.75 0.439 -2.34 1.02 
ESE Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM Not Produced Not Produced 
             
Note. Results not statistically significant. n= 13,784. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main 
job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant.  
 
Table 5.68 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Cultural Distance as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome          
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -0.07 -0.18 0.03 No -0.35 -1.63 0.61 No 
SIE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
         
ESE, First Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
ESE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
         
AGM, First Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
Note. n= 13,784. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in 




























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Cultural Distance Included as a First Stage Moderator 
             
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.07 0.09 10.63 0.438 -0.11 0.25 -1.28 2.24 262.78 0.568 -6.35 2.75 
ESE Not produced Not produced 
AGM Not produced Not produced 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. n= 13,784. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per 
week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
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Results for the model with career achievement as the outcome were largely similar where the 
index of moderated mediation was positive, but also not statistically significant SIEs (β = 62.20, 
95% CI [-26.81, 151.80]) within and SIEs (β = 159.89, 95% CI [-258.47, 561.52]) between when 
cultural distance was a first stage moderator. No results were produced when it was shifted to a 
second stage moderator. The test for indirect effect of migrant status on career achievement 
through RSC and as a product of cultural distance as a first stage moderator showed SIEs (β =     
-59.90, p = 0.436, SD = 9,376.77) within and SIEs (β = 588.76, p = 0.497, SD = 105,735.06) 























Index of Moderated Mediation, Cultural Distance as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome          
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 62.20 -26.81 151.80 No 159.89 -258.47 561.52 No 
SIE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced          
ESE, First Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
ESE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced          
AGM, First Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM, Second Stage Not Produced Not produced          
Note. Results not statistically significant. n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main 
job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant.  
 
Table 5.71 
Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Cultural Distance, Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -59.90 76.81 9376.77 0.436 -208.93 90.59 588.76 866.16 105735.06 0.497 -1110.17 2205.25 
ESE Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM Not Produced Not Produced 
Note. Results not statistically significant, n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, 
per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant. 
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GDP Per Capita as a Moderator 
 Hypothesis 17b posed a positive relationship between RSC and GDP per capita across all 
immigrant types. In other words, H17b stated that immigrants living in higher GDP per capita 
countries will have higher RSC than those living in lower GDP countries. RQ8 then asked which 
of the three migrant groups will have the highest RSC.  
A review of the results showed interesting findings. Namely, that the only statistically 
significant result was for SIEs, but the relationship was almost non-existent. Non-existent 
relationships (whether statistically significant or not) were generally the case across all results 
testing GDP per capita as a moderator, regardless of whether the model positioned financial 
compensation or career achievement as the outcome. Specifically, for the conditional process 
analysis relationship between immigrant type and RSC moderated by GDP per capita, findings 
were as follows: SIEs (β = 0.00, p = 0.090, SD = 0.00), ESEs (β = 0.00, p = 0.143, SD = 0.00), 
and AGMs (β = 0.00, p = 0.332, SD = 0.00). Likewise, the between group results were not 
statistically significant for any of the groups where SIEs (β = 0.00, p = 0.404, SD = 0.00), ESEs 
(β = 0.00, p = 0.207, SD = 0.00), and AGMs (β = 0.00, p = 0.174, SD = 0.00). See Table 5.72 for 































The Effects of GDP Per Capita on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage 
Moderation 
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL 
SIE 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.090 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.404 0.00 0.00 
ESE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.143 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.207 -0.00 0.00 
AGM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.332 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.174 0.00 0.00 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,551 to n=14,780. Models controlled for 
number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer 
Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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The results for the index of moderated mediation where financial compensation was the 
outcome were also non-existent and not statistically significant within or between groups, 
indicating that GDP per capita does not moderated this model within countries. Results for each 
group were as follows: SIEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00]), ESEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 
0.00]), and AGMs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00]). Similarly, between group findings were not 
statistically significant such that: SIEs (β = 0.000, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00]), ESEs (β = 0.000, 95% 























Index of Moderated Mediation, GDP Per Capita as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
         
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 0.00 0.00 No          
ESE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 -0.00 0.00 No          
AGM, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 0.00 0.00 No          
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,551 to n=14,877. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ 
main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant.  
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Testing this model with career achievement in place of financial compensation provided 
similar results. Specifically, no moderated mediation or effects for any of the groups regardless 
of whether the effect was tested within or between groups. Within group results were as follows: 
SIEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00]), ESEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00]), and AGMs (β = 
0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00]). Between group results were as follows: SIEs (β = -0.01, 95% CI [      
-0.02, 0.01]), ESEs (β = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.03], and AGMs (β = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.01]). 
See Table 5.74 for more details 
Table 5.74 
Index of Moderated Mediation, GDP Per Capita as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome 
         
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No -0.01 -0.02 0.01 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.01 -0.01 0.03 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No -0.01 -0.03 0.01 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
No different from the results above, the output showing the indirect effects of migrant groups 
on financial compensation through RSC and as a product of GDP per capita as a first stage 
moderator were almost non-existent and not statistically significant for any of the migrant 
groups. Specifically, results were as follows for SIEs (β = 0.00, p = 0.779, SD = 1.59), ESEs (β = 
0.06, p = 0.167, SD = 3.49), and AGMs (β = -0.06, p = 0.138, SD = 4.09). Likewise, between 
group results were, SIEs (β = -0.27, p = 0.632, SD = 68.77), ESEs (β = 1.24, p = 0.362, SD = 
110.38), and AGMs (β = -1.44, p = 0.221, SD = 125.49). When career achievement replaced 
financial compensation as the outcome, there were some small, but non-significant effects. 
Within groups findings showed the following for SIEs (β = -3.10, p = 0.778, SD = 1,345.00), 
ESEs (β = -37.33, p = 0.159, SD = 2,146.38), and AGMs (β = 46.68, p = 0.135, SD = 3,334.15). 
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Similarly, between groups were as follows: SIEs (β = 124.50, p = 0.574, SD = 27,034.27), ESEs 
(β = -609.63, p = 0.178, SD = 36,690.19), and AGMs (β = 633.91, p = 0.149, SD = 46,952.03). 



























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, GDP Per Capita Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.00 0.01 1.59 0.779 -0.02 0.03 -0.27 0.56 68.77 0.632 -1.58 0.77 
ESE 0.06 0.04 3.49 0.167 -0.02 0.15 1.24 1.36 110.38 0.362 -0.75 4.57 
AGM -0.06 0.04 4.09 0.138 -0.13 0.02 -1.44 1.18 125.49 0.221 -4.17 0.50 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,551 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
Table 5.76 
Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, GDP Per Capita, Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -3.10 11.02 1345.00 0.778 -24.73 18.36 124.50 221.46 27034.27 0.574 -317.99 562.03 
ESE -37.33 26.48 2146.38 0.159 -89.54 14.23 -609.63 452.62 36690.19 0.178 -1521.92 247.71 
AGM 46.68 31.19 3334.15 0.135 -14.43 107.59 633.91 439.26 46952.03 0.149 -230.01 1486.28 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant. 
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Taken together, these results support do not support H17b (which suggested that the 
relationship between immigrant type and career resources will be moderated by GDP per capita, 
positively). Testing GDP per capita had one statistically significant finding (SIEs [β = 0.000, p = 
0.050, SD = 0.00]) but with a non-existent effect and did not have an effect of any the other 
relationships tested in my model. The results also did not allow me to answer RQ8 which asked 
how social capital will differ by migrant group as a product of GDP per capita.  
Social Expenditure as a moderator. Hypothesis 18b argued that migrants living in countries 
where social expenditure is higher will have higher social capital resources than migrants living 
in countries with lower social expenditures. Similarly, RQ9b asked which migrant group will 
have higher levels of social capital as social expenditure increases?  
The findings for this hypothesis were not significant across any of the groups, within or 
between, suggesting that there is no relationship between immigrant type and RSC as a product 
of social expenditure. Results for the conditional process analyses showed the following for each 
group: SIEs (β = 0.01, p = 0.394, SD = 0.88), ESEs (β = 0.00, p = 0.883, SD = 1.16), and AGMs 
(β = -0.01, p = 0.514, SD = 1.46), within groups. Likewise, the between group results were not 
statistically significant for any of the groups and were as follows, SIEs (β = 0.07, p = 0.412, SD 
= 9.71), ESEs (β = -0.04, p = 0.650, SD = 6.35), and AGMs (β = -0.01, p = 0.954, SD = 11.40). 























The Effects of Social Expenditure on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage Moderation 
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant Group β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.394 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 9.71 0.412 -0.11 0.24 
ESE 0.00 0.01 1.16 0.883 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.08 6.35 0.650 -0.21 0.14 
AGM -0.01 0.01 1.46 0.514 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.11 11.40 0.954 -0.25 0.23 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,551 to n=14,877. Models controlled for number of average 
hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Likewise, results for the index of moderated mediation with financial compensation as the 
outcome were almost non-existent and not significant, within or between groups, meaning that 
social expenditure does not moderate this model. Results for each group were as follows: SIEs (β 
= 0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00]), ESEs (β = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01]), and AGMs (β = 0.00, 95% 
CI [-0.01, 0.01]). Similarly, between group findings were not statistically significant such that: 
SIEs (β = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.02), ESEs (β = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.07], and AGMs (β = 
0.00, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.13]). See Table 5.78 for more details.  
Table 5.78 
Index of Moderated Mediation, Social Expenditure as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
 Within Between 
Migrant Group 
and Moderator 
Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.03 -0.05 0.03 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 -0.01 0.01 No -0.02 -0.12 0.07 No 
AGM, First 
Stage 
0.00 -0.01 0.01 No 0.00 -0.14 0.13 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,551 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-
Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant.  
 
Testing the index of moderated mediation with career achievement as the model’s outcome, 
provided similar results. That is, no moderated mediation for either within or between group 
analyses. Within group results were as follows: SIEs (β = -1.39, 95% CI [-4.53, 1.82]), ESEs (β 
= -0.44, 95% CI [-6.19, 5.40]), and AGMs (β = 2.13, 95% CI [-4.18, 8.54]). Between group 
results were as follows: SIEs (β = -16.36, 95% CI [-54.21, 22.18]), ESEs (β = 8.35, 95% CI [      
























Index of Moderated Mediation, Social Expenditure as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome 
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -1.39 -4.53 1.82 No -16.36 -54.21 22.18 No 
ESE, First Stage -0.44 -6.19 5.40 No 8.35 -26.53 44.29 No 
AGM, First Stage 2.13 -4.18 8.54 No 1.55 -50.80 54.13 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ 
main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= 
Asylum Granted Migrant.  
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Like the results above, the results for the indirect of migrant groups on financial 
compensation through RSC and as a product of social expenditure as a first stage moderator were 
not statistically significant and almost non-existent for any of the migrant groups, regardless of 
whether the analyses was conducted within or between groups. Specifically, results showed: 
SIEs (β = -0.02, p = 0.738, SD = 5.63), ESEs (β = -0.02, p = 0.886, SD = 9.66), and AGMs (β = 
0.04, p = 0.664, SD = 10.77). Likewise, between group results were as follows: SIEs (β = -0.78, 
p = 0.502, SD = 141.58), ESEs (β = 0.45, p = 0.689, SD = 89.43), and AGMs (β = 0.05, p = 
0.976, SD = 166.15). With career achievement in place of financial compensation as the 
outcome, the results were also not significant. Within groups findings showed the following SIEs 
(β = 13.23, p = 0.737, SD = 4,807.92), ESEs (β = 10.75, p = 0.886, SD = 6,051.12), and AGMs 
(β = -36.05, p = 0.663, SD = 8,833.16). Similarly, between groups, SIEs (β = 360.26, p = 0.415, 
SD = 53,923.60), ESEs (β = -218.31, p = 0.621, SD = 35,801.98), and AGMs (β = -20.62, p = 

































Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Social Expenditure Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -0.02 0.05 5.63 0.738 -0.11 0.08 -0.78 1.16 141.58 0.502 -3.50 1.26 
ESE -0.02 0.12 9.66 0.886 -0.25 0.22 0.45 1.11 89.43 0.689 -1.58 3.03 
AGM 0.04 0.10 10.77 0.664 -0.15 0.25 0.05 1.56 166.15 0.976 -3.20 3.25 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,551 to n=14,780. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
 
Table 5.81 
Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Social Expenditure, Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 13.23 39.39 4807.92 0.737 -64.67 90.13 360.26 441.73 53923.60 0.415 -523.38 1218.20 
ESE 10.75 74.65 6051.12 0.886 -136.65 156.69 -218.31 441.66 35801.98 0.621 -1100.58 637.26 
AGM -36.05 82.64 8833.16 0.663 -199.67 125.13 -20.62 646.11 69061.76 0.975 -1307.12 1240.87 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant. 
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Collectively, as none of these results were significant, they do not support H18b (which 
hypothesized a positive relationship between social expenditure and RSC for migrants) and did 
not allow me to answer RQ9b (which asked how RSC will differ by migrant group).  
MIPEX as a moderator. MIPEX, or the Migrant Integration Policy Index which indexes the 
conditions that a legal migrant has to fulfill in European countries to be allowed to participate in 
their host society economically and politically, was tested as a first stage exploratory variable. 
There were no specific hypotheses made for this variable or research questions to answer. 
Ultimately none of the tests (that is, the direct moderation of MIPEX on RSC, the index of 
moderated mediation and the indirect effect of MIPEX on the outcome variables through RSC) 
were statistically significant, indicating that MIPEX had little to no effect on my model. All 


















































The Effects of MIPEX on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage Moderation 
 Within Effects Between Effects 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
SIE 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.768 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1.67 0.484 -0.04 0.02 
ESE 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.912 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.908 -0.02 0.02 
AGM -0.00 0.00 0.28 0.265 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.10 0.839 -0.02 0.02 
             
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked 
at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= 
Asylum Granted Migrant.  
Table 5.83 
Index of Moderated Mediation, MIPEX as Moderator, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
         
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No -0.01 -0.03 0.01 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 -0.01 0.01 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 -0.01 0.01 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week 





































Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, MIPEX Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE 0.01 0.02 2.84 0.583 -0.03 0.06 0.45 0.56 68.06 0.415 -0.45 1.77 
ESE -0.00 0.05 4.05 0.980 -0.10 0.10 0.04 0.40 32.29 0.918 -0.79 0.92 
AGM 0.03 0.05 5.12 0.572 -0.07 0.12 -0.16 0.46 49.61 0.736 -1.17 0.76 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average 
hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated 
Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted Migrant. 
Table 5.85 
Index of Moderated Mediation, MIPEX as Moderator, Career Achievement as Outcome 
 Within Between 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 
SIE, First Stage -0.10 -0.73 0.55 No 2.37 -4.15 8.96 No 
ESE, First Stage -0.05 -1.00 0.91 No -0.27 -4.84 4.35 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.70 -0.52 1.94 No -0.53 -5.52 4.49 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and 




































Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, MIPEX, Included as a First Stage Moderator 
 Within Between 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
SIE -10.89 19.76 2411.65 0.582 -49.64 27.70 -209.14 203.98 24901.13 0.305 -613.33 188.26 
ESE 0.78 31.07 2518.85 0.980 -60.22 61.52 -20.10 163.47 13251.50 0.902 -346.85 303.53 
AGM -22.25 39.19 4188.94 0.570 -99.19 54.26 68.83 191.22 20439.16 0.719 -301.82 438.74 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 
Granted Migrant. 
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The next chapter will discuss my findings. For ease of the review of the data, I added 
summary results tables below. See tables 5.87 through 5.94 for the effects of the micro level 
moderators and tables 5.95 through 5.99 for all results relating to macro level moderating 
variables. Table 5.100 provides a summary of all of my hypotheses and details whether or not 























Summary Table: The Effects of the Micro Level Moderating Variables on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage 
Moderation 





β SE SD 
p-
value 
LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
Gender 
(H6b, H7b, RQ2) 
SIE -0.06 0.04 4.42 0.104 -0.13 0.01 0.04 0.08 9.64 0.595 -0.11 0.2 
ESE -0.24*** 0.06 5.18 0.00 -0.37 -0.12 -0.10 0.10 8.49 0.333 -0.31 0.10 
AGM 0.28*** 0.06 6.87 0.000 0.15 0.4 0.19* 0.09 10.00 0.04 0.01 0.38 
Perceived 
Discrimination  
(H8b, H9, RQ3) 
SIE -0.14 0.14 16.81 0.326 -0.41 0.13 -0.79* 0.37 45.73 0.036 -1.52 -0.05 
ESE 0.45** 0.25 20.39 0.075 -0.04 0.94 -0.32 0.37 29.75 0.39 -1.04 0.40 
AGM -0.43** 0.25 26.99 0.092 -0.92 0.07 0.43 0.29 30.48 0.132 -0.13 0.99 
Cultural Distance 
(H15b, H16, RQ7) 
SIE -0.27 0.20 24.03 0.178 -0.68 0.13 -0.66 0.85 99.75 0.439 -2.34 1.02 
ESE Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM Not Produced Not Produced 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 
respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum Granted 
Migrant.  





























Summary Table: The Effects of Micro Level Moderating Variables on the Relationship Between Revised Social Capital and Financial 
Compensation, Second Stage Moderation 




β SE SD 
p-
value 





(H6b, H7b, RQ2) 
SIE 0.20*** 0.03 3.08 0.000 0.15 0.25 0.48*** 0.1168 14.26 0.000 0.25 0.71 
ESE 0.22*** 0.04 3.57 0.000 0.14 0.31 0.26 0.1815 14.71 0.149 -0.09 0.62 
AGM 0.18*** 0.02 2.52 0.000 0.13 0.23 0.26* 0.1244 13.3 0.032 0.02 0.51 
Perceived 
Discrimination 
(H8b, H9, RQ3) 
SIE -0.13** 0.07 8.63 0.064 -0.27 0.01 -0.90* 0.44 54.09 0.043 -1.76 -0.03 
ESE -0.24 0.16 12.8 0.127 -0.55 0.07 -0.63 0.75 60.45 0.401 -2.09 0.84 
AGM -0.13** 0.07 7.09 0.057 -0.26 0.00 -0.76** 0.37 39.37 0.039 -1.48 -0.04 
Cultural Distance 
(H15b, H16, RQ7) 
SIE Not Produced Not Produced 
ESE Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM Not Produced Not Produced 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours 
worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; 





























Summary Table: The Effects of Micro Level Moderating Variables on the Relationship Between Revised Social Capital and Career Achievement, 
Second Stage Moderation 
  Within Effects Between Effects 
Moderator 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL β SE SD 
p-
value LL UL 
Gender 
(H6b, H7b, RQ2) 
SIE 10.85*** 1.13 137.83 0.000 8.63 13.06 13.23*** 5.13 626.73 0.010 3.17 23.30 
ESE 13.88*** 1.86 150.42 0.000 10.24 17.51 9.34 7.60 615.95 0.219 -5.56 24.23 
AGM 7.59*** 1.09 116.56 0.000 5.45 9.73 17.52*** 5.68 606.76 0.002 6.40 28.65 
Perceived 
Discrimination 
(H8b, H9, RQ3) 
SIE -14.33*** 3.10 378.50 0.000 -20.41 -8.26 -2.30 19.19 2342.36 0.905 -39.91 35.31 
ESE -19.95*** 6.28 509.35 0.002 -32.27 -7.64 6.29 31.44 2548.63 0.841 -55.34 67.93 
AGM -6.99* 2.99 319.50 0.019 -12.84 -1.127 -4.87 16.68 1782.99 0.77 -37.58 27.82 
Cultural Distance 
(H15b, H16, RQ7) 
SIE Not produced Not produced 
ESE Not produced Not produced 
AGM Not produced Not produced 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked 
at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= 





























Summary Table: Index of Moderated Mediation, Micro Level Moderators, Financial Compensation as an Outcome 
  Within Between 
Moderator 
Migrant Type and 
Analysis Stage 
Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 




(H6b, H7b, RQ2) 
SIE, First Stage -0.02 -0.03 0.00 No 0.02 -0.07 0.14 No 
SIE, Second Stage 0.01 0.01 0.02 Yes 0.13 -0.10 0.42 No 
         
ESE, First Stage -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 Yes -0.05 -0.21 0.06 No 
ESE, Second Stage 0.00 -0.01 0.02 No 0.02 -0.09 0.17 No 
         
 AGMs, First Stage 0.08 0.04 0.12 Yes 0.11 0.003 0.27 Yes 
 AGM, Second 
Stage 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.003 Yes -0.01 -0.12 0.09 No 
Perceived 
Discrimination 
(H8b, H9, RQ3) 
SIE, First Stage -0.04 -0.11 0.04 No -0.41 -1.16 0.06 No 
SIE, Second Stage -0.01 -0.02 .000 No -0.24 -0.93 0.21 No 
         
ESE, First Stage 0.15 -0.02 0.32 No -0.15 -0.70 0.23 No 
ESE, Second Stage 0.00 -0.03 0.02 No -0.05 -0.52 0.31 No 
         
AGM, First Stage -0.12 -0.27 0.02 No 0.24 -0.07 0.69 No 
AGM, Second 
Stage 
0.01 -0.00 0.03 No 0.03 -0.28 0.34 No 
Cultural Distance  
(H15b, H16, RQ7) 
SIE, First Stage -0.07 -0.18 0.03 No -0.35 -1.63 0.61 No 
SIE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
         
ESE, First Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
ESE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
         
AGM, First Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM, Second 
Stage 
Not Produced Not Produced 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,566 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week 
























Summary Table: Index of Moderated Mediation, Micro Level Moderators, Career Achievement as Outcome 
  Within Between 
Moderator 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 




(H6b, H7b, RQ2) 
SIE, Second Stage 0.80 0.40 1.25 Yes 3.60 -2.82 12.85 No 
ESE, Second Stage 0.17 -0.78 1.12 No 0.77 -3.51 6.45 No 
AGM, Second 
Stage 
-0.66 -1.207 -0.15 Yes -0.6392 -7.11 5.77 No 
Perceived 
Discrimination 
(H8b, H9, RQ3) 
SIE, Second Stage -1.06 -1.82 -0.45 Yes -0.63 -17.16 14.61 No 
ESE, Second Stage -0.24 -1.75 1.19 No 0.52 -13.15 15.76 No 
AGM, Second 
Stage 




SIE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
ESE, Second Stage Not Produced Not Produced 
AGM, Second 
Stage 
Not Produced Not produced 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, 






























Summary Table: Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Micro Level Moderating Variables as First Stage Moderators 









SIE 0.03* 0.01 0.92 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.18 21.48 0.407 -0.13 0.56  
ESE 0.05* 0.02 1.42 0.007 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.11 9.15 0.586 -0.13 0.33  





SIE 0.02* 0.01 0.63 0.000 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.19 22.58 0.348 -0.10 0.62  
ESE 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.942 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.11 9.09 0.70 -0.16 0.31  





SIE 0.07 0.09 10.63 0.438 -0.11 0.25 -1.28 2.24 262.78 0.568 -6.35 2.75  
ESE Not produced Not produced  
AGM Not produced Not produced 
 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,566 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked 
at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= 






























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Micro Level Moderating Variables as Second Stage Moderators 




β SE SD 
p-
value 
MCLL MCUL β SE SD p-value MCLL MCUL 
Gender 
(H6b, H7b, RQ2) 
SIE 0.02*** 0.00 0.57 0.000 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.14 17.55 0.472 -0.12 0.45 
ESE 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.729 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 7.72 0.751 -0.14 0.26 
AGM -0.02* 0.01 0.94 0.011 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 10.07 0.847 -0.21 0.17 
Perceived 
Discrimination 
(H8b, H9, RQ3) 
SIE 0.02*** 0.01 0.62 0.000 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.19 23.28 0.385 -0.14 0.61 
ESE 0.00 0.01 0.9 0.727 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.11 9.01 0.722 -0.17 0.30 




SIE Not produced Not produced 
ESE Not produced Not produced 
AGM Not produced Not produced 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at 
the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in country. ESE = Employer Sponsored Expatriate; SIE= Self-Initiated Expatriate; AGM= Asylum 





























Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Micro Level Moderating Variables as Second Stage Moderators 
Moderator 
Migrant 
Status Within Between 




SIE -16.94*** 4.21 0.000 513.91 -25.27 -8.69 -67.31 63.94 7805.36 0.292 -193.50 54.64 
ESE -2.56 7.26 0.725 588.75 -16.93 11.71 -19.07 44.13 3576.97 0.666 -105.86 65.45 
AGM 20.77*** 7.92 0.009 846.75 5.168 36.33 9.25 44.22 4726.49 0.834 -78.80 93.55 
Perceived 
Discrimination 
(H8b, H9, RQ3) 
SIE -16.50*** 4.10 0.000 500.56 -24.63 -8.46 -65.90 62.6 7642.21 0.293 -189.69 53.51 
ESE -2.47 7.02 0.725 569.19 -16.38 11.28 -18.74 43.35 3513.87 0.666 -103.98 64.32 





SIE Not produced Not produced 
ESE Not produced Not produced 
AGM Not produced Not produced 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01 Sample sizes ranged from n= 6,571 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 




























Summary Table: The Effects of Macro Level Moderators on the Relationship Between Immigrant Type and Revised Social Capital, First Stage 
Moderation 
  Within Effects Between Effects 
Moderator 
Migrant 
Group β SE SD p-value LL UL β SE SD p-value LL UL 
Power Distance 
(H10b, RQ4b) 
SIE -0.10** 0.06 7.28 0.087 -0.22 0.01 0.97 1.97 238.89 0.64 -3.84 5.78 
ESE 0.23 0.17 13.33 0.17 -0.10 0.55 0.15 1.17 94.21 0.904 -2.66 2.95 




SIE 0.23*** 0.06 7.73 0.000 0.1 0.35 0.05 0.71 86.07 0.946 -1.68 1.78 
ESE -0.06 0.09 7.60 0.543 -0.24 0.13 -0.27 0.47 38.05 0.591 -1.36 0.83 




SIE -0.10*** 0.03 4.18 0.005 -0.16 -0.03 0.19 0.70 85.26 0.798 -1.50 1.88 
ESE 0.10 0.07 5.87 0.188 -0.05 0.24 0.05 0.50 39.79 0.922 -1.16 1.26 





SIE 0.15* 0.07 8.46 0.037 0.01 0.28 1.45 1.27 154.47 0.296 -1.62 4.51 
ESE 0.01 0.11 9.19 0.944 -0.22 0.23 -0.46 0.86 68.85 0.616 -2.65 1.73 





SIE 0.25*** 0.08 7.32 0.002 0.10 0.41 3.07 1.84 167.58 0.126 -1.04 7.18 
ESE -0.26** 0.14 8.58 0.07 -0.54 0.02 0.70 1.74 104.47 0.699 -3.30 4.69 





SIE 0.06 0.12 9.59 0.618 -0.17 0.29 3.26 1.76 141.15 0.104 -0.84 7.36 
ESE 0.22 0.18 9.68 0.113 -2.08 15.96 0.96 1.36 72.75 0.499 -2.19 4.12 




SIE 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.090 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.404 0.00 0.00 
ESE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.143 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.207 -0.00 0.00 




SIE 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.394 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 9.71 0.412 -0.11 0.24 
ESE 0.00 0.01 1.16 0.883 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.08 6.35 0.65 -0.21 0.14 
AGM -0.01 0.01 1.46 0.514 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.11 11.4 0.954 -0.25 0.23 
MIPEX 
(Exploratory) 
SIE 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.768 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1.67 0.484 -0.04 0.02 
ESE 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.912 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.908 -0.02 0.02 
AGM 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.265 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.1 0.839 -0.02 0.02 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,869 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the 























Summary Table: Index of Moderated Mediation, Macro Moderating Variables, Financial Compensation as Outcome 
Macro Moderating 
Variable 




Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 





SIE, First Stage -0.03 -0.06 0.00 No 0.51 -1.80 3.21 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.08 -0.03 0.19 No 0.07 -1.32 1.48 No 




SIE, First Stage 0.06 0.03 0.09 Yes 0.03 -0.88 0.94 No 
ESE, First Stage -0.02 -0.08 0.04 No -0.12 -0.79 0.38 No 




SIE, First Stage -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 Yes 0.10 -0.76 1.03 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.03 -0.02 0.08 No 0.02 -0.55 0.62 No 





SIE, First Stage 0.04 0.00 0.08 Yes 0.76 -0.6 2.77 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 -0.07 0.08 No -0.21 -1.38 0.67 No 





SIE, First Stage 0.14 0.05 0.23 Yes 2.98 -0.53 7.98 No 
ESE, First Stage -0.17 -0.36 0.01 No 0.59 -2.56 4.1 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.10 -0.06 0.26 No -1.29 -4.71 1.52 No 
Gender 
Egalitarianism, 
Female Sample Only  
(H14b, RQ6b) 
SIE, First Stage 0.01 -0.02 0.04 No 1.52 -0.21 4.26 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.02 -0.01 0.08 No 0.28 -0.78 1.88 No 
AGM, First Stage -0.04 -0.12 0.02 No -0.62 -2.05 0.43 No 
GDP Per Capita 
(H17b, RQ8b) 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 -0.00 0.00 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 
Social Expenditure 
(H18b, RQ9b) 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.01 No 0.04 -0.05 0.30 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 -0.01 0.01 No -0.02 -0.12 0.07 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.00 -0.01 0.01 No 0.00 -0.14 0.13 No 
MIPEX 
(Exploratory) 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No -0.01 -0.03 0.01 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 -0.01 0.01 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.00 -0.01 0.01 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,869 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in 

























Summary Table: Index of Moderated Mediation, Macro Moderating Variable, Career Achievement as Outcome 
 Within Between 
Macro Moderating 
Variable 
Migrant Group and 
Moderator Stage 
Est MCLL MCUL 
Moderated 
Mediation? 





SIE, First Stage 23.01 -3.01 49.41 No -234.10 -1149.08 715.68 No 
ESE, First Stage -47.11 -113.40 20.54 No -33.55 -546.52 500.42 No 




SIE, First Stage -50.67 -78.24 -22.60 Yes -12.14 -345.45 329.58 No 
ESE, First Stage 11.89 -26.00 50.29 No 60.37 -148.15 275.71 No 
AGM, First Stage 9.11 -38.20 57.25 No 52.35 -144.21 247.35 No 
In Group Collectivism 
(H13, RQ5b) 
SIE, First Stage 21.75 6.80 36.90 Yes -45.43 -375.86 293.53 No 
ESE, First Stage -19.91 -49.15 9.91 No -11.53 -231.14 213.68 No 




SIE, First Stage -32.55 -62.8 -1.79 Yes -350.79 -942.65 264.97 No 
ESE, First Stage -1.67 -47.39 44.81 No 103.93 -269.54 492.4 No 
AGM, First Stage 11.05 -42.41 65.43 No -70.12 -479.69 347.42 No 
Gender Egalitarianism, 
Male Sample Only 
(H14b, RQ6b) 
SIE, First Stage -51.33 -83.21 -19.20 Yes -717.06 -1582.14 132.08 No 
ESE, First Stage 48.59 -4.10 101.69 No -155.46 -939.97 609.48 No 
AGM, First Stage -38.71 -99.05 22.25 No 344.81 -404.78 1089.52 No 
Gender Egalitarianism, 
Female Sample Only 
(H14b, RQ6b) 
SIE, First Stage -14.47 -71.63 43.36 No -855.96 -1789.53 59.11 No 
ESE, First Stage -48.85 -129.35 32.54 No -250.54 -966.08 443.28 No 
AGM, First Stage 60.57 -33.67 155.64 No 376.01 -267.62 1010.24 No 
GDP Per Capita 
(H17b, RQ8b) 
SIE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No -0.01 -0.02 0.01 No 
ESE, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 0.01 -0.01 0.03 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.00 0.00 0.00 No -0.01 -0.03 0.01 No 
Social Expenditure 
(H18b, RQ9b) 
SIE, First Stage -1.39 -4.53 1.82 No -16.36 -54.21 22.18 No 
ESE, First Stage -0.44 -6.19 5.40 No 8.35 -26.53 44.29 No 
AGM, First Stage 2.13 -4.18 8.54 No 1.55 -50.8 54.13 No 
MIPEX 
(Exploratory) 
SIE, First Stage -0.10 -0.73 0.55 No 2.37 -4.15 8.96 No 
ESE, First Stage -0.05 -1.00 0.91 No -0.27 -4.84 4.35 No 
AGM, First Stage 0.70 -0.52 1.94 No -0.53 -5.52 4.49 No 
Note. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,869 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ main job, per week and time spent in 






















Summary Table: Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Financial Compensation, Macro Level Moderators Included as a First Stage Moderators 











SIE 0.16* 0.08 10.20 0.05 0.00 0.33 -2.63 6.19 752.05 0.671 -16.55 9.26 
ESE -0.38 0.28 22.82 0.178 -0.94 0.17 -0.41 3.21 258.47 0.898 -7.40 6.36 




SIE -0.21*** 0.07 8.36 0.002 -0.35 -0.08 -0.10 1.77 214.98 0.953 -3.85 3.63 
ESE 0.08 0.13 10.83 0.546 -0.18 0.35 0.28 1.13 90.78 0.802 -1.94 2.91 




SIE 0.14*** 0.04 5.40 0.001 0.06 0.23 -0.35 1.92 232.93 0.853 -4.52 3.58 
ESE -0.14 0.11 8.69 0.200 -0.35 0.07 -0.15 1.17 94.25 0.901 -2.71 2.31 





SIE -0.10** 0.06 7.54 0.094 -0.23 0.02 -2.59 2.95 358.7 0.38 -9.47 2.12 
ESE -0.01 0.13 10.46 0.945 -0.26 0.25 0.66 1.75 140.42 0.703 -2.51 4.77 
AGM 0.02 0.12 12.3 0.839 -0.2 0.25 -0.49 1.81 192.97 0.784 -4.38 3.1 
Gender 
Egalitarianism, 
Male Sample Only 
(H14b, RQ6b) 
SIE -0.43* 0.15 13.93 0.005 -0.74 -0.14 -10.6 7.43 678.69 0.154 -27.89 1.47 
ESE 0.46 0.32 19.00 0.148 -0.17 1.11 -2.13 5.79 347.31 0.713 -14.9 9.40 






SIE -0.01 0.05 4.31 0.832 -0.12 0.10 -5.35 3.92 314.72 0.172 -14.71 0.50 
ESE -0.06 0.07 3.97 0.459 -0.23 0.08 -0.97 2.23 119.46 0.664 -6.60 2.84 
AGM 0.10 0.12 8.41 0.389 -0.13 0.35 2.17 2.21 155.85 0.325 -1.54 7.19 
GDP Per Capita 
(H17b, RQ8b) 
SIE 0.00 0.01 1.59 0.779 -0.02 0.03 -0.27 0.56 68.77 0.632 -1.58 0.77 
ESE 0.06 0.04 3.49 0.167 -0.02 0.15 1.24 1.36 110.38 0.362 -0.75 4.57 
AGM -0.06 0.04 4.09 0.138 -0.13 0.02 -1.44 1.18 125.49 0.221 -4.17 0.50 
Social Expenditure 
(H18b, RQ9b) 
SIE -0.02 0.05 5.63 0.738 -0.11 0.08 -0.78 1.16 141.58 0.502 -3.5 1.26 
ESE -0.02 0.12 9.66 0.886 -0.25 0.22 0.45 1.11 89.43 0.689 -1.58 3.03 
AGM 0.04 0.10 10.77 0.664 -0.15 0.25 0.05 1.56 166.15 0.976 -3.2 3.25 
MIPEX 
(Exploratory) 
SIE 0.01 0.02 2.84 0.583 -0.03 0.06 0.45 0.56 68.06 0.415 -0.45 1.77 
ESE -0.00 0.05 4.05 0.98 -0.1 0.1 0.04 0.40 32.29 0.918 -0.79 0.92 
AGM 0.03 0.05 5.12 0.572 -0.07 0.12 -0.16 0.46 49.61 0.736 -1.17 0.76 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,869 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ 




































SIE -140.14* 70.39 8592.56 0.047 -279.19 -2.81 1209.55 2449.7 299043.57 0.622 -3677.74 5918.11 
ESE 239.03 174.28 14127.30 0.170 -106.1 578.74 202.6 1317.24 106777.40 0.878 -2429.08 2724.05 




SIE 180.73*** 56.63 6913.02 0.001 68.83 291.00 47.76 718.18 87670.78 0.947 -1379.32 1434.63 
ESE -50.87 83.58 6775.27 0.543 -216.56 112.00 -139.08 458.08 37132.98 0.761 -1042.81 744.26 




SIE -121.66*** 36.43 4446.65 0.001 -193.65 -50.46 163.25 774.75 94577 0.833 -1376.47 1655.15 
ESE 86.65 66.41 5383.67 0.192 -44.62 216.02 71.40 480.42 38943.67 0.882 -877.65 1002.99 





SIE 88.62** 52.24 6377.22 0.09 -14.80 190.64 1192.64 1059.09 129287.3 0.26 -909.47 3236.52 
ESE 5.58 80.84 6553.23 0.945 -154.38 163.23 -325.78 695.92 56412.77 0.64 -1722.33 1004.33 






SIE 156.11* 54.16 4969.78 0.004 48.93 263.50 2553.89** 1465.5 134483.4 0.081 -338.81 5508.15 
ESE -133.98 91.53 5547.38 0.143 -314.25 48.35 565.48 1415.3 85774.41 0.69 -2234.89 3415.82 






SIE 20.99 96.95 7804.97 0.829 -170.54 213.08 3010.17** 1545.19 124394.6 0.051 -37.67 6129.68 
ESE 121.52 139.89 7530.51 0.385 -154.18 399.26 860.13 1265.67 68135.02 0.497 -1644.75 3419.87 
AGM -143.41 164.24 11612.69 0.383 -467.27 183.45 -1328.79 1147.45 81128.78 0.247 -3602.67 970.57 
GDP Per Capita 
(H17b, RQ8b) 
SIE -3.10 11.02 1345 0.778 -24.73 18.36 124.50 221.46 27034.27 0.574 -317.99 562.03 
ESE -37.33 26.48 2146.38 0.159 -89.54 14.23 -609.63 452.62 36690.19 0.178 -1521.92 247.71 




SIE 13.23 39.39 4807.92 0.737 -64.67 90.13 360.26 441.73 53923.6 0.415 -523.38 1218.2 
ESE 10.75 74.65 6051.12 0.886 -136.65 156.69 -218.31 441.66 35801.98 0.621 -1100.58 637.26 
AGM -36.05 82.64 8833.16 0.663 -199.67 125.13 -20.62 646.11 69061.76 0.975 -1307.12 1240.87 
MIPEX 
(Exploratory) 
SIE -10.89 19.76 2411.65 0.582 -49.64 27.7 -209.14 203.98 24901.13 0.305 -613.33 188.26 
ESE 0.78 31.07 2518.85 0.98 -60.22 61.52 -20.1 163.47 13251.5 0.902 -346.85 303.53 






















Summary Table: Test for Indirect Effects of Migrant Status on Career Achievement, Macro Level Moderators Included as a First Stage Moderators 
Note. *=p<0.05. **=p< 0.10. ***= p<0.01. Sample sizes ranged from n= 2,898 to n=14,902. Models controlled for number of average hours worked at the respondents’ 


































Summary Table: Results by Hypothesis Number 
  Supported? 
Hypothesis Number Hypothesis Within Groups Between Groups 
H1b (without 
covariates) 
AGMs will have lower levels of SC resources than either ESEs 
or SIEs 
Yes No 
H1b (with covariates) Yes No 
RQ1b (without 
covariates) Are there differences between ESEs and SIEs in the levels of 
SC Resources? 
Being an ESE is more beneficial to RSC 
than being an SIE 
No clear findings 
RQ1b (with covariates) 
Being an SIE is more beneficial to RSC 
than being an ESE 
No clear findings 
H3 (without 
covariates) 
SC resources positively relate to H3a) financial compensation 
and H3b) career achievement such that migrants with more SC 












covariates) SC resources mediate the relationship between immigrant type 





H5 (with covariates) 
H5a) Yes, for SIEs and AGMs only 




Gender moderates the relationship between immigrant type 
and social capital such that being male will result in higher 
levels of RSC for AGMs than for SIEs and ESEs.  
Yes, for AGMs only Yes for AGMs only 
H7 
Gender moderates the relationship between career-related 
resources and career outcomes such that being male will result 
in higher levels of both H7a) financial compensation and H7b) 
career achievement for SIEs when compared to AGMS and 
ESEs.  
H7a) Yes, for SIEs only 




How will the effect of gender on RQ2a) career-related 
resources and RQ2b) career outcomes differ by immigrant 
type? 
RQ2a) When gender is a first stage 
moderator, it is beneficial to male AGMs 
only. When gender is a second stage 
moderator, it is beneficial to male SIEs 
only. 
RQ2b) When gender is a second stage 
moderator, it is beneficial to male SIEs 
only. 
RQ2a) When gender is a 
first stage moderator, it 
is beneficial to male 
AGMs only. 
 























Summary Table: Results by Hypothesis Number 
H8b 
Immigrants’ perceived discrimination moderates the 
relationship between immigrant type and social capital such 
that high levels of perceived discrimination will lead to lower 
levels of human and social capital among AGMs in 
comparison to both SIEs and ESEs.   
Yes, for AGMs only No 
H9 
Immigrants’ reported perceived discrimination moderates the 
relationship between career-related resources and career 
outcomes such that higher levels of perceived discrimination 
will lead to lower H9a) financial compensation and H9b) 
career success for SIEs when compared to both ESEs and 
AGMs.  
H9a) No 




How will the effects of perceived discrimination on RQ3a) 
career-related resources and RQ3b) career outcomes differ by 
immigrant type? 
RQ3a) No clear findings 
RQ3b) Perceived discrimination is harmful 
to SIEs and but not to AGMs 
RQ3a) No clear findings 
RQ3b) No clear findings 
H10b 
Migrants in lower power distance cultures will have higher 
levels of social capital than those in higher power distance 
cultures 
Yes, for SIEs only No 
RQ4b 
Which group, ESEs, SIEs, or AGMs will have higher levels of 
social capital, as power distance increases? 
No clear findings No clear findings 
H12 
National levels of institutional collectivism (INC) will relate 
negatively to levels of social capital. That is, the higher the 
national levels of institutional collectivism the lower the levels 
of social capital in migrants.  
Yes, for SIEs only. No 
H13 
National levels of in-group collectivism (IGC) will relate 
negatively to levels of social capital. That is, I expect that the 
higher the national levels of in-group collectivism increases, 
the lower the levels of social capital in migrants. 
Yes, for SIEs only and only when the model 




As collectivism increases, which immigrant group, ESEs, 
SIEs, or AGMs will have the highest levels of RQ5b) social 
capital? 























Summary Table: Results by Hypothesis Number 
H14b 
Gender egalitarianism moderate the relationship between the 
immigrants’ migrant status and social capital resources such 
that there are smaller gender differences in high gender 
egalitarian countries than in low gender egalitarian countries. 
No No 
RQ6b 
What effect will immigrant type have on the accumulation of 
social capital resources as gender egalitarianism increases? 
How will this differ across genders? 
No clear findings No clear findings 
H15b 
Cultural distance moderates the relationship between 
immigrant type and social capital such that migrants 
experiencing lower levels of cultural distance will have higher 
levels of these resources than those experiencing higher levels 
of cultural distance 
No No 
H16 
Cultural distance moderates the relationship between career-
related resources and career outcomes such that migrants 
experiencing lower levels of cultural distance will have higher  
H16a) financial compensation and H16b) career achievement 






Does cultural distance have differing effects on RQ7a) career-
related resources RQ7b) career-related outcomes among ESEs, 
SIEs, and AGMs? 
No clear findings No clear findings 
H17b 
GDP moderates the relationship between immigrant type and 
career-related resources such that migrants living in countries 
with higher GDP will have higher social capital resources than 
migrants living in countries with lower GDP. 
No No 
RQ8b 
Which group, SIEs, ESEs or AGMs, will have higher levels of 
social capital, as GDP increases? 
No clear findings No clear findings 
H18b 
Social expenditure moderates the relationship between 
immigrant type and career-related resources such that migrants 
living in countries with higher social expenditure will have 
higher social capital resources than migrants living in countries 
with lower social expenditures. 
No No 
RQ9b 
Which group, SIEs, ESEs or AGMs, will have higher levels of 
social capital, as social expenditure increases? 
No clear findings No clear findings 
Exploratory MIPEX- tested as an exploratory variable. No clear findings No clear findings 





The overarching purpose of my study was to explore the career related outcomes of three 
migrant groups (SIE, ESE, AGMs), post migration, cross nationally. My goal was to compare 
these three migrant groups against each other and draw conclusions using a single study model, 
across the groups. Although a large body of literature exists about migrants and migration, much 
of it fails to compare these groups cross-nationally. Existing research is often restricted to one 
migrant group (usually ESEs) in one or a handful of countries (failing to compare it to other 
migrant groups) or consists of multiple migrant groups within the same country (failing to 
compare these groups across countries) (Al Ariss & Ozbilgin, 2010; Cangiano, 2014; Doherty, 
2010; Dofinherty et al., 2013; Ollier-Malaterre & Foucreault, 2017). Therefore, I sought to create 
a study using a single design and dataset which allowed me to make these cross-national, cross-
migrant group comparisons and draw conclusions.  
As such, I combined data from six datasets which allowed me to create these 
comparisons across 25 countries. The primary dataset I used was the EULFS and its Ad-hoc 
module title Migration and the Labor Market. These data were merged with data from O*NET 
(Cross-walked with the ISCO-08 to make the data applicable to my European sample), Project 
GLOBE country scores, MIPEX, and the OECD’s GDP Per Capita and Social Expenditure 
indicators. These data were then integrated and analyzed in a multilevel moderated mediation 
model containing one mediator (RSC), three micro level moderators (Perceived Discrimination, 
Gender, Cultural Distance) and seven macro level moderators (Gender Egalitarianism, Power 
Distance, In-group Collectivism, Institutional Collectivism, GDP Per capita, Social Expenditure, 
and MIPEX scores). These mediating and moderating variables were selected due to their 
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integral roles in existing research studying migrants, career success, or both. To test my 
predictions, I used a single model, identical in all analyses (one model for each unique 
moderator) with the exception of the migrant group which allowed me to make cross migrant 
group comparisons. This comparison between migrant groups advances prior calls to expand 
migrant research to both study asylum seekers, post migration, and to begin to better understand 
some of the mechanisms which impact migrant career success in host countries.  
My results suggest that career outcomes, post-migration differ greatly for each of the 
migrant groups, dependent on both individual factors (e.g., gender) and country level factors 
(e.g., culture), primarily within groups, but that these results within groups often vary greatly (as 
shown by large standard deviations and standard errors). Between group (between country) 
findings were largely not statistically significant but are discussed below where relevant.  
In examining the effects of individual level factors (i.e., gender and perceived 
discrimination) on financial compensation, result collectively found that AGMs faced the largest 
reduction in their financial compensation, post migration, while results for ESEs and SIEs 
(where available, more details below) were generally positive and beneficial to their financial 
compensation. Interestingly, the results for career achievement were the largely the opposite, 
with AGMs’ succeeding more in their career achievement than SIEs or ESEs. This pattern of 
reverse results for financial compensation and career achievement is a theme that extends 
throughout my results and will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  
Results for the macro level moderating variables (i.e., national culture, national policies, 
MIPEX scores) were less amenable to drawing comparisons between groups as most results were 
only statistically significant for SIEs, but not ESEs or AGMs, within groups. These and any other 
migrant group findings will be discussed below. Three moderators (i.e., Cultural Distance, Social 
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Expenditure, and MIPEX scores) were found not to have statistically significant results and 
therefore will not be discussed in this section. This chapter will start with a summary of my 
findings, followed by empirical contributions, practical implications, study limitations, 
suggestions for future research and final conclusions.  
Summary of Findings 
Migrants and RSC, Direct Effect 
The first groupings of analyses were tests of the direct paths leading from migrant type to 
RSC and RSC to career outcomes (financial compensation and career achievement). My primary 
arguments were that AGMs will have lower levels of RSC than ESEs or SIEs post migration. I 
also wanted to test the direct effect of RSC on financial compensation and career achievement. 
These arguments were made in line with both social capital theory and existing research on 
migrants described earlier in my paper.  
Two key patterns of findings emerged when testing these relationships (in support of my 
arguments above). First, AGMs generally did, in fact, have lower RSC and career outcomes 
(both financial compensation and career achievement) than the other two migrant groups (within 
groups, regardless of the inclusion of covariates) and b) the inclusion of covariates (hours 
worked by the migrant and time in country) changed the strength and/or directionality of findings 
across all three migrant groups, within groups. Between group results were not statistically 
significant and therefore will not be discussed.  
The first finding, that AGMs showed reduced RSC post migration and this reduction was 
greater than that of SIEs or ESEs, was in line with what I posed in my paper. As I noted when I 
posed this hypothesis, it is possible that this finding was due to the unique challenges faced by 
these migrants pre- and post-migration, including the fracturing of their social networks in their 
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country of origin prior to migration (usually due to war or persecution), difficulties interacting 
with locals in their host countries (as a result of challenges with local language or culture), 
stereotyping by local populations, and lack of access to resources offered to other types of 
migrants (Mohamed & Vyas, 2019), among other potential reasons. 
Of note with these results, however, is that after the inclusion of the covariates, these 
negative effects were mitigated (but were still negative), suggesting that exposure to others in the 
AGMs’ adopted country (either in the form of paid labor or simply being in the country) is 
beneficial to AGMs’ RSC. Likewise, results for SIEs and ESEs changed after the inclusion of 
covariates in my model. Results for SIEs went from having a negative effect on RSC to having a 
positive effect while results for ESEs changed from being statistically significant (and positive) 
to not significant. As there is evidence that increased access to social group and improved social 
cohesion generally support social capital building (Cheong et al., 2007), it is very likely that the 
time spent in a country and/ or the hours engaged in paid labor may improve immigrant access to 
local social and work networks building greater social capital. Nevertheless, the mechanisms by 
which and environment in which this social capital building may occur is still unclear and should 
be researched further.  
RSC and Career Outcomes, Direct Effect 
The second path to be examined asked about the relationship between RSC and career 
outcomes (both financial compensation and career achievement). I posed that migrants with 
greater RSC will obtain greater financial compensation and career achievement. These 
arguments were made in line with both social capital theory and existing research on migrants 
described earlier in my paper.  
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Interestingly, four patterns of results emerged from these analyses, across all three 
migrant groups, within groups only. First, the effect of RSC on financial compensation was 
positive (strongest for ESEs, weakest for AGMs), second, the effect of RSC on career 
achievement was negative (strongest for AGMs, weakest for ESEs), third (and summarizing the 
prior two patterns), effect of RSC on both financial compensation and career achievement was 
the most beneficial to ESEs and least beneficial to AGMs, and lastly the effect of RSC on both 
financial compensation and career achievement was mitigated once the covariates were added to 
my model. Said differently, accounting for the covariates in my model brought all results closer 
to zero (meaning, positive effects on financial compensation were reduced and negative effects 
on career achievement became less negative). Also worth noting, the opposite patterns of 
relationships found in the first and second patterns note above (positive effect of RSC on 
financial compensation and negative effect of RSC on career achievement) occur consistently 
throughout the results. These will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.   
The first findings (the positive effect of RSC on financial compensation) was expected 
and in line with existing literature. There is ample evidence that ESEs receive organizational 
support (e.g., training in the foreign language and culture, access to a social network abroad) 
when arriving abroad (Dickmann et al., 2016), something that is not likely to occur for SIEs and 
AGMs. Moreover, as mentioned prior, AGMs appear to face the greatest challenges post 
migration, with adaptation to their host country being costly to their social capital (Chiswick & 
Miller, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that social capital among ESEs is more beneficial to 
financial compensation than that of AGMs. 
The surprising finding, however, was that these results were reversed when career 
achievement was the outcome such that increased RSC was actually detrimental to career 
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success. This is unexpected as there are strong correlations between career achievement and 
financial compensation. It was my expectation that patterns of results for both financial 
compensation and career achievement would generally be similar. Nevertheless, these findings 
are not without precedent. Lin and colleagues (1981a, 1981b) conceptualized social capital 
resource theory around the nature of the resources embedded within one’s network. They argued 
that one’s the relationship between one’s social network and career success is not necessarily a 
product of size or strength of social network, but rather the ability of one’s ties to reach someone 
with the type of resources required for the individual to achieve their objectives. Therefore, one’s 
social network occupational prestige (that is, the occupational prestige of those in one’s social 
network) was positively related to prestige of the job secured by the individual (Lin et al., 1981a, 
1981b; De Graaf & Flap, 1988; Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988). It therefore makes sense that if 
one’s social network does not hold highly prestigious roles (as is likely the case for many 
migrants into a new country) (Kanas et al., 2009; Nee & Sanders, 2001), the migrants will 
struggle to work in prestigious jobs. Likewise, as migrants spend time in their host country, they 
may improve their social networks (particularly in the case of ESEs and possibly SIEs) bettering 
its effects on career achievement (Cheong et al., 2007) (pattern four, above).  
Largely keeping to the patterns above the between group results were similar. When 
examining variable relationships with financial compensation as the outcome variable, the 
between group patterns were identical to the within group patterns prior to the inclusion of the 
covariates (that is, RSC was beneficial to financial compensation across all three groups where it 
was most beneficial to ESEs and least beneficial to AGMs). Testing the model with covariate 
inclusion found a reduction in these effects (like the within group results). When reviewing the 
between group findings for career achievement, the aforementioned pattern of RSC being 
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harmful to career achievement held true as did the reduction of these effects across all three 
groups after covariate inclusion. Collectively, explanations of the between group findings are 
likely largely similar to those for the within group findings and therefore apply cross-nationally, 
across different cultures and migration policies.  
Testing for Mediation 
The next test I conducted was a test for mediation, examining how RSC mediated the 
relationship between migrant type and career outcomes. Four noteworthy patterns emerged from 
these results. The first was that the variance accounted for by RSC in the relationship between 
migrant status and career outcomes (financial compensation and career achievement) was largest 
for AGMs, in all within group analyses, both before and after the inclusion of model covariates. 
Second, the variance accounted for by RSC on the relationship between immigrant status and 
career achievement were much larger than those for financial compensation, across all three 
migrant groups, within groups. Third, all effect sizes shrunk once the covariates were introduced 
into the model (similar to prior findings). Finally, and in conjunction with patterns emerging 
when comparing results towards financial compensation and career achievement, the 
directionality of relationships between migrant type and financial compensation were the 
opposite of those between migrant type and career achievement. Only the first two patterns will 
be discussed in this section. Pattern three was discussed above (and the reasoning does not 
change with these findings) and pattern four will be discussed later in this section. Between 
group results for these analyses were not statistically significant and therefore will not be 
discussed.  
The first pattern is consistent with prior literature which argued that social capital and 
social networks, including the resources they entail, can be among the most important beneficial 
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resources to an immigrant’s labor market performance, particularly if these migrants arrived on 
their own and without a prior network (De Graaf & Flap, 1988; Drever & Hoffmeister, 2008). 
Moreover, particularly among migrants who migrate due to fear or persecution (such as refugees 
or asylum seekers), social networks and social capital play one of the most important roles in 
their ability to find employment, in some cases, more so than national and social policies 
(Cheung & Phillimore, 2014; Peters & Vink, 2016). It therefore expected that the role of RSC is 
most important in the career success of AGMs. What is less clear is why the variance accounted 
for by RSC in the relationship between immigrant type and career achievement was so much 
greater than on financial compensation (pattern two).  
Among the possible reasons for my finding are that immigrants often choose to self-
employ rather than network to find salaried opportunities, as a solution to unemployment and 
poverty (Waldinger et al., 2006; Yoon, 1991), thereby forgoing or reducing emphasis on social 
networks to find work. Likewise, juxtaposing the conceptualization of social capital resource 
theory by Lin et al. (1981a, 1981b) (discussed in the prior section), with literature stating that 
immigrants predominantly maintain contact with member of their own ethnic group (rather than 
expand their social networks to national natives or other ethnic groups) (Kanas et al., 2009), 
another possibility is that migrants’ achievement of career prestige is heavily dependent on their 
social network, but their financial compensation is not. That is to say, they may be able to find 
high paying work with reduced prestige alone or through a minimal network of their peers, but 
they may struggle to find high prestige work without a high prestige social network.  
Collectively, however, this differential influence of RSC on financial compensation and 
career success is a call for more research on these findings. Future studies may benefit from 
examining both the different types of social networks and social capital as well as any cognitive, 
MIGRATION AND WORK 258 
 
 
affective, or behavioral components in how social capital is actually used to determine migrant 
financial compensation and career achievement and how these may differ by migrant group.  
Moderators and Moderated Mediation 
Individual Level Moderating Variables.  
Career Outcomes of Migrants by Gender. As nearly half of all global migrants 
worldwide are female (O’Neil et al., 2016), I thought it important to examine gender as part of 
my model. Existing literature around women in the workplace regularly finds the existence of a 
gender wage and career success gap, but poses multiple reasons for this gap (Becker, 1985; Lips, 
2012; Correll et al., 2007; Goldin, 2014). Moreover, this gap extends job type, having been 
found in unskilled labor, managerial positions, STEM fields (Science, Technology, Engineering 
and Mathematics), entrepreneurial, and high status, high pay positions (Catalyst, 2014; Cohen et 
al., 2009; Cooke et al., 2019; Office for National Statistics, 2016; Padavic & Reskin, 2002; 
Reshma et al., 2016). While there are exceptions to these findings and multiple reasons for such 
discrepancies (e.g., stereotyping, individual career choices), the literature largely indicates that 
these gaps exist and favor men. There is also evidence of gender-based differences in the 
acquisition and maintenance of social capital networks among both men and women, such that 
women’s networks are typically smaller and lower in the professional hierarchy than those of 
men (Lee, 2010; Lin, 2000) reducing both access to and acquisition of social capital. With this in 
mind, I expected that general patterns of findings would largely favor men in the workplace such 
that men will generally fare better than women across all migrant groups with respect to their 
RSC, career achievement, and financial compensation.  
The results, however, were surprising. The only general pattern of relationships which 
emerged from examining these groups by gender was that being male was beneficial to male 
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SIEs’ RSC, financial compensation and career achievement in almost all analyses. However, 
being male was not always beneficial to other migrant groups and in some cases, harmful to their 
financial compensation (such as in the case of ESEs) and career achievement (such as in the case 
of AGMs). Likewise, the between effects results were largely not significant, but the few that 
were followed these patterns.  
A possible reason for the results among SIEs is that this group represents the widest, most 
diverse segment of the migrant population (in terms of origin country and qualifications prior to 
migration) making them the most similar to the general non-migrant workforce (Al Ariss & 
Ozbilgin, 2010; Al Ariss, 2010; Farcas & Gonclaves, 2017; Selmer & Lauring, 2012). It is 
therefore possible that treatment of SIEs largely mimics general findings about gender and 
workplace success.  
Research about ESEs and AGMs, however, does not easily explain my findings and more 
often than not, negates them. Literature specific to ESEs for example, argues that gender does 
have noticeable effect on both salary and career success among ESEs such that it’s beneficial to 
males (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2011; Suutari et al., 2017). Likewise, female ESEs are often 
underutilized leading to a reduction in salary compared to male ESEs (Andresen et al., 2015). 
Findings about AGM women in the workplace supports the notion (argued above) that women’s 
employment, post migration is often driven by their social networks and in some cases social 
expectations (Nawyn, 2010). Likewise, women in particular, often face multiple barriers which 
hinder their career progression, including organizations not recognizing their right to work as 
refugees (Magqibelo et al., 2016), xenophobic attacks (Amataika, 2013), and traditional gender 
stereotyping that exists towards women in the workplace in most societies (Sandberg, 2013). 
Moreover, women often prioritize seeking quick employment allowing for basic commodities for 
MIGRATION AND WORK 260 
 
 
survival rather than developing a career (Nyabvudzi & Chiyamurindi, 2019). Collectively, the 
inconsistent patterns in these results indicate that more research is needed on the intersection 
between the migrant type, gender, and migrants job successes post migration to better understand 
how the effects of gender on career success differs by migrant type. It is also possible that these 
findings, like all results in models which include moderators would be different without the 
inclusion of my model covariates (as covariates were included in all analyses with moderators).  
Perceived Discrimination as a Moderator. General consensus in European scholarship is 
that there is ongoing anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe (Czaika & Di Lillo, 2018; Fekete, 
2004; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019; Kuntz et al., 2017; Pichler 2010; Peach & Glebe, 1995; 
Zolberg & Long, 1999). This anti-immigrant sentiment, often manifesting in various forms of 
discrimination, results in lower life satisfaction and reduced feelings of social integration for 
immigrants (when compared to natives) and has been attributed to migrants’ perceptions of 
discriminatory treatment post migration (Safi, 2009). Additionally, discrimination threat by 
others towards migrants and as perceived by the migrants themselves are key and crucial barriers 
to migrant employment, post migration (Aronson, 2008; Binggeli et al., 2013; Booth et al., 2012; 
Campion, 2018; Duffy et al., 2016). It is for these reasons that I proposed to examine the effects 
of perceived discrimination (as perceived by the migrants) on revised social capital and career 
related outcomes, by migrant group. Specifically, I argued that perceived discrimination will 
generally harm both revised social capital and career outcomes (financial compensation and 
career achievement) for migrants, regardless of migrant type.  
Two consistent result patterns emerged from these analyses. The first was that AGMs 
achieved reduced RSC and reduced financial compensation when experiencing high perceived 
discrimination. The second was that among all three migrant groups, the second stage 
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conditional process analysis (that is the direct effect of RSC on career achievement) was 
negative. This meant that increased perceived discrimination resulted in decreased career 
achievement across all three migrant groups. Other results for migrant groups (e.g., the indirect 
effects of the migrant group on the career related) varied by migrant group. Between effects 
results were largely not statistically significant, but the few that were followed the 
aforementioned patterns.  
Collectively, both patterns mentioned above were to be expected. What was unexpected, 
however, was the occurrence of positive relationships certain between migrant types and career 
outcomes. Thus, for example, among SIEs, the indirect effects of migrant status on financial 
compensation indicated that high perceptions of discrimination resulted in increased financial 
compensation. Similar results were found for the indirect effect of AGMs on career achievement. 
I highlight these results as they go against general consensus in existing literature on the effects 
of discrimination on work related success and are a call to explore these patterns further. 
Discrimination is a pervasive social obstacle for the assimilation of any migrant group. However, 
research in general has been limited when examining migrant groups cross-culturally or in 
specific countries (Andriessen et al., 2012; Campion, 2018; Drydakis & Vlassis, 2007; 
McGinnity & Lunn, 2011; Midtboen, 2012; Safi, 2009). Therefore, additional research is needed 
to understand exactly how the effects of perceived discrimination impact the career outcomes of 
different migrant groups. An intra-individual approach, for example, using an experience 
sampling method or a diary study could allow researchers to capture a details of the role of 
perceived discrimination in a migrants’ career related behaviors, post migration. Alternatively, 
self-report measures asking migrants about their experiences with discrimination and/or 
perception of discrimination as well as their social network building behavior and/or career 
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search behaviors can help researchers understand how perceived discrimination actually affects 
migrants’ social network expansion or self-guided career development, post migration.  
Macro level results 
Culture and Social Policies. Cultural values (Power Distance, Institutional-Collectivism, 
In-Group Collectivism, and Gender Egalitarianism) and national policies (GDP Per Capita) were 
tested as country level moderators in my model. The findings for cultural values will be 
discussed first followed by the findings national policies. General patterns of relationships 
showed that almost all cultural values played a role in both the relationship between migrant type 
and RSC and in the indirect effect of migrant type on both financial compensation and career 
success. Moreover, these results were statistically significant for SIEs, within groups only, 
regardless of whether the outcome variable was financial compensation or career achievement. 
The two exceptions to these patterns occurred when gender egalitarianism was entered into my 
model. That is, gender egalitarianism was harmful to female AGMs’ and male ESEs’ RSC, 
within groups and the indirect effects of gender egalitarianism on career achievement was such 
that high gender egalitarianism was helpful to both male and female SIEs, between groups. No 
other between group results were found.  
These general patterns noted above were largely grouped by cultural value. Specifically, 
power distance and in-group collectivism moderated the relationships in my model such that 
high levels of these cultural values were harmful to RSC (as hypothesized) and career 
achievement but helpful to financial compensation. However, surprisingly, institutional 
collectivism and gender egalitarianism (both for the whole group and for males only) moderated 
these relationships such that high levels of these cultural values were helpful to RSC and career 
achievement but harmful to financial compensation. Noteworthy also is that almost all results for 
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career success and financial compensation were in opposition to each other, as has been a 
consistent pattern in my study thus far. 
The unexpected patterns of relationships between social capital and institutional 
collectivism were not as I predicted, but not necessarily a surprising as there is ample evidence 
supporting the positive relationship between individualism and RSC (Beilmann et al., 2018; 
Gheroghiu et al., 2009; Realo & Alik, 2009). Nevertheless, these studies often examined 
individualism-collectivism as a singular construct (as defined by Hofstede in 1980) and not as 
two separate constructs, as distinguished by project GLOBE and as defined in my study (House 
& Javidan, 2004), suggesting that future research may benefit from examining the relationships 
between migrants and institutional or in-group collectivism separately.  
The results around gender egalitarianism, particularly the results stating that high gender 
egalitarianism is helpful to men’s RSC but then indirectly harmful to their financial capital, were 
not expected, but were not without precedent in the literature. There is some evidence that 
immigrant men may experience a pattern of downward mobility in their work environment, post 
migration which is accompanied by a reduced accumulation of and access to wealth (Fernández-
Kelly & Garcia 1990; Idema & Pahlet, 2007; Roder & Muhlau, 2014). This occurs in part due to 
the unfamiliar gender norms of the countries to which they migrate and trouble accumulating 
social resources (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994).  
As my findings primarily offered statistically significant results for SIEs, perhaps future 
research should focus on the relationships between the acceptance of host country gender 
egalitarianism norms by the migrant and their financial compensation, post migration. Likewise, 
these countries may choose to compare the differences between genders as the aforementioned 
patterns of downward mobility seem to apply primarily to men.  
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Results around GDP per capita were statistically significant, but almost nonexistent (β = 
0.00), for the effects of migrant status on RSC for SIEs, within groups only. No other results 
(within or between groups) were found. This, surprisingly, meant that GDP per Capita 
definitively had little to no effect on RSC for SIEs.  
To attempt and explain this result, I examined existing literature around this relationship. 
In doing so, I found an interesting pattern of publications. Specifically, while I tested the 
relationship with GDP per capita as a predictor, studies primarily tend to test the relationships 
between these two variables by placing it as the outcome. That is, existing research either 
examines correlations between these two variables or the effects of Social Capital 
(conceptualized differently, depending on the study) on GDP per capita (not GDP per capita on 
social capital as was done in my study). See for example, work by Bartolini and Sarracino 
(2014), Helliwell and Putnam (1995), or Salahuddin et al., (2016). My findings are as they are 
because GDP per capita, in fact, has no effect on RSC or perhaps more research is needed in this 
area.  
Overall Summary of Results 
In summation, this dissertation largely found that the career outcomes of migrant types 
did, in fact, vary between the groups. Among the findings comparing all three groups, AGMs 
often fared the worst while ESEs fared the best. Moreover, I unexpectedly found evidence that 
time spent in a country by migrants or hours spent in the work environment mitigated some of 
the negative effects of migration on career outcomes. Other findings showed that individual level 
factors such as gender and perceptions of discrimination and country level factors, such as 
culture, did in fact, matter to the social capital and career outcomes of these migrants. Not all 
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patterns of relationships were as expected, nor were patterns consistent across models, 
suggesting there is room for future research exploring these relationships.  
In reviewing these results collectively, one additional pattern appeared consistently: an 
inverse relationship between financial compensation and career achievement results (meaning 
that models which showed patterns beneficial to financial compensation also generally found a 
harmful effect on career achievement). This result is unexpected as there is consistent evidence 
examining extrinsic career successes (defined as both salary and occupational prestige) stating 
that both salary and occupational prestige follow a pattern where an increase in one generally 
coincides with an increase in the other. There are, of course, exceptions as not all employees 
working at the same occupational prestige earn the same salary (Georgellis et al., 2019), 
however, a study by Kleinjans and colleagues (2017), for example, found that there is generally a 
correlation of 0.73 between the two. The authors argued that typical high prestige occupations 
often also pay well (e.g., lawyers, physicians) while typical low prestige occupations often do not 
(e.g., cashiers and movers). Likewise, a study by Converse and colleagues (2012) examined 
extrinsic career success (defined as both salary and occupational prestige) and found similar 
patterns (if prestige increased, so did one’s salary).  
While it is possible to engage in an occupation where prestige and pay are not aligned 
(e.g., the role of computer programmer which pays well, but has a reduced prestige score relative 
to their pay) (Kleinjans et al., 2017) and while differences exist in the methodology used and the 
definitions of prestige and salary across the aforementioned studies and my study, these do not 
explain the consistently opposite pattern of outcomes which emerged in my study.  
One possible reason for my findings stems from a research about immigrants into the 
United States. There is some consensus that using social capital to assist in finding paid labor 
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had different effects on different migrant groups’ salary and prestige. Specifically, using social 
capital to assist with finding work, post migration into the United States, was detrimental to the 
occupational prestige (but not pay) of Asian migrants (Sanders et al., 2002; Tegegne, 2015), but 
had little to no effect or a positive effect on the labor market outcomes of Black and Hispanic 
immigrants (Aguilera & Massey, 2003; Tegegne, 2015). Moreover, these authors argue that it is 
possible that use of social capital networks as a way to paid labor compensates for deficiencies in 
other constructs related to paid labor (e.g., accessibility to employment opportunities, job search 
strategies, human capital) (Aguilera & Massey 2003; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Tegegne, 2015). 
Therefore, perhaps my findings would be different if I examined these patterns in relation to 
migrant groups’ ethnicities or countries of origin.  
Additional cross-sectional studies surveying these migrant groups may also help clarify 
these findings. One possibility is that immigrant groups from certain countries or ethnicities have 
a less extensive network of job opportunities than other migrant groups or natives, a network of 
job opportunities only in certain industries, and/or face greater discrimination in finding work. In 
their search for work, they may prefer to choose prestige over salary or salary over prestige, but 
struggle to attain both. Future research should explore these ideas further keeping migrant 
ethnicity or national origin in mind, not just migrant type. 
Empirical Contributions 
             As mentioned prior, my review of the available literature studying migrants career 
success, post migration suggested that prior studies on these groups was greatly limited to either 
single migrant groups, studied cross-nationally or single country comparisons of multiple 
migrant groups. Moreover, studies about AGMs as a standalone group and studies comparing 
AGMs to SIEs and ESEs were greatly limited and there have been research calls to study 
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migrants cross-nationally and comparatively (Al Ariss & Ozbilgin, 2010; Cangiano, 2014; 
Doherty, 2010; Ollier- Malaterre & Foucreault, 2017). To answer these calls, and in contrast to 
existing research, my study used well established theory and constructs, and existing national 
policies (e.g., RSC, project GLOBE values, GDP Per Capita) to generate and test hypotheses 
which allowed a clearer understanding of the relationships between migrant types, RSC, 
individual factors (e.g., gender), national factors (e.g., culture, policy), and career success, post 
migration. Moreover, this was done using a single theoretical framework which allowed for clear 
comparisons of migrant groups, across countries. The findings of my dissertation contribute to 
existing research as they may serve as a springboard for future cross-national or migrant 
comparative studies. My study design can be modified to include alternate migrant relevant 
variables. Likewise, the patterns of relationships found in my study create a foundation for 
further exploration of these relationships (some of which were discussed earlier).  
 Another advantage of my study was the breadth of my sample and the dataset itself. The 
EULFS standardizes its survey process making it a very large, representative, sample of migrants 
into European countries (Kogan, 2006). This dataset provided migrants’ country of origin, 
allowing for a qualitative understand of where these migrants originated, and a data point which 
was rarely offered in other similar household surveys. It also provided a consistent lens through 
which to explore these migrants (e.g., data such as migrant salary and education were offered by 
the EULFS in ways which allowed for comparisons across countries without data manipulation). 
The EULFS team generally ensures high validity and reliability of the questionnaire and data 
collected by using duplication or substation of responses, carrying out quality checks and 
ensuring a minimal sample size from every represented country (Rendall et al., 2003). This 
extensive, realistic, and representative sample of migrants did not restrict migrant work types, 
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salaries, education, job prestige, or other work-related qualifications and achievements, pre- and 
post-migration, as is often the case in existing migrant databases and research. This allowed for a 
broad comparison across different types of employees engaged in paid labor. Notably, my study 
also included AGMs as a comparison group, a group that is often neglected in migrant research, 
particularly in comparison to other migrant groups (Al Ariss & Ozbilgin, 2010; Cangiano, 2014; 
Doherty, 2010) allowing for an overall better understanding of the relationships between migrant 
types and career outcomes, post migration.  
Another strength is the use of multilevel analyses which allowed for the test of 
fundamental relationships within groups while accounting for the importance of social context 
also affecting these population groups (countries). Using a multilevel model made it possible to 
examine migrant groups by cluster and see existing patterns on an individual level while still 
accounting for the constraints imposed by country level culture and policies. This allowed me to 
generalize results to a wider population than a test of a migrant groups in a single country or tests 
of a single migrant group.  
Lastly, my study contributes in its use of the MLMED Macro for SPSS. This 
computational Macro is still in its beta stage, but it has been shown to obtain comparable 
multilevel analyses results to other available software alternatives (e.g., MPlus and R) with 
greater parsimony in the estimation of all parameters of the model (Rockwood, 2017). My 
dissertation tested an analytical model containing data from multiple sources (adding complexity 
to the analyses) with imbalanced cell sizes. These data also reflect the reality of the migrant 
experience and often had to be formatted to use in MLMED (e.g., by converting ordinal to 
continuous scales). Collectively, the complexity of the data with the broad tested model provided 
a “stress-test” of MLMED allowing for a better understanding of the many benefits but also 
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potential limitations of this macro. In conducting this “stress-test” my analysis ultimately faced 
some challenges. These are discussed in greater detail in the limitations section below.   
Practical Implications 
Migration is multifaceted and includes all types of voluntary and involuntary movements 
of populations for multiple reasons. Migrants migrate with an array of differences in 
demographic, economic socio-cultural, and psychological issues which influence the patterns and 
directions of human migration (Swain, 2019). Globally, the number of migrants is rising and 
expected to continue to rise for the foreseeable future (UN International Migration Report, 2015; 
International Migration Outlook, 2017; Swain, 2019). Currently, an estimated 5% of the total EU 
population (or about 21.8 million people) are estimated to be migrants (The European Council, 
2020) making the need to understand migrants ever pressing.  
The practical implications of my work somewhat differ by migrant group. This is because 
of the differences in the nature of each migrant group discussed in my paper, and the different 
outcome for these migrant groups. Below I discuss three practical implications of my study- 
implications for migrant policies, programs, and for organizations.  
Implications for Policies on Migrant Discrimination.  
Among my study results, I found that perceived discrimination by the migrants 
themselves was harmful to migrants’ RSC, financial compensation, and career achievement in 
varying degrees across the three migrant groups. These results suggest that feelings of 
discrimination among migrants (particularly among SIEs and AGMs) are robust and prominent 
enough to harm their development of social capital, financial compensation, and/or career 
achievement for one or both groups. 
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Europe already has general and robust anti-discrimination policies in place (European 
Commission, 2019) such that all residents of the European Union, regardless of citizenship 
status, are protected by law from discrimination in access to work or at work on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin and religion (European Commission, 2014). However, perceptions of 
discrimination may likely stem from actual discrimination, be it overt (e.g., disparate treatment, 
bullying) or subtle (e.g., microaggressions, normalized unintentional interpersonal 
discrimination) (Jones et al., 2013; Safi, 2009) indicating that there is more work needed in the 
development and implementation of anti-discrimination policies and programs in Europe 
addressing both overt and subtle forms of discrimination, which are often less likely to be 
addressed in the laws (Jones et al., 2013).   
The development of anti-discrimination policies can admittedly be tricky as there are 
everchanging laws surrounding the integration of migrants into European countries (European 
Commission, 2019). Anti-discrimination policies and programs are currently either headed by 
the general governing bodies of the European Union or occur on a national and local level 
(European Commission, 2019). These laws will therefore differ by country and often result in an 
inequitable distribution of national responsibility for taking care of migrants, particularly AGMs 
in many European countries (European Commission, 2019).  
Nevertheless, some policy changes which may help reduce feelings of discrimination 
experienced by migrants include the introduction and enforcement of policies aimed at 
increasing the visibility of migrants (e.g., by having them participate in local or national 
governments, in media). Additionally, policies to combat prejudice, such as the strict 
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, may help combat discrimination. Similar to the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 in the United States, equal pay for equal work may help reduce feelings of 
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discrimination among migrants in the workforce. Lastly, an increased focus on creating and 
enforcing legislation to combat subtle discrimination and reduce migrants’ exposure to this type 
of treatment may also be beneficial in reducing the experience of (and by extension, the feelings 
which follow) discrimination among migrants  
Education and social inclusion policies may also help. The enactment of programs for 
native about migrants and migrants about natives may improve mutual understanding and 
integration and prevent ethnic based racism, xenophobia, and hate speech effectively reducing 
feelings (and likely the experience of) discrimination by migrants. Similarly, programs such as 
intercultural team sports or community activities (such as film or cultural programs) may 
improve intercultural dialogue.  
Regardless of the policies, the enactment of these in an efficient way, equitably across 
countries and with a sensitivity towards the unique culture of each host country and of the 
migrant’s country of origin is key in ensuring that these policies are effective. 
Implications for Integration Programs  
My study provides clear evidence that migrant groups, particularly SIEs and AGMs, and 
particularly early in their arrival, struggle to develop their social capital post migration. These 
findings may offer practical utility to European policymakers planning for migrant integration. 
As my results indicate that the time migrants spend in a country reduces their challenges with 
developing a social network (albeit the challenges still exist regardless of time spent in their host 
country), it appears there is a particular need for early integration and programs for migrants. 
These may include language classes pre- or immediately post-arrival, job related training (e.g., 
upskilling, assistance with the transfer of foreign credentials, training on job market norms in the 
host culture), assistance with asylum requests (where relevant), one-on-one resettlement 
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counselors, and perhaps programs which help migrants integrate with the local population rather 
than only their own social circle.  
Programs such as these, which are based on existing migrant research, may help migrants 
integrate better into their host countries. Programs which teach a migrant how to integrate into 
the host country, develop a social network, and navigate the local job market are particularly 
important as my study also found that low social capital results in challenges achieving high 
prestige careers. Early integration of migrants into a local economy has a positive fiscal net 
contribution if they are integrated early in the labor market (OECD, 2013)  
Implications for Employers  
Among the consistent findings in my study was that culture moderated the relationships 
between SIEs and their financial compensation or career achievement. While my study was not 
designed to identify the exact reasons for the moderating effects of culture on these migrants, the 
results were clear in showing that these effects of culture exist. Therefore, while future studies 
may choose survey or diary based study designs to identify the exact reasons for the effects of 
culture on these migrants, my findings are enough to alert organizations to the effects of local 
national culture on migrant workforce integration and success. 
 As culture is highly pervasive and influential on a person’s behaviors (Foster 2000), 
organizations may wish to invest time and money into strategies for assisting non-ESE migrants 
adapt cross-nationally (similar to the strategies in place for ESEs), which are likely to provide a 
return on investment at a later date (McNulty & Tharenou, 2004). Such programs may include 
cultural adaptation training on subjects such as cultural norms in the host country, which can 
prove useful in helping SIEs transition to their new work environment (Abdullah & Jin, 2015). 
These trainings may include education about facial expressions, body language, etiquette, body 
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contact, and spatial awareness (such as appropriate levels of personal space between two 
persons), all elements of culture which can be taught (Taras et al., 2011). Likewise, programs 
which assist with the familiarization of the local language may prove beneficial to SIEs.  
Beyond integration programs for the workers themselves, organizations may choose to 
offer integration programs to the migrants’ spouse or family. As is often the case when families 
move for work, the spouse may not initially work, making them more likely to interact with the 
local population in their day-to-day (Shaffer & Harrison, 2001). Programs to assist with spousal 
integration may benefit the spouse’s quality of life and create an environment more amenable to 
the SIE’s long term employment at the organization thereby serving the interests of both 
employee and organization. Generally, the more distant the culture, the tougher it is to adapt to 
(Black et al., 1999) so programs such as those mentioned above may be in the best interest of 
both migrants and the organizations which hire them. 
Study Limitations 
As is true of all research, no study is without its potential limitations and these limitations 
are for researchers to express and understand when interpreting study results. My study is no 
exception. First and foremost, while I addressed the many benefits of using the EULFS in my 
paper above (namely a common set of questions, variables, and definitions administered across 
the entire sample of participating countries, collecting data on socio-economic characteristics 
typically only found in administrative sources making comparisons between responses very 
high) (Rendall et al.,  2003), this dataset is not without its challenges. There is some concern that 
household surveys, such as the EULFS, may under-represent immigrant populations. This may 
be due to migrants’ reluctance to answer government sponsored surveys and/or language 
difficulties which may reduce the immigrant participation (Rendall et al., 2003). Similarly, as the 
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EULFS depends, in part, on country registers (a national registry of all residents within a 
country; not applicable in all countries) to identify their sample, and as some migrants 
(particularly newly arrived migrants) may be slow to register, the survey may not reach some 
migrant groups to collect their response, increasing sampling bias and potentially limiting the 
generalizability of my findings. Moreover, as all EULFS data are self-report, there may be some 
response bias present in the data, resulting in the overestimation or underestimation of certain 
findings. Both the sampling bias and the response bias are of particular concern for my study as 
its intent is to study migrants (including very recent migrants and migrant groups which may be 
slow to register such as AGMs ) and understand their experiences. A potential inability to collect 
data from all migrant groups or to collect responses of limited accuracy from the survey 
respondents may not allow for an accurate representation of the migrant experience.  
Additionally, natural limitations which come with archival studies and should also be 
considered when interpreting my study results are concerns about uneven sample sizes and 
construct validity of measures. Sample sizes from each country often vary, in part due to the 
differences in country size and in part because some countries mandate responses to the EULFS 
and others do not. Likewise, as the EULFS requires a minimum number of responses per country 
prior to including the data in the larger dataset (to avoid the publication of statistically unreliable 
data) but as these response rates depend on population size, they vary greatly as well (Rendall et 
al., 2003). While my study supplied sufficient power to detect conditional effects, the sizeable 
imbalances across subgroups (e.g., migrant groups, countries) may have skewed the results, 
which should therefore be interpreted with caution.  
The concern about construct validity is also not unique to archival studies and is of 
particular concern in my study as evidenced by the challenges I had when attempting to extract 
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factors representing human capital and social capital (my initially proposed mediating variables). 
Generally, the items used in my study were most similar to items used in prior studies and based 
in existing theory, but no measure included an exact range of items found in published scales for 
any given construct. In the particular case of items selected to create the human and social capital 
measures, the items stemmed from more than one data source (i.e., EULFS and O*NET) further 
complicating my attempt at constructing a single scale (as the data originated at different times 
using different samples). Despite my attempts at extracting single factors representing these 
constructs (e.g., by using rotations or by altering the range of items) I was not able to create a 
single measure of human or social capital (as originally proposed) resulting in the creation of an 
alternative revised social capital measure (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) 
 Another study limitation is the non-experimental, cross-sectional nature of the data. As 
this study was based in archival data, it contained no control group, making it difficult to draw 
definitive causal conclusions from the findings. Likewise, the data did not allow for the 
examination of financial compensation or career success within each individual or within 
specific job titles. Said differently, while my study examined career outcomes across individuals, 
it is possible that these outcomes differ based on one’s specific job title and/or one’s specific 
career level (e.g., a senior manager compared to an entry-level position). This is a potential 
confound of my results and something I was not able to explore in detail. Moreover, while these 
data would be interesting to examine longitudinally, the cross-sectional nature was required as 
the 2014 Ad-Hoc module collecting migrant data is administered sparingly by the EULFS. 
Therefore, my study cannot provide information about the fluctuation of relationships over time.  
 Another concern which emerged as I was analyzing my data, is the use of MLMED to 
test real-world, complex nature of these data. The data used in my study reflect the reality of the 
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experiences of migrants, as collected through the EULFS. This combined with the use of 
multiple additional datasets created a complex, often imbalanced, dataset for which in hindsight, 
MLMED may not have been the best analytical tool. I initially selected MLMED as my 
statistical analysis program as it seemed to be the best fit for the analytical needs of my model. 
Ultimately however, the tool was not as adept as I expected at handling the type (e.g., largely 
categorical, heavily skewed) and size of my dataset. Attempts were made to fit all data into the 
single primary analytical tool (MLMED) and many analyses were conducted in a piecemeal 
fashion rather than across multiple groups (e.g., analyzing each migrant group separately) in 
order to ensure my analyses were completed as hypothesized. Future research may benefit from 
analyzing data originating from a single source focusing on these groups and use a different tool 
(e.g. MPlus, R) for a more streamlined analytical process.  
Lastly, my study set out to compare migrant groups cross-nationally. Nevertheless, the 
majority of my moderated mediation results were only significant for SIEs groups. As SIEs are 
often the most diverse type of migrant (Al Ariss & Ozbilgin, 2010; Al Ariss, 2010; Farcas & 
Gonclaves, 2017; Selmer & Lauring, 2012) it may be difficult to generalize many of my findings 
to other to other migrant groups such as ESEs and AGMs who migrate due to unique needs. 
Future research will need to obtain a sufficient amount of data from these other migrants groups 
and explore them further. Similarly, as my dataset consisted primarily of migrants into European 
countries, there may be some limitations in the generalizability of these findings to other 
continents. Nevertheless, this limitation is mitigated by my examination of cultural values and 
national policies rather than the countries themselves. Specifically, the patterns of my findings 
depend on low vs. high cultural values and types of national policies. It is therefore theoretically 
possible to extend these findings to other, non-European cultures, as the patterns of relationships 
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are expected to be similar with similar cultural dimensions in other cultures. One noteworthy 
caveat however, is that my data consisted primarily of migrants to European countries from other 
European countries, Africa, and the Middle East making my findings arguably less generalizable 
to migrants from the Americas and Oceania where drivers and results of migration may be 
different. That said, results from future studies on other continents and for other migrant groups 
may still be beneficial in exploring and supporting the generalization of my findings.  
Future Research  
My dissertation answered recent calls by researchers to expand focus onto the different 
migrant groups and their experiences with paid labor (Ollier- Malaterre & Foucreault, 2017) 
including a need for research on SIEs and AGMs (Al Ariss & Ozbilgin, 2010; Cangiano, 2014; 
Doherty, 2010). While this study did find that RSC mediated some of the relationships between 
migrant type and career success and that these relationships were moderated by both individual 
and country level factors, more research is needed to examine these complex relationships, build 
theory further, and inform practitioners on how and why these relationships occur. Some 
suggestions for future research have already been interspersed throughout this chapter. However, 
there are number of other research areas also ripe for future research and worth mentioning.  
First, future work should further examine the counterintuitive relationship between 
financial compensation and career achievement. Although the reverse patterns of these 
relationships are not unheard of, general consensus on these pattern states that they often rise and 
fall together such that high financial compensation and high career achievement go hand in hand 
(Kleinjans et al., 2017). Future work should investigate these relationships to determine if there 
is something unique to research about migrants driving this reversal of these relationships. If my 
findings are replicated, subsequent studies should attempt to understand why these findings are 
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as they are. This could be done through longitudinal study designs tracking migrants career 
success immediately post migration and over time. Likewise, a longitudinal approach to the 
development of migrants’ social capital may also provide insight into migrants’ adaptation to a 
host country and the development of their work-related resources over time. Alternatively, a 
quasi-experimental, experimental, or even a diary study asking migrants for their attitudes or 
behavioral motivators may help explain these findings. It may be, for example, that among 
specific groups of migrants’ financial compensation is prioritized over career success (or the 
opposite may hold true), depending on the unique needs of the migrant group.  
Another avenue for research is to replicate these findings either with MLMED or other 
appropriate research tools. If these findings are replicated, subsequent research may choose to 
explore these relationships using a piecemeal approach. That is, examine, for example, why time 
in country or hours spent at work (my covariates) reduce the effects of migrant status on RSC so 
dramatically, why the effects of RSC on financial compensation were so much weaker than that 
of RSC on career achievement, or why social policies such as GDP Per capita had little to no 
effect on the relationships in my model. Examining this model on a smaller scale, perhaps using 
a single dataset as the study sample, may provide greater insight into why these relationships are 
occurring.  
Conclusions 
Overall, my study found that RSC levels, financial compensation and career achievement 
ultimately differed by migrant groups such that AGMs usually fared the worst and ESEs fared 
the best when these effects were examined directly. Moreover, RSC did, in fact, mediate the 
relationships between migrant type and financial compensation or career achievement and many 
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of these results were moderated by both individual level factors (such as perceptions of 
discrimination) and national level factors (such as culture; particularly in the case of SIEs).  
While the patterns which emerged from my study provide a foundation for much additional 
research, evidence of these patterns, in a cross-national comparison setting and across multiple 
migrant groups, is an initial step in towards understanding some of the work-related needs of 
migrants who move cross-nationally. Ultimately the results of my study can be used as a 
foundation for future research and to impart guidance on policies and social programs aimed at 
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